Chris Nennemann
612b06aa8e
- Fix 3 client panics: replace .unwrap()/.expect() with proper error handling in rpc.rs (AUTH_CONTEXT lock), repl.rs (pending_member), and retry.rs (last_err) - Add --danger-accept-invalid-certs flag with InsecureServerCertVerifier for development TLS bypass, plus mdBook TLS documentation - Add CI coverage job (cargo-tarpaulin) and Docker build validation to GitHub Actions workflow, plus README CI badge - Add [workspace.lints] config, fix 46 clippy warnings across 8 crates, zero warnings on all buildable crates - Update Dockerfile for all 11 workspace members
82 lines
3.0 KiB
Rust
82 lines
3.0 KiB
Rust
//! quicproquo CLI client library.
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//!
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//! # KeyPackage expiry and refresh
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//!
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//! KeyPackages are single-use (consumed when someone fetches them for an invite) and the server
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//! may enforce a TTL (e.g. 24 hours). To stay invitable, run `qpq refresh-keypackage`
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//! periodically (e.g. before the server TTL) or after your KeyPackage was consumed:
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//!
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//! ```bash
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//! qpq refresh-keypackage --state qpq-state.bin --server 127.0.0.1:7000
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//! ```
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//!
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//! Use the same `--access-token` (or `QPQ_ACCESS_TOKEN`) as for other authenticated
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//! commands. See the [running-the-client](https://docs.quicproquo.dev/getting-started/running-the-client)
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//! docs for details.
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use std::sync::RwLock;
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use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
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pub mod client;
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pub use client::commands::{
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cmd_chat, cmd_check_key, cmd_create_group, cmd_demo_group, cmd_export, cmd_export_verify,
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cmd_fetch_key, cmd_health, cmd_health_json, cmd_invite, cmd_join, cmd_login, cmd_ping,
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cmd_recv, cmd_register, cmd_register_state, cmd_refresh_keypackage, cmd_register_user,
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cmd_send, cmd_whoami, opaque_login, receive_pending_plaintexts, whoami_json,
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};
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pub use client::repl::run_repl;
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pub use client::rpc::{connect_node, connect_node_opt, create_channel, enqueue, fetch_wait, resolve_user};
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// Global auth context — RwLock so the REPL can set it after OPAQUE login.
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pub(crate) static AUTH_CONTEXT: RwLock<Option<ClientAuth>> = RwLock::new(None);
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/// When `true`, [`connect_node`] skips TLS certificate verification.
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/// Set via [`set_insecure_skip_verify`]; read by the RPC layer.
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pub(crate) static INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
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/// Enable or disable insecure (no-verify) TLS mode globally.
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///
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/// **Development only.** When enabled, all outgoing connections skip certificate
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/// verification, making them vulnerable to MITM attacks.
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pub fn set_insecure_skip_verify(enabled: bool) {
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INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY.store(enabled, Ordering::Relaxed);
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct ClientAuth {
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pub(crate) version: u16,
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pub(crate) access_token: Vec<u8>,
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pub(crate) device_id: Vec<u8>,
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}
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impl ClientAuth {
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/// Build a client auth context from optional token and device id.
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pub fn from_parts(access_token: String, device_id: Option<String>) -> Self {
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let token = access_token.into_bytes();
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let device = device_id.unwrap_or_default().into_bytes();
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Self {
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version: 1,
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access_token: token,
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device_id: device,
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}
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}
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/// Build from raw token bytes (e.g. a 32-byte OPAQUE session token).
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pub fn from_raw(raw_token: Vec<u8>, device_id: Option<String>) -> Self {
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let device = device_id.unwrap_or_default().into_bytes();
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Self {
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version: 1,
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access_token: raw_token,
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device_id: device,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Set (or replace) the global auth context.
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pub fn init_auth(ctx: ClientAuth) {
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let mut guard = AUTH_CONTEXT.write().expect("AUTH_CONTEXT poisoned");
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*guard = Some(ctx);
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}
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