Files
quicproquo/crates/quicproquo-core/src/keystore.rs
Christian Nennemann 394199b19b fix: security hardening — 40 findings from full codebase review
Full codebase review by 4 independent agents (security, architecture,
code quality, correctness) identified ~80 findings. This commit fixes 40
of them across all workspace crates.

Critical fixes:
- Federation service: validate origin against mTLS cert CN/SAN (C1)
- WS bridge: add DM channel auth, size limits, rate limiting (C2)
- hpke_seal: panic on error instead of silent empty ciphertext (C3)
- hpke_setup_sender_and_export: error on parse fail, no PQ downgrade (C7)

Security fixes:
- Zeroize: seed_bytes() returns Zeroizing<[u8;32]>, private_to_bytes()
  returns Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, ClientAuth.access_token, SessionState.password,
  conversation hex_key all wrapped in Zeroizing
- Keystore: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- MeshIdentity: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- Timing floors: resolveIdentity + WS bridge resolve_user get 5ms floor
- Mobile: TLS verification gated behind insecure-dev feature flag
- Proto: from_bytes default limit tightened from 64 MiB to 8 MiB

Correctness fixes:
- fetch_wait: register waiter before fetch to close TOCTOU window
- MeshEnvelope: exclude hop_count from signature (forwarding no longer
  invalidates sender signature)
- BroadcastChannel: encrypt returns Result instead of panicking
- transcript: rename verify_transcript_chain → validate_transcript_structure
- group.rs: extract shared process_incoming() for receive_message variants
- auth_ops: remove spurious RegistrationRequest deserialization
- MeshStore.seen: bounded to 100K with FIFO eviction

Quality fixes:
- FFI error classification: typed downcast instead of string matching
- Plugin HookVTable: SAFETY documentation for unsafe Send+Sync
- clippy::unwrap_used: warn → deny workspace-wide
- Various .unwrap_or("") → proper error returns

Review report: docs/REVIEW-2026-03-04.md
152 tests passing (72 core + 35 server + 14 E2E + 1 doctest + 30 P2P)
2026-03-04 07:52:12 +01:00

143 lines
4.4 KiB
Rust

use std::{
collections::HashMap,
fs,
path::{Path, PathBuf},
sync::RwLock,
};
use openmls_traits::key_store::{MlsEntity, OpenMlsKeyStore};
/// A disk-backed key store implementing `OpenMlsKeyStore`.
///
/// In-memory when `path` is `None`; otherwise flushes the entire map to disk on
/// every store/delete so HPKE init keys survive process restarts.
///
/// # Serialization
///
/// Uses bincode for both individual MLS entity values and the outer HashMap
/// container. This is required because OpenMLS types use bincode-compatible
/// serialization, and `HashMap<Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>>` requires a binary format
/// (JSON mandates string keys).
///
/// # Persistence security
///
/// When `path` is set, file permissions are restricted to owner-only (0o600)
/// on Unix platforms, since the store may contain HPKE private keys.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct DiskKeyStore {
path: Option<PathBuf>,
values: RwLock<HashMap<Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>>>,
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum DiskKeyStoreError {
#[error("serialization error")]
Serialization,
#[error("io error: {0}")]
Io(String),
}
impl DiskKeyStore {
/// In-memory keystore (no persistence).
pub fn ephemeral() -> Self {
Self {
path: None,
values: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
/// Persistent keystore backed by `path`. Creates an empty store if missing.
pub fn persistent(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Self, DiskKeyStoreError> {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
let values = if path.exists() {
let bytes = fs::read(&path).map_err(|e| DiskKeyStoreError::Io(e.to_string()))?;
if bytes.is_empty() {
HashMap::new()
} else {
bincode::deserialize(&bytes)
.map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Serialization)?
}
} else {
HashMap::new()
};
let store = Self {
path: Some(path),
values: RwLock::new(values),
};
// Set restrictive file permissions on the keystore file.
store.set_file_permissions()?;
Ok(store)
}
fn flush(&self) -> Result<(), DiskKeyStoreError> {
let Some(path) = &self.path else {
return Ok(());
};
let values = self.values.read().map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Io("lock poisoned".into()))?;
let bytes = bincode::serialize(&*values).map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Serialization)?;
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|e| DiskKeyStoreError::Io(e.to_string()))?;
}
fs::write(path, &bytes).map_err(|e| DiskKeyStoreError::Io(e.to_string()))?;
self.set_file_permissions()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Restrict file permissions to owner-only (0o600) on Unix.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn set_file_permissions(&self) -> Result<(), DiskKeyStoreError> {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
if let Some(path) = &self.path {
if path.exists() {
let perms = std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600);
fs::set_permissions(path, perms)
.map_err(|e| DiskKeyStoreError::Io(format!("set permissions: {e}")))?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn set_file_permissions(&self) -> Result<(), DiskKeyStoreError> {
Ok(())
}
}
impl Default for DiskKeyStore {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::ephemeral()
}
}
impl OpenMlsKeyStore for DiskKeyStore {
type Error = DiskKeyStoreError;
fn store<V: MlsEntity>(&self, k: &[u8], v: &V) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
let value = bincode::serialize(v).map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Serialization)?;
let mut values = self.values.write().map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Io("lock poisoned".into()))?;
values.insert(k.to_vec(), value);
drop(values);
self.flush()
}
fn read<V: MlsEntity>(&self, k: &[u8]) -> Option<V> {
let values = match self.values.read() {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => return None,
};
values
.get(k)
.and_then(|bytes| bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok())
}
fn delete<V: MlsEntity>(&self, k: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
let mut values = self.values.write().map_err(|_| DiskKeyStoreError::Io("lock poisoned".into()))?;
values.remove(k);
drop(values);
self.flush()
}
}