Full codebase review by 4 independent agents (security, architecture,
code quality, correctness) identified ~80 findings. This commit fixes 40
of them across all workspace crates.
Critical fixes:
- Federation service: validate origin against mTLS cert CN/SAN (C1)
- WS bridge: add DM channel auth, size limits, rate limiting (C2)
- hpke_seal: panic on error instead of silent empty ciphertext (C3)
- hpke_setup_sender_and_export: error on parse fail, no PQ downgrade (C7)
Security fixes:
- Zeroize: seed_bytes() returns Zeroizing<[u8;32]>, private_to_bytes()
returns Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, ClientAuth.access_token, SessionState.password,
conversation hex_key all wrapped in Zeroizing
- Keystore: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- MeshIdentity: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- Timing floors: resolveIdentity + WS bridge resolve_user get 5ms floor
- Mobile: TLS verification gated behind insecure-dev feature flag
- Proto: from_bytes default limit tightened from 64 MiB to 8 MiB
Correctness fixes:
- fetch_wait: register waiter before fetch to close TOCTOU window
- MeshEnvelope: exclude hop_count from signature (forwarding no longer
invalidates sender signature)
- BroadcastChannel: encrypt returns Result instead of panicking
- transcript: rename verify_transcript_chain → validate_transcript_structure
- group.rs: extract shared process_incoming() for receive_message variants
- auth_ops: remove spurious RegistrationRequest deserialization
- MeshStore.seen: bounded to 100K with FIFO eviction
Quality fixes:
- FFI error classification: typed downcast instead of string matching
- Plugin HookVTable: SAFETY documentation for unsafe Send+Sync
- clippy::unwrap_used: warn → deny workspace-wide
- Various .unwrap_or("") → proper error returns
Review report: docs/REVIEW-2026-03-04.md
152 tests passing (72 core + 35 server + 14 E2E + 1 doctest + 30 P2P)
QPQ — quicproquo
End-to-end encrypted messaging over QUIC + TLS 1.3 + MLS (RFC 9420), written in Rust.
The server never sees plaintext. Every byte on the wire is protected by a QUIC
transport secured with TLS 1.3 (quinn + rustls). The inner MLS layer
provides forward secrecy, post-compromise security, and ratcheted group key
agreement across any number of participants. Messages are framed with
Cap'n Proto for zero-copy, schema-versioned serialisation.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Application / MLS ciphertext │ <- group key ratchet (RFC 9420)
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Cap'n Proto RPC │ <- typed, schema-versioned framing
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ QUIC + TLS 1.3 (quinn/rustls) │ <- mutual auth + transport secrecy
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
| Property | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Transport confidentiality | TLS 1.3 over QUIC (rustls) |
| Transport authentication | TLS 1.3 server cert (self-signed or CA) |
| Group key agreement | MLS MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519 |
| Post-compromise security | MLS epoch ratchet |
| Forward secrecy | Per-epoch key schedule |
| Identity | Ed25519 (MLS credential + leaf node signature) |
| Password auth | OPAQUE (password never sent to server) |
| Post-quantum readiness | X25519 + ML-KEM-768 hybrid KEM envelope |
| Local storage encryption | SQLCipher + Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305 |
| Message framing | Cap'n Proto (unpacked wire format) |
Features
Core
- Interactive REPL — multi-conversation chat with auto-register, auto-login, 40+ slash commands, background polling, and message history
- 1:1 DMs — dedicated channels with server-enforced membership authorization
- Multi-party groups — N-member MLS groups with Commit fan-out and epoch sync
- OPAQUE authentication — password-authenticated key exchange (password never leaves the client)
- Encrypted local storage — SQLCipher database + encrypted session tokens (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Persistent state — server and client survive restarts; SQLite/SQLCipher or file-backed storage
- Rich messaging — reactions, read receipts, typing indicators, message editing, message deletion
- File transfer — chunked upload/download with SHA-256 content addressing, MIME detection, 50 MB limit
- Disappearing messages — per-conversation TTL with server-side GC (
/disappear 30m,1h,1d,7d) - Account deletion — transactional purge of all user data, sessions, and channel memberships (GDPR-ready)
- Self-DM notepad — send messages to yourself (local-only, no server round-trip)
- Certificate pinning — pass the server cert as
--ca-certto trust only that server - Federation — server-to-server message relay via Cap'n Proto RPC over QUIC with mTLS
- mDNS discovery — servers announce
_quicproquo._udp.local.; clients auto-discover nearby nodes - Sealed sender mode — optional anonymous enqueue (sender identity inside MLS ciphertext only)
- Prometheus metrics —
--metrics-listenexposes/metricsendpoint for monitoring - Dynamic plugin system — load
.so/.dylibplugins at runtime via--plugin-dir - Safety numbers —
/verify <username>for out-of-band key verification (60-digit numeric code) - Transcript export — encrypted, tamper-evident message archives with hash-chain integrity verification
- MLS key rotation —
/update-keyrotates MLS leaf node material with epoch advancement
Client SDKs
- Go SDK (
sdks/go/) — native QUIC transport viaquic-go, Cap'n Proto RPC, full API: connect, OPAQUE auth, send/receive, disappearing messages, account deletion - TypeScript SDK (
sdks/typescript/) —@quicproquo/clientwith WASM crypto (175 KB), WebSocket transport, offline crypto mode, browser demo - Python FFI (
examples/python/) —ctypeswrapper over the C FFI library with CLI - C FFI (
crates/quicproquo-ffi/) —libquicproquo_ffi.sowith 7 extern functions: connect, login, send, receive, disconnect, last_error, free_string
REPL slash commands
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
/dm <username> |
Start a 1:1 DM with a peer |
/create-group <name> (or /cg) |
Create a new group |
/invite <username> |
Add a member to the current group |
/remove <username> |
Remove a member from the current group |
/join |
Join a pending group invitation |
/leave |
Leave the current group |
/switch @user or /switch #group |
Switch active conversation |
/list or /ls |
List all conversations |
/members |
Show group members with resolved usernames |
/group-info (or /gi) |
Show group type, members, MLS epoch |
/rename <name> |
Rename the current conversation |
/history [count] (or /hist) |
Show message history (default 20) |
/react <emoji> [index] |
React to a message with an emoji |
/typing |
Send a typing indicator |
/typing-notify on|off |
Toggle typing indicator display |
/edit <index> <text> |
Edit one of your messages |
/delete <index> |
Delete one of your messages |
/send-file <path> (or /sf) |
Upload and send a file (chunked, SHA-256 verified) |
/download <index> (or /dl) |
Download a received file |
/disappear <duration> |
Set message TTL (30m, 1h, 1d, 7d) |
/verify <username> |
Compare safety numbers with a peer |
/update-key (or /rotate-key) |
Rotate your MLS key material |
/delete-account |
Permanently delete your account (with confirmation) |
/whoami |
Show identity and group status |
/help |
Command reference |
/quit |
Exit |
Mesh commands (requires --features mesh):
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
/mesh peers |
Scan for nearby qpq nodes via mDNS |
/mesh server <host:port> |
Note a discovered server address |
/mesh send <peer_id> <msg> |
Direct P2P message via iroh |
/mesh broadcast <topic> <msg> |
Publish to a broadcast channel |
/mesh subscribe <topic> |
Join a broadcast channel |
/mesh route |
Show routing table |
/mesh identity |
Show mesh identity info |
/mesh store |
Show store-and-forward stats |
Mesh networking (feature-gated: --features mesh)
- P2P transport (
quicproquo-p2p) — iroh-based direct peer-to-peer messaging with NAT traversal - Self-sovereign identity — Ed25519 keypair-based mesh identity, independent of server registration
- Store-and-forward — TTL-based message buffering with hop counting and deduplication
- Broadcast channels — ChaCha20-Poly1305 symmetric topic-based pub/sub (no MLS overhead)
- mDNS discovery — servers announce
_quicproquo._udp.local.; clients auto-discover nearby nodes - Federation routing — server-to-server message relay with mTLS
Experimental / proof-of-concept
- Tauri 2 GUI (
quicproquo-gui) — foundational desktop app shell; not feature-complete - Mobile FFI (
quicproquo-mobile) — C API for QUIC connection migration (wifi to cellular) - Bot framework (
quicproquo-bot) — programmable bot client
Quick start
# Prerequisites: Rust 1.77+, capnp CLI
brew install capnp # macOS
# apt-get install capnproto # Debian/Ubuntu
# Build (excludes GUI — requires GTK system libs)
cargo build --bin qpq-server --bin qpq
# Run tests
cargo test --workspace --exclude quicproquo-gui
# Start the server (port 7000 by default, auto-generates self-signed cert)
cargo run --bin qpq-server -- --allow-insecure-auth
# Interactive REPL (auto-registers and logs in)
cargo run --bin qpq -- repl --username alice --password mypass
REPL quickstart (two terminals)
# Terminal 1
qpq repl --username alice --password secretA
# Terminal 2
qpq repl --username bob --password secretB
# In Alice's REPL:
/dm bob
Hello from Alice!
# Bob sees: [alice] Hello from Alice!
Server configuration (TOML)
cat > qpq-server.toml <<'EOF'
listen = "0.0.0.0:7000"
data_dir = "data"
tls_cert = "data/server-cert.der"
tls_key = "data/server-key.der"
auth_token = "your-strong-token-here"
store_backend = "sql" # or "file"
db_path = "data/qpq.db"
db_key = "your-db-encryption-key"
metrics_listen = "0.0.0.0:9090"
metrics_enabled = true
# Federation (optional)
# federation_enabled = true
# federation_domain = "chat.example.com"
# federation_listen = "0.0.0.0:7001"
# Plugin loading (optional)
# plugin_dir = "/etc/qpq/plugins"
EOF
cargo run --bin qpq-server -- --config qpq-server.toml
Production: use a strong
QPQ_AUTH_TOKEN, setQPQ_DB_KEYwhen usingstore_backend = "sql", and provide real TLS certificates (the server refuses to auto-generate certs in production mode).
See the full demo walkthrough for a step-by-step guide.
Crate layout
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
quicproquo-core |
MLS group operations, hybrid KEM, OPAQUE auth, crypto primitives, WASM-compatible modules |
quicproquo-proto |
Cap'n Proto schemas and generated RPC code |
quicproquo-server |
QUIC server, NodeService RPC (24 methods), storage backends, federation, plugins, blob storage |
quicproquo-client |
CLI + REPL (40+ commands), session management, conversation store, file transfer |
quicproquo-ffi |
C FFI bindings (libquicproquo_ffi.so) for cross-language integration |
quicproquo-plugin-api |
C-compatible plugin hook API (HookVTable, 6 hooks) |
quicproquo-kt |
Key transparency / Merkle-log identity bindings |
quicproquo-bot |
Programmable bot client framework |
quicproquo-gen |
Code generation utilities |
quicproquo-gui |
Tauri 2 desktop app (experimental, requires GTK) |
quicproquo-mobile |
C FFI for mobile connection migration (experimental) |
quicproquo-p2p |
iroh-based P2P transport, mesh identity, store-and-forward, broadcast channels |
CI pipeline
GitHub Actions runs on every push and PR:
cargo fmt --check— formattingcargo build --workspace— full buildcargo test --workspace— 130+ tests (core, server, client, E2E, P2P, doctests)cargo clippy --workspace— lintcargo deny check— license and advisory auditcargo audit— vulnerability scancargo tarpaulin— code coverage (uploaded as artifact)docker build— container image validation
Milestones
| # | Name | Status | What it adds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | QUIC/TLS transport | Done | QUIC + TLS 1.3 endpoint, length-prefixed framing, Ping/Pong |
| M2 | Authentication Service | Done | Ed25519 identity, KeyPackage generation, AS upload/fetch |
| M3 | Delivery Service + MLS groups | Done | DS relay, GroupMember create/join/add/send/recv |
| M4 | Group CLI subcommands | Done | Persistent CLI, OPAQUE login, 20 subcommands |
| M5 | Multi-party groups | Done | N > 2 members, Commit fan-out, send --all, epoch sync |
| M6 | Persistence + REPL | Done | SQLite/SQLCipher, interactive REPL, DM channels, encrypted local storage |
| M7 | Post-quantum MLS | Planned | Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 integrated into MLS ciphersuite |
M7 note: the hybrid KEM envelope is already implemented and tested (10 tests passing). What remains is integrating it into the OpenMLS CryptoProvider so all MLS key material gets post-quantum confidentiality.
Roadmap
See ROADMAP.md for the full phased plan. Summary:
| Phase | Focus | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Production hardening (unwrap removal, secure defaults, Docker) | In progress |
| 2 | Test and CI maturity | Partially done |
| 3 | Client SDKs (Go, TypeScript/WASM, Python FFI, C FFI) | Go, TS, FFI, WASM done |
| 4 | Trust and security (audit, key transparency, PQ MLS) | DS auth + enumeration mitigation done |
| 5 | Features and UX (rich messaging, file transfer, disappearing) | Edit/delete, files, TTL done |
| 6 | Scale and operations (horizontal scaling, observability) | Planned |
| 7 | Platform expansion (mobile, web, federation, sealed sender) | Sealed sender done |
| 8 | Freifunk / community mesh networking | F0-F6 done |
| 9 | Developer experience and community growth | Safety numbers + plugins done |
Recently completed (Sprints 1-9)
- Rich messaging — reactions, read receipts, typing indicators, edit/delete messages
- File transfer — chunked upload/download with SHA-256 content addressing and progress bars
- Disappearing messages — per-conversation TTL with server-side garbage collection
- Account deletion — transactional purge of all user data (GDPR-ready)
- Go SDK — native QUIC + Cap'n Proto client with full API coverage
- TypeScript SDK — WASM crypto (175 KB) + WebSocket transport + browser demo
- C FFI + Python bindings — cross-language integration via
libquicproquo_ffi - Mesh networking — self-sovereign identity, store-and-forward, broadcast channels, extended REPL
- Security hardening — DS sender binding, username enumeration mitigation, MLS key rotation
- CI pipeline — fmt, build, test, clippy, deny, audit, tarpaulin coverage, Docker build
- Plugin system — dynamic
.so/.dylibloading with 6 C-compatible hook points
Building without the GUI
The GUI crate requires GTK system libraries. To build just the server and client:
cargo build --bin qpq-server --bin qpq
To build the client with mesh/P2P support:
cargo build -p quicproquo-client --features mesh
Documentation
Full documentation is available as an mdBook in docs/:
cargo install mdbook # once
mdbook serve docs # http://localhost:3000
- Getting Started — build, run, demo walkthrough
- REPL Command Reference — complete list of 40+ commands
- Go SDK Guide — native QUIC + Cap'n Proto client
- TypeScript SDK & Browser Demo — WASM crypto + WebSocket transport
- Rich Messaging — reactions, typing, edit/delete, receipts
- File Transfer — chunked upload/download with SHA-256
- Mesh Networking — P2P, broadcast, store-and-forward
- Architecture Overview — two-service model, dual-key design, crate layout
- Protocol Deep Dives — QUIC/TLS 1.3, Cap'n Proto, MLS, Hybrid KEM
- Cryptographic Properties — forward secrecy, post-compromise security, PQ readiness, threat model
- Design Rationale — why MLS over Signal/Matrix, ADRs for key decisions
- Wire Format Reference — annotated Cap'n Proto schemas
- Roadmap — milestones, production readiness, future research
- Future Improvements — prioritised list of security, ops, and feature improvements
Security
This is a research project and has not undergone a formal third-party audit. See the threat model and security audit for details.
- The server only routes opaque ciphertexts by recipient key — it never sees plaintext.
- OPAQUE ensures passwords never leave the client.
- Local databases are encrypted with SQLCipher when a password is provided.
- Session tokens are encrypted at rest (Argon2id key derivation + ChaCha20-Poly1305).
- Certificate pinning: pass the server cert as
--ca-certso the client trusts only that server. - Sealed sender: optional mode where the server cannot see who sent a message.
- Dependency checks: CI runs
cargo deny checkandcargo auditon every PR.
License
MIT
