Files
quicproquo/crates/quicproquo-server/src/node_service/user_ops.rs
Chris Nennemann 9ab306d891 feat: Sprint 2 — security hardening, MLS key rotation, E2E tests
- DS sender identity binding (Phase 4.3): explicit audit logging of
  sender_prefix in enqueue/batch_enqueue, documenting that sender
  identity is always derived from authenticated session
- Username enumeration mitigation (Phase 4.5): 5ms timing floor on
  resolveUser responses + rate limiting to prevent bulk enumeration
- Add /update-key REPL command for MLS leaf key rotation via
  propose_self_update + auto-commit + fan-out to group members
- Add 4 new E2E tests: message delivery round-trip, key rotation
  update path, oversized payload rejection, multi-party group (12 total)
2026-03-03 23:37:24 +01:00

180 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust

//! resolveUser / resolveIdentity RPCs: bidirectional username ↔ identity key lookup.
use capnp::capability::Promise;
use quicproquo_proto::node_capnp::node_service;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::time::Instant;
use crate::auth::{check_rate_limit, coded_error, validate_auth_context};
use crate::error_codes::*;
use crate::metrics;
use crate::storage::StorageError;
use super::NodeServiceImpl;
/// Minimum response time for resolveUser to mask DB lookup timing differences.
const RESOLVE_TIMING_FLOOR: Duration = Duration::from_millis(5);
fn storage_err(err: StorageError) -> capnp::Error {
coded_error(E009_STORAGE_ERROR, err)
}
impl NodeServiceImpl {
pub fn handle_resolve_user(
&mut self,
params: node_service::ResolveUserParams,
mut results: node_service::ResolveUserResults,
) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
let p = match params.get() {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
};
let username = match p.get_username() {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
};
let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
Ok(ctx) => ctx,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
};
let username_str = match username.to_str() {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
};
if username_str.is_empty() {
return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, "username must not be empty"));
}
// Federation: parse user@domain format.
let addr = crate::federation::address::FederatedAddress::parse(username_str);
let is_remote = match (&addr.domain, &self.local_domain) {
(Some(d), Some(ld)) => d != ld,
(Some(_), None) => true,
_ => false,
};
if is_remote {
// Proxy to remote server via federation.
if let (Some(ref fed_client), Some(ref domain)) = (&self.federation_client, &addr.domain) {
if fed_client.has_peer(domain) {
let fed = fed_client.clone();
let user = addr.username.clone();
let dom = domain.clone();
return Promise::from_future(async move {
match fed.proxy_resolve_user(&dom, &user).await {
Ok(Some(key)) => {
results.get().set_identity_key(&key);
}
Ok(None) => {
// Not found on remote — return empty.
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "federation proxy_resolve_user failed");
// Fall through — return empty (not found).
}
}
Ok(())
});
}
}
// No federation client or unknown peer — return empty (not found).
return Promise::ok(());
}
// Rate-limit resolve requests to prevent bulk enumeration.
if let Err(e) = check_rate_limit(&self.rate_limits, &auth_ctx.token) {
tracing::warn!("rate_limit_hit");
metrics::record_rate_limit_hit_total();
return Promise::err(e);
}
// Timing floor: record the start time so we can pad the response to a
// fixed minimum duration, masking DB-lookup timing differences between
// existing and non-existing usernames.
let deadline = Instant::now() + RESOLVE_TIMING_FLOOR;
// Local resolution.
let identity_key = match self.store.get_user_identity_key(&addr.username) {
Ok(Some(key)) => key,
Ok(None) => {
// Return empty Data — caller checks length to detect "not found".
// Pad to timing floor before responding.
return Promise::from_future(async move {
tokio::time::sleep_until(deadline).await;
Ok(())
});
}
Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
};
let mut r = results.get();
r.set_identity_key(&identity_key);
// Attempt to include a KT Merkle inclusion proof.
// Non-fatal: if the log is unavailable or has no entry, return just the key.
if let Ok(log) = self.kt_log.lock() {
if let Some(leaf_idx) = log.find(&addr.username, &identity_key) {
match log.inclusion_proof(leaf_idx) {
Ok(proof) => match proof.to_bytes() {
Ok(bytes) => {
r.set_inclusion_proof(&bytes);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "KT proof serialise failed");
}
},
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "KT inclusion_proof failed");
}
}
}
}
// Pad to timing floor before responding.
Promise::from_future(async move {
tokio::time::sleep_until(deadline).await;
Ok(())
})
}
pub fn handle_resolve_identity(
&mut self,
params: node_service::ResolveIdentityParams,
mut results: node_service::ResolveIdentityResults,
) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
let p = match params.get() {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
};
let identity_key = match p.get_identity_key() {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
};
let _auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
Ok(ctx) => ctx,
Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
};
if identity_key.len() != 32 {
return Promise::err(coded_error(
E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
format!("identityKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", identity_key.len()),
));
}
match self.store.resolve_identity_key(identity_key) {
Ok(Some(username)) => {
results.get().set_username(&username);
}
Ok(None) => {
// Return empty string — caller checks length to detect "not found".
}
Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
}
Promise::ok(())
}
}