Christian Nennemann 553de3a2b7 feat: interactive REPL with auto-setup, auto-join, encrypted local storage
REPL auto-setup (zero-friction startup):
- OnceLock → RwLock for CLIENT_AUTH to allow delayed init after OPAQUE login
- Extract opaque_register/opaque_login helpers from one-shot commands
- Token cache (.session file) with QPCE encryption when password provided
- Add --username/--password/--state-password to repl subcommand
- resolve_access_token: auto-register + login, cache token, prompt interactively
- rpassword for secure password input (no echo)

Interactive REPL (multi-conversation):
- SessionState: identity, hybrid key, ConversationStore, per-conversation GroupMembers
- ConversationStore: SQLite-backed conversations + messages with full CRUD
- Slash commands: /dm, /group, /invite, /join, /switch, /list, /members, /history, /whoami
- Background polling (1s interval) with auto-join from MLS Welcome messages
- pending_member pattern: persistent keystore for HPKE init key, replenish after join
- Self-DM handled as local-only notepad (no MLS/server channel)
- ANSI display module for colored prompts, incoming messages, status/error output

Username resolution:
- resolveIdentity RPC (@20 in node.capnp): look up username by identity key
- Server: resolve_identity_key in Store trait, FileBackedStore, SqlStore
- Client: resolve_identity in rpc.rs, used in auto-join for peer display names
- resolveUser: bidirectional lookup (username → identity key)

Encrypted local storage (nothing in cleartext):
- ConversationStore uses SQLCipher when --state-password is provided
- Argon2id key derivation with per-database random salt (.convdb-salt, mode 0600)
- Transparent migration of existing unencrypted databases via sqlcipher_export
- Token cache encrypted with QPCE format (Argon2id + ChaCha20Poly1305)

Server changes:
- resolveIdentity + resolveUser RPC handlers with auth + validation
- Auth: sealed-sender identity binding on enqueue, channel member authorization
- Delivery: hybrid decrypt attempts, identity key validation on enqueue
- Config: --allow-sealed-sender flag for anonymous delivery mode
- zeroize added to server dependencies

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 22:45:34 +01:00

quicnprotochat

End-to-end encrypted group messaging over QUIC + TLS 1.3 + MLS (RFC 9420), written in Rust.

Every byte on the wire is protected by a QUIC transport secured with TLS 1.3 (quinn + rustls). The inner MLS layer provides post-compromise security and ratcheted group key agreement across any number of participants. Messages are framed with Cap'n Proto, keeping serialisation zero-copy and schema-versioned.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│          Application / MLS ciphertext        │  <- group key ratchet (RFC 9420)
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              Cap'n Proto RPC                │  <- typed, schema-versioned framing
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│        QUIC + TLS 1.3 (quinn/rustls)        │  <- mutual auth + transport secrecy
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Property Mechanism
Transport confidentiality TLS 1.3 over QUIC (rustls)
Transport authentication TLS 1.3 server cert (self-signed by default)
Group key agreement MLS MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519
Post-compromise security MLS epoch ratchet
Identity Ed25519 (MLS credential + leaf node signature)
Message framing Cap'n Proto (unpacked wire format)

Documentation

Full documentation is available as an mdBook wiki in docs/:

# Install mdBook (once)
cargo install mdbook

# Build and serve locally
mdbook serve docs
# Open http://localhost:3000

Highlights


Quick start

# Prerequisites: Rust 1.77+, capnp CLI
brew install capnp          # macOS
# apt-get install capnproto # Debian/Ubuntu

# GUI prerequisites (Linux only) — WebKitGTK + GTK3 for Tauri 2
# sudo apt install -y libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev libgtk-3-dev libglib2.0-dev libssl-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev librsvg2-dev patchelf

# Build and test
cargo build --workspace
cargo test --workspace

# Start the server (port 7000 by default)
cargo run -p quicnprotochat-server

# Or via a config file (TOML)
# Note: auth_token = "devtoken" and db_key = "" are for development only.
# Production: set QUICNPROTOCHAT_AUTH_TOKEN to a strong secret and (when store_backend = "sql")
# set QUICNPROTOCHAT_DB_KEY so the database is encrypted. Empty db_key = plaintext DB (insecure).
cat > quicnprotochat-server.toml <<'EOF'
listen = "0.0.0.0:7000"
data_dir = "data"
tls_cert = "data/server-cert.der"
tls_key = "data/server-key.der"
auth_token = "devtoken"
store_backend = "file" # or "sql"
db_path = "data/quicnprotochat.db"
db_key = ""
EOF
cargo run -p quicnprotochat-server -- --config quicnprotochat-server.toml

# Run the two-party demo
cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- demo-group \
  --server 127.0.0.1:7000

# Interactive 1:1 chat (after creating a group and inviting a peer)
# Terminal 1: quicnprotochat chat --peer-key <other_identity_hex>
# Terminal 2: quicnprotochat chat --peer-key <first_identity_hex>
# Type messages and press Enter; incoming messages appear as [peer] <msg>. Ctrl+D to exit.

See the full demo walkthrough for a step-by-step guide.


Milestones

# Name Status What it adds
M1 QUIC/TLS transport Done QUIC + TLS 1.3 endpoint, length-prefixed framing, Ping/Pong
M2 Authentication Service Done Ed25519 identity, KeyPackage generation, AS upload/fetch
M3 Delivery Service + MLS groups Done DS relay, GroupMember create/join/add/send/recv
M4 Group CLI subcommands Done Persistent CLI (create-group, invite, join, send, recv), OPAQUE login
M5 Multi-party groups Done N > 2 members, Commit fan-out, send --all, epoch sync
M6 Persistence Done SQLite/SQLCipher, migrations, durable server + client state
M7 Post-quantum Next PQ hybrid for MLS/HPKE (X25519 + ML-KEM-768)

Building without the GUI

To build only the server and CLI client (faster, no Tauri/WebKit):

cargo build -p quicnprotochat-server -p quicnprotochat-client

Core and proto crates are built as dependencies. Omit quicnprotochat-gui and quicnprotochat-p2p if you don't need them.


Security notes

This is a proof-of-concept research project. It has not undergone a formal third-party audit. See the threat model for what is and isn't protected, and the security audit for an internal review of authentication, crypto, transport, and authorization.

  • Dependency checks: Run cargo install cargo-audit && cargo audit to check for known vulnerabilities.
  • Certificate pinning: Use the server's certificate as --ca-cert (e.g. copy server-cert.der from the server) so the client only trusts that server; see Certificate pinning in the security audit.

Production deployment: Set QUICNPROTOCHAT_PRODUCTION=1 and provide a strong QUICNPROTOCHAT_AUTH_TOKEN (not devtoken). When using store_backend = "sql", set QUICNPROTOCHAT_DB_KEY; an empty key leaves the database unencrypted on disk.


License

MIT

Description
End-to-end encrypted messaging over QUIC + TLS 1.3 + MLS (RFC 9420), written in Rust.
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