Privacy Hardening (Sprint 10): - Server --redact-logs flag: SHA-256 hashed identity prefixes in audit logs, payload_len omitted when enabled - Client /privacy command suite: redact-keys on|off, auto-clear with duration parsing, padding on|off for traffic analysis resistance - Forward secrecy: /verify-fs checks MLS epoch advancement, /rotate-all-keys rotates MLS leaf + hybrid KEM keypair - Dummy message type (0x09): constant-rate traffic padding every 30s, silently discarded by recipients, serialize_dummy() + parse support - delete_messages_before() for auto-clear in ConversationStore Multi-Device Support (Sprint 11): - Device registry: registerDevice @24, listDevices @25, revokeDevice @26 RPCs with Device struct (deviceId, deviceName, registeredAt) - Server storage: devices table (migration 008), max 5 per identity, E029_DEVICE_LIMIT and E030_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND error codes - Device cleanup integrated into deleteAccount transaction - Client REPL: /devices, /register-device <name>, /revoke-device <id> 72 core + 35 server tests pass.
155 lines
8.5 KiB
Cap'n Proto
155 lines
8.5 KiB
Cap'n Proto
# node.capnp — Unified quicproquo node RPC interface.
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#
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# Combines Authentication and Delivery operations into a single service.
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#
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# ID generated with: capnp id
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@0xd5ca5648a9cc1c28;
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interface NodeService {
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# Upload a single-use KeyPackage for later retrieval by peers.
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# identityKey : Ed25519 public key bytes (32 bytes)
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# package : TLS-encoded openmls KeyPackage
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# auth : Auth context (version=1, non-empty accessToken required).
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uploadKeyPackage @0 (identityKey :Data, package :Data, auth :Auth) -> (fingerprint :Data);
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# Fetch and atomically remove one KeyPackage for a given identity key.
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# Returns empty Data if none are stored.
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fetchKeyPackage @1 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (package :Data);
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# Enqueue an opaque payload for delivery to a recipient.
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# channelId : Optional channel identifier (empty for default). A 16-byte UUID
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# is recommended for 1:1 channels.
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# version : Schema/wire version. Must be 1.
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# Returns the monotonically increasing per-inbox sequence number assigned to this message,
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# plus a cryptographic delivery proof (96 bytes: 32-byte SHA-256 preimage || 64-byte Ed25519
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# signature). Old clients that do not read deliveryProof are unaffected (Cap'n Proto optional).
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enqueue @2 (recipientKey :Data, payload :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth, ttlSecs :UInt32) -> (seq :UInt64, deliveryProof :Data);
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# Fetch and drain all queued payloads for the recipient.
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# limit: max number of messages to return (0 = fetch all).
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# Returns envelopes with per-inbox sequence numbers for ordered MLS processing.
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fetch @3 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth, limit :UInt32) -> (payloads :List(Envelope));
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# Long-poll: wait up to timeoutMs for new payloads, then drain queue.
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# limit: max number of messages to return (0 = fetch all).
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# Returns envelopes with per-inbox sequence numbers for ordered MLS processing.
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fetchWait @4 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, timeoutMs :UInt64, auth :Auth, limit :UInt32) -> (payloads :List(Envelope));
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# Health probe for readiness/liveness.
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health @5 () -> (status :Text);
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# Upload the hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) public key for sealed envelope encryption.
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uploadHybridKey @6 (identityKey :Data, hybridPublicKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Fetch a peer's hybrid public key (for post-quantum envelope encryption).
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fetchHybridKey @7 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (hybridPublicKey :Data);
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# ── OPAQUE password-authenticated registration ──────────────────────────
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# Start OPAQUE registration: client sends blinded password element.
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opaqueRegisterStart @8 (username :Text, request :Data) -> (response :Data);
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# Finish OPAQUE registration: client uploads sealed credential envelope.
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opaqueRegisterFinish @9 (username :Text, upload :Data, identityKey :Data) -> (success :Bool);
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# ── OPAQUE password-authenticated login ─────────────────────────────────
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# Start OPAQUE login: client sends credential request.
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opaqueLoginStart @10 (username :Text, request :Data) -> (response :Data);
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# Finish OPAQUE login: client sends credential finalization, receives session token.
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opaqueLoginFinish @11 (username :Text, finalization :Data, identityKey :Data) -> (sessionToken :Data);
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# ── P2P endpoint discovery ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Publish this node's iroh endpoint address for P2P connectivity.
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# nodeAddr is the serialized iroh NodeAddr (JSON or custom encoding).
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publishEndpoint @12 (identityKey :Data, nodeAddr :Data, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Resolve a peer's iroh endpoint for direct P2P connection.
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resolveEndpoint @13 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (nodeAddr :Data);
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# Peek at queued payloads without removing them (non-destructive read).
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# Returns envelopes sorted by seq. Use `ack` to remove processed messages.
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peek @14 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth, limit :UInt32) -> (payloads :List(Envelope));
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# Acknowledge (remove) all messages up to and including the given sequence number.
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ack @15 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, seqUpTo :UInt64, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Fetch multiple peers' hybrid public keys in a single round-trip.
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fetchHybridKeys @16 (identityKeys :List(Data), auth :Auth) -> (keys :List(Data));
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# Enqueue the same payload to multiple recipients in a single round-trip.
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batchEnqueue @17 (recipientKeys :List(Data), payload :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth, ttlSecs :UInt32) -> (seqs :List(UInt64));
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# Create a 1:1 channel between the caller and the given peer. Returns a 16-byte channelId (UUID).
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# Both members can enqueue/fetch for this channel; recipientKey must be the other member.
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# wasNew is true iff this call created the channel; false if it already existed.
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# The caller who receives wasNew=true is the MLS group initiator and must send the Welcome.
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# The caller who receives wasNew=false must wait for the peer's Welcome via the background poller.
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createChannel @18 (peerKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (channelId :Data, wasNew :Bool);
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# Resolve a username to its Ed25519 identity key (32 bytes).
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# Returns empty Data if the username is not registered.
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# inclusionProof : bincode-serialised InclusionProof from quicproquo-kt, proving the
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# (username, identityKey) binding is in the server's append-only Merkle log.
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# Empty when the log entry is not yet available (e.g. legacy server or new registration
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# that has not been committed to the log). Clients should verify when non-empty.
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resolveUser @19 (username :Text, auth :Auth) -> (identityKey :Data, inclusionProof :Data);
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# Reverse lookup: resolve an Ed25519 identity key to the registered username.
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# Returns empty Text if the identity key is not associated with any user.
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resolveIdentity @20 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (username :Text);
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# Upload a blob chunk. The server reassembles chunks and verifies SHA-256 on completion.
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# blobHash : expected SHA-256 hash (32 bytes) of the complete blob.
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# chunk : raw bytes for this segment.
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# offset : byte offset within the blob where this chunk starts.
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# totalSize : total size of the complete blob in bytes.
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# mimeType : MIME type of the blob (e.g. "image/png").
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# Returns blobId = blobHash once the blob is fully uploaded and verified.
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uploadBlob @21 (auth :Auth, blobHash :Data, chunk :Data, offset :UInt64, totalSize :UInt64, mimeType :Text) -> (blobId :Data);
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# Download a blob chunk. Returns up to `length` bytes starting at `offset`.
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# blobId : the blob identifier (SHA-256 hash returned by uploadBlob).
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# offset : byte offset within the blob to start reading from.
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# length : maximum number of bytes to return (capped at 256 KB).
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# Returns the requested chunk, the total blob size, and its MIME type.
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downloadBlob @22 (auth :Auth, blobId :Data, offset :UInt64, length :UInt32) -> (chunk :Data, totalSize :UInt64, mimeType :Text);
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# Permanently delete the authenticated user's account and all associated data.
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# Requires an identity-bound session (OPAQUE login). Removes user record,
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# identity keys, key packages, hybrid keys, queued messages, and channel memberships.
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# A tombstone entry is added to the KT log for auditability.
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# All active sessions for the identity are invalidated.
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deleteAccount @23 (auth :Auth) -> (success :Bool);
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# Register a device for the authenticated identity. Max 5 devices per identity.
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registerDevice @24 (auth :Auth, deviceId :Data, deviceName :Text) -> (success :Bool);
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# List all registered devices for the authenticated identity.
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listDevices @25 (auth :Auth) -> (devices :List(Device));
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# Revoke (remove) a registered device.
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revokeDevice @26 (auth :Auth, deviceId :Data) -> (success :Bool);
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}
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struct Auth {
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version @0 :UInt16; # 1 = token-based auth (required)
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accessToken @1 :Data; # opaque bearer token issued at login
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deviceId @2 :Data; # optional UUID bytes for auditing/rate limiting
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}
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struct Device {
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deviceId @0 :Data;
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deviceName @1 :Text;
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registeredAt @2 :UInt64;
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}
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# A delivery envelope pairing a per-inbox sequence number with an opaque payload.
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# Clients sort by `seq` before processing to guarantee MLS commit ordering.
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struct Envelope {
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seq @0 :UInt64; # monotonically increasing per-inbox counter (assigned by server)
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data @1 :Data; # opaque payload (hybrid-encrypted MLS message)
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}
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