Christian Nennemann
0bdc222724
Phase 1 — Foundation: - Constant-time token comparison via subtle::ConstantTimeEq (Fix 11) - Structured error codes E001–E020 in new error_codes.rs (Fix 15) - Remove dead envelope.capnp code and related types (Fix 16) Phase 2 — Auth Hardening: - Registration collision check via has_user_record() (Fix 5) - Auth required on uploadHybridKey/fetchHybridKey RPCs (Fix 1) - Identity-token binding at registration and login (Fix 2) - Session token expiry with 24h TTL and background reaper (Fix 3) - Bounded pending logins with 5-minute timeout (Fix 4) Phase 3 — Resource Limits: - Rate limiting: 100 enqueues/60s per token (Fix 6) - Queue depth cap at 1000 + 7-day message TTL/GC (Fix 7) - Partial queue drain via limit param on fetch/fetchWait (Fix 8) Phase 4 — Crypto Fixes: - OPAQUE KSF switched from Identity to Argon2id (Fix 10) - Random AEAD nonce in hybrid KEM instead of HKDF-derived (Fix 12) - Zeroize secret fields in HybridKeypairBytes (Fix 13) - Encrypted client state files via QPCE format (Fix 9) Phase 5 — Protocol: - Commit fan-out to all existing members on invite (Fix 14) - Add member_identities() to GroupMember Breaking: existing OPAQUE registrations invalidated (Argon2 KSF). Schema: added auth to hybrid key ops, identityKey to OPAQUE finish RPCs, limit to fetch/fetchWait. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
74 lines
3.7 KiB
Cap'n Proto
74 lines
3.7 KiB
Cap'n Proto
# node.capnp — Unified quicnprotochat node RPC interface.
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#
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# Combines Authentication and Delivery operations into a single service.
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#
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# ID generated with: capnp id
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@0xd5ca5648a9cc1c28;
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interface NodeService {
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# Upload a single-use KeyPackage for later retrieval by peers.
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# identityKey : Ed25519 public key bytes (32 bytes)
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# package : TLS-encoded openmls KeyPackage
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# auth : Auth context (versioned). For legacy clients, pass an empty
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# struct or version=0.
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uploadKeyPackage @0 (identityKey :Data, package :Data, auth :Auth) -> (fingerprint :Data);
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# Fetch and atomically remove one KeyPackage for a given identity key.
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# Returns empty Data if none are stored.
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fetchKeyPackage @1 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (package :Data);
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# Enqueue an opaque payload for delivery to a recipient.
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# channelId : Optional channel identifier (empty for legacy). A 16-byte UUID
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# is recommended for 1:1 channels.
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# version : Schema/wire version. Must be 0 (legacy) or 1 (this spec).
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enqueue @2 (recipientKey :Data, payload :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Fetch and drain all queued payloads for the recipient.
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# limit: max number of messages to return (0 = fetch all).
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fetch @3 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, auth :Auth, limit :UInt32) -> (payloads :List(Data));
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# Long-poll: wait up to timeoutMs for new payloads, then drain queue.
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# limit: max number of messages to return (0 = fetch all).
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fetchWait @4 (recipientKey :Data, channelId :Data, version :UInt16, timeoutMs :UInt64, auth :Auth, limit :UInt32) -> (payloads :List(Data));
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# Health probe for readiness/liveness.
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health @5 () -> (status :Text);
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# Upload the hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) public key for sealed envelope encryption.
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uploadHybridKey @6 (identityKey :Data, hybridPublicKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Fetch a peer's hybrid public key (for post-quantum envelope encryption).
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fetchHybridKey @7 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (hybridPublicKey :Data);
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# ── OPAQUE password-authenticated registration ──────────────────────────
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# Start OPAQUE registration: client sends blinded password element.
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opaqueRegisterStart @8 (username :Text, request :Data) -> (response :Data);
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# Finish OPAQUE registration: client uploads sealed credential envelope.
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opaqueRegisterFinish @9 (username :Text, upload :Data, identityKey :Data) -> (success :Bool);
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# ── OPAQUE password-authenticated login ─────────────────────────────────
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# Start OPAQUE login: client sends credential request.
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opaqueLoginStart @10 (username :Text, request :Data) -> (response :Data);
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# Finish OPAQUE login: client sends credential finalization, receives session token.
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opaqueLoginFinish @11 (username :Text, finalization :Data, identityKey :Data) -> (sessionToken :Data);
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# ── P2P endpoint discovery ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Publish this node's iroh endpoint address for P2P connectivity.
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# nodeAddr is the serialized iroh NodeAddr (JSON or custom encoding).
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publishEndpoint @12 (identityKey :Data, nodeAddr :Data, auth :Auth) -> ();
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# Resolve a peer's iroh endpoint for direct P2P connection.
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resolveEndpoint @13 (identityKey :Data, auth :Auth) -> (nodeAddr :Data);
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}
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struct Auth {
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version @0 :UInt16; # 0 = legacy/none, 1 = token-based auth
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accessToken @1 :Data; # opaque bearer token issued at login
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deviceId @2 :Data; # optional UUID bytes for auditing/rate limiting
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}
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