Files
quicproquo/crates/quicprochat-core/src/identity.rs
Christian Nennemann a05da9b751 feat: upgrade OpenMLS 0.5 → 0.8 for security patches and GREASE support
Migrates all MLS code in quicprochat-core from OpenMLS 0.5 to 0.8:
- StorageProvider replaces OpenMlsKeyStore (keystore.rs full rewrite)
- HybridCryptoProvider updated for new OpenMlsProvider trait
- Group operations updated for new API signatures
- MLS state persistence via MemoryStorage serialization
- tls_codec 0.3 → 0.4, openmls_traits/rust_crypto 0.2 → 0.5
2026-03-21 19:14:06 +01:00

246 lines
8.4 KiB
Rust

//! Ed25519 identity keypair for MLS credentials and AS registration.
//!
//! The [`IdentityKeypair`] is the long-term identity key embedded in MLS
//! `BasicCredential`s. It is used for signing MLS messages and as the
//! indexing key for the Authentication Service.
//!
//! # Zeroize
//!
//! The 32-byte private seed is stored as `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>`, which zeroes
//! the bytes on drop. `[u8; 32]` is `Copy + Default` and satisfies zeroize's
//! `DefaultIsZeroes` constraint, avoiding a conflict with ed25519-dalek's
//! `SigningKey` zeroize impl.
//!
//! # Fingerprint
//!
//! A 32-byte SHA-256 digest of the raw public key bytes is used as a compact,
//! collision-resistant identifier for logging.
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer as DalekSigner, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
/// An Ed25519 identity keypair.
///
/// Created with [`IdentityKeypair::generate`]. The private signing key seed
/// is zeroed when this struct is dropped.
pub struct IdentityKeypair {
/// Raw 32-byte private seed — zeroized on drop.
///
/// Stored as bytes rather than `SigningKey` to satisfy zeroize's
/// `DefaultIsZeroes` bound on `Zeroizing<T>`.
seed: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>,
/// Corresponding 32-byte public verifying key.
verifying: VerifyingKey,
}
impl IdentityKeypair {
/// Recreate an identity keypair from a 32-byte seed.
pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
let verifying = signing.verifying_key();
Self {
seed: Zeroizing::new(seed),
verifying,
}
}
/// Return the raw 32-byte private seed (for persistence).
///
/// The returned value is wrapped in [`Zeroizing`] so it is securely
/// erased when dropped, preventing the seed from lingering in memory.
pub fn seed_bytes(&self) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
Zeroizing::new(*self.seed)
}
}
impl IdentityKeypair {
/// Generate a fresh random Ed25519 identity keypair.
pub fn generate() -> Self {
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
let signing = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
let verifying = signing.verifying_key();
let seed = Zeroizing::new(signing.to_bytes());
Self { seed, verifying }
}
/// Return the raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key.
///
/// This is the byte array used as `identityKey` in `auth.capnp` calls.
pub fn public_key_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.verifying.to_bytes()
}
/// Return the SHA-256 fingerprint of the public key (32 bytes).
pub fn fingerprint(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(self.verifying.to_bytes());
hasher.finalize().into()
}
/// Reconstruct the `SigningKey` from the stored seed bytes.
fn signing_key(&self) -> SigningKey {
SigningKey::from_bytes(&self.seed)
}
}
/// Implement the openmls `Signer` trait so `IdentityKeypair` can be passed
/// directly to `KeyPackage::builder().build(...)` without needing the external
/// `openmls_basic_credential` crate.
#[cfg(feature = "native")]
impl openmls_traits::signatures::Signer for IdentityKeypair {
fn sign(&self, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, openmls_traits::signatures::SignerError> {
let sk = self.signing_key();
let sig: ed25519_dalek::Signature = sk.sign(payload);
Ok(sig.to_bytes().to_vec())
}
fn signature_scheme(&self) -> openmls_traits::types::SignatureScheme {
openmls_traits::types::SignatureScheme::ED25519
}
}
impl IdentityKeypair {
/// Sign arbitrary bytes with the Ed25519 key and return the 64-byte signature.
///
/// Used by sealed sender to sign the inner payload for recipient verification.
pub fn sign_raw(&self, payload: &[u8]) -> [u8; 64] {
let sk = self.signing_key();
let sig: ed25519_dalek::Signature = sk.sign(payload);
sig.to_bytes()
}
/// Verify an Ed25519 signature over `payload` using the given public key.
pub fn verify_raw(
public_key: &[u8; 32],
payload: &[u8],
signature: &[u8; 64],
) -> Result<(), crate::error::CoreError> {
use ed25519_dalek::Verifier;
let vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(public_key)
.map_err(|e| crate::error::CoreError::Mls(format!("invalid public key: {e}")))?;
let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(signature);
vk.verify(payload, &sig)
.map_err(|e| crate::error::CoreError::Mls(format!("signature verification failed: {e}")))
}
}
/// Verify a 96-byte delivery proof produced by the server's `build_delivery_proof`.
///
/// # Layout
/// ```text
/// bytes 0..32 — SHA-256(seq_le || recipient_key || timestamp_ms_le)
/// bytes 32..96 — Ed25519 signature over those 32 bytes
/// ```
///
/// Returns `Ok(true)` when the proof is structurally valid and the signature verifies,
/// `Ok(false)` when the proof length is wrong (graceful degradation for old servers),
/// or `Err` when the signature is structurally invalid / verification fails.
pub fn verify_delivery_proof(
server_pubkey: &[u8; 32],
proof: &[u8],
) -> Result<bool, crate::error::CoreError> {
if proof.len() != 96 {
return Ok(false);
}
let hash: [u8; 32] = proof[..32].try_into().expect("slice is 32 bytes");
let sig: [u8; 64] = proof[32..96].try_into().expect("slice is 64 bytes");
IdentityKeypair::verify_raw(server_pubkey, &hash, &sig)?;
Ok(true)
}
impl Serialize for IdentityKeypair {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: serde::Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(&self.seed[..])
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for IdentityKeypair {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
let bytes: Vec<u8> = serde::Deserialize::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let seed: [u8; 32] = bytes
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| serde::de::Error::custom("identity seed must be 32 bytes"))?;
Ok(IdentityKeypair::from_seed(seed))
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for IdentityKeypair {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
let fp = self.fingerprint();
f.debug_struct("IdentityKeypair")
.field(
"fingerprint",
&format!("{:02x}{:02x}{:02x}{:02x}", fp[0], fp[1], fp[2], fp[3]),
)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
mod proof_tests {
use super::*;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
fn make_proof(kp: &IdentityKeypair, seq: u64, recipient_key: &[u8], timestamp_ms: u64) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(seq.to_le_bytes());
hasher.update(recipient_key);
hasher.update(timestamp_ms.to_le_bytes());
let hash: [u8; 32] = hasher.finalize().into();
let sig = kp.sign_raw(&hash);
let mut proof = vec![0u8; 96];
proof[..32].copy_from_slice(&hash);
proof[32..].copy_from_slice(&sig);
proof
}
#[test]
fn verify_valid_proof() {
let kp = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let pk = kp.public_key_bytes();
let rk = [0xabu8; 32];
let proof = make_proof(&kp, 42, &rk, 1_700_000_000_000);
assert!(verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &proof).unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn reject_wrong_length() {
let kp = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let pk = kp.public_key_bytes();
assert!(!verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &[0u8; 64]).unwrap());
assert!(!verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &[]).unwrap());
assert!(!verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &[0u8; 97]).unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn reject_tampered_hash() {
let kp = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let pk = kp.public_key_bytes();
let rk = [0x01u8; 32];
let mut proof = make_proof(&kp, 1, &rk, 999);
proof[0] ^= 0xff; // corrupt the hash bytes
assert!(verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &proof).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn reject_wrong_pubkey() {
let kp = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let other = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let pk = other.public_key_bytes();
let rk = [0x02u8; 32];
let proof = make_proof(&kp, 5, &rk, 0);
assert!(verify_delivery_proof(&pk, &proof).is_err());
}
}