use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;

use capnp::capability::Promise;
use dashmap::DashMap;
use quicproquo_proto::node_capnp::node_service;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use tokio::time::timeout;

use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

use crate::auth::{
    check_rate_limit, coded_error, fmt_hex, require_identity_or_request, validate_auth_context,
};
use crate::error_codes::*;
use crate::metrics;
use crate::storage::{StorageError, Store};

use super::{NodeServiceImpl, CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION};
use crate::hooks::{HookAction, MessageEvent, FetchEvent};

// Audit events here must not include secrets: no payload content, no full recipient/token bytes (prefix only).

const MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB cap per message
const MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH: usize = 1000;

/// Build a 96-byte delivery proof: SHA-256(seq || recipient_key || timestamp_ms) || Ed25519 sig.
///
/// Layout:
///   bytes  0..32 — SHA-256 preimage hash
///   bytes 32..96 — Ed25519 signature over those 32 bytes
fn build_delivery_proof(
    signing_key: &quicproquo_core::IdentityKeypair,
    seq: u64,
    recipient_key: &[u8],
    timestamp_ms: u64,
) -> [u8; 96] {
    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
    hasher.update(seq.to_le_bytes());
    hasher.update(recipient_key);
    hasher.update(timestamp_ms.to_le_bytes());
    let hash: [u8; 32] = hasher.finalize().into();

    let sig = signing_key.sign_raw(&hash);

    let mut proof = [0u8; 96];
    proof[..32].copy_from_slice(&hash);
    proof[32..].copy_from_slice(&sig);
    proof
}

fn storage_err(err: StorageError) -> capnp::Error {
    coded_error(E009_STORAGE_ERROR, err)
}

pub fn fill_payloads_wait(
    results: &mut node_service::FetchWaitResults,
    messages: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
) {
    let mut list = results.get().init_payloads(messages.len() as u32);
    for (i, (seq, data)) in messages.iter().enumerate() {
        let mut entry = list.reborrow().get(i as u32);
        entry.set_seq(*seq);
        entry.set_data(data);
    }
}

impl NodeServiceImpl {
    pub fn handle_enqueue(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::EnqueueParams,
        mut results: node_service::EnqueueResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let p = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let recipient_key = match p.get_recipient_key() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let payload = match p.get_payload() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = p.get_channel_id().unwrap_or_default().to_vec();
        let version = p.get_version();
        let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if recipient_key.len() != 32 {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                format!("recipientKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", recipient_key.len()),
            ));
        }
        if payload.is_empty() {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(E005_PAYLOAD_EMPTY, "payload must not be empty"));
        }
        if payload.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E006_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
                format!("payload exceeds max size ({} bytes)", MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        if let Err(e) = check_rate_limit(&self.rate_limits, &auth_ctx.token) {
            // Audit: rate limit hit — do not log token or identity.
            tracing::warn!("rate_limit_hit");
            metrics::record_rate_limit_hit_total();
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        // Phase 4.3 — DS sender identity binding.
        // When sealed_sender is false, the sender MUST have an identity-bound session.
        // The sender_identity used for audit/hooks is ALWAYS derived from
        // auth_ctx.identity_key (populated by OPAQUE session lookup in validate_auth_context),
        // never from any client-supplied field. This guarantees that the server only
        // attributes messages to the cryptographically authenticated identity.
        if !self.sealed_sender {
            if let Err(e) = crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                return Promise::err(e);
            }
        }

        // Federation routing: if the recipient's home server differs from ours, relay the
        // message to the remote server instead of enqueueing locally. This enables
        // cross-node delivery in a Freifunk / community mesh deployment.
        if let (Some(fed_client), Some(local_domain)) =
            (&self.federation_client, &self.local_domain)
        {
            let dest = crate::federation::routing::resolve_destination(
                &self.store,
                &recipient_key,
                local_domain,
            );
            if let crate::federation::routing::Destination::Remote(remote_domain) = dest {
                let fed = Arc::clone(fed_client);
                let rk = recipient_key;
                let pl = payload;
                let ch = channel_id;
                tracing::info!(
                    recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&rk[..4]),
                    domain = %remote_domain,
                    "federation: routing enqueue to remote server"
                );
                return Promise::from_future(async move {
                    let seq = fed
                        .relay_enqueue(&remote_domain, &rk, &pl, &ch)
                        .await
                        .map_err(|e| {
                            capnp::Error::failed(format!("federation relay failed: {e}"))
                        })?;
                    results.get().set_seq(seq);
                    metrics::record_enqueue_total();
                    metrics::record_enqueue_bytes(pl.len() as u64);
                    Ok(())
                });
            }
        }

        // DM channel authz: channel_id.len() == 16 means a created channel; caller and recipient must be the two members.
        if channel_id.len() == 16 {
            let members = match self.store.get_channel_members(&channel_id) {
                Ok(Some(m)) => m,
                Ok(None) => {
                    return Promise::err(coded_error(E023_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND, "channel not found"));
                }
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
            };
            let caller = match crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                Ok(id) => id,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            };
            let (a, b) = &members;
            let caller_in = caller == a.as_slice() || caller == b.as_slice();
            let recipient_other = (recipient_key == *a && caller == b.as_slice())
                || (recipient_key == *b && caller == a.as_slice());
            if !caller_in || !recipient_other {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E022_CHANNEL_ACCESS_DENIED,
                    "caller or recipient not a member of this channel",
                ));
            }
        }

        match self.store.queue_depth(&recipient_key, &channel_id) {
            Ok(depth) if depth >= MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH => {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E015_QUEUE_FULL,
                    format!("queue depth {} exceeds limit {}", depth, MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH),
                ));
            }
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
            _ => {}
        }

        let payload_len = payload.len();
        // sender_identity is derived solely from auth_ctx (server-side session state).
        let sender_identity = if self.sealed_sender {
            None
        } else {
            crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx).ok().map(|v| v.to_vec())
        };
        let sender_prefix = sender_identity
            .as_deref()
            .filter(|id| id.len() >= 4)
            .map(|id| fmt_hex(&id[..4]));

        // Hook: on_message_enqueue — fires after validation, before storage.
        let hook_event = MessageEvent {
            sender_identity,
            recipient_key: recipient_key.clone(),
            channel_id: channel_id.clone(),
            payload_len,
            seq: 0, // not yet assigned
        };
        if let HookAction::Reject(reason) = self.hooks.on_message_enqueue(&hook_event) {
            return Promise::err(capnp::Error::failed(format!("hook rejected enqueue: {reason}")));
        }

        let seq = match self
            .store
            .enqueue(&recipient_key, &channel_id, payload)
            .map_err(storage_err)
        {
            Ok(seq) => seq,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        let timestamp_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .unwrap_or_default()
            .as_millis() as u64;
        let proof = build_delivery_proof(&self.signing_key, seq, &recipient_key, timestamp_ms);

        let mut r = results.get();
        r.set_seq(seq);
        r.set_delivery_proof(&proof);

        // Metrics and audit. Audit events must not include secrets (no payload, no full keys).
        metrics::record_enqueue_total();
        metrics::record_enqueue_bytes(payload_len as u64);
        if let Ok(depth) = self.store.queue_depth(&recipient_key, &channel_id) {
            metrics::record_delivery_queue_depth(depth);
        }
        tracing::info!(
            sender_prefix = sender_prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or("sealed"),
            recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&recipient_key[..4]),
            payload_len = payload_len,
            seq = seq,
            "audit: enqueue"
        );

        crate::auth::waiter(&self.waiters, &recipient_key).notify_waiters();

        Promise::ok(())
    }

    pub fn handle_fetch(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::FetchParams,
        mut results: node_service::FetchResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let recipient_key = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => match p.get_recipient_key() {
                Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
            },
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = params
            .get()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|p| p.get_channel_id().ok())
            .map(|c| c.to_vec())
            .unwrap_or_default();
        let version = params
            .get()
            .ok()
            .map(|p| p.get_version())
            .unwrap_or(CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION);
        let limit = params.get().ok().map(|p| p.get_limit()).unwrap_or(0);
        let auth_ctx = match params
            .get()
            .ok()
            .map(|p| validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()))
            .transpose()
        {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if recipient_key.len() != 32 {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                format!("recipientKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", recipient_key.len()),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        let auth_ctx = match auth_ctx {
            Some(ctx) => ctx,
            None => return Promise::err(coded_error(E003_INVALID_TOKEN, "auth required")),
        };

        if let Err(e) = require_identity_or_request(
            &auth_ctx,
            &recipient_key,
            self.auth_cfg.allow_insecure_identity_from_request,
        ) {
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        if channel_id.len() == 16 {
            let members = match self.store.get_channel_members(&channel_id) {
                Ok(Some(m)) => m,
                Ok(None) => {
                    return Promise::err(coded_error(E023_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND, "channel not found"));
                }
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
            };
            let caller = match crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                Ok(id) => id,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            };
            let (a, b) = &members;
            let caller_in = caller == a.as_slice() || caller == b.as_slice();
            let recipient_other = (recipient_key.as_slice() == a.as_slice() && caller == b.as_slice())
                || (recipient_key.as_slice() == b.as_slice() && caller == a.as_slice());
            if !caller_in || !recipient_other {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E022_CHANNEL_ACCESS_DENIED,
                    "caller or recipient not a member of this channel",
                ));
            }
        }

        let messages = if limit > 0 {
            match self
                .store
                .fetch_limited(&recipient_key, &channel_id, limit as usize)
                .map_err(storage_err)
            {
                Ok(m) => m,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            }
        } else {
            match self
                .store
                .fetch(&recipient_key, &channel_id)
                .map_err(storage_err)
            {
                Ok(m) => m,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            }
        };

        // Hook: on_fetch — fires after messages are retrieved.
        self.hooks.on_fetch(&FetchEvent {
            recipient_key: recipient_key.clone(),
            channel_id: channel_id.clone(),
            message_count: messages.len(),
        });

        // Audit: fetch — do not log payload or full keys.
        metrics::record_fetch_total();
        tracing::info!(
            recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&recipient_key[..4]),
            count = messages.len(),
            "audit: fetch"
        );

        let mut list = results.get().init_payloads(messages.len() as u32);
        for (i, (seq, data)) in messages.iter().enumerate() {
            let mut entry = list.reborrow().get(i as u32);
            entry.set_seq(*seq);
            entry.set_data(data);
        }

        Promise::ok(())
    }

    pub fn handle_fetch_wait(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::FetchWaitParams,
        mut results: node_service::FetchWaitResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let p = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let recipient_key = match p.get_recipient_key() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = p.get_channel_id().unwrap_or_default().to_vec();
        let version = p.get_version();
        let timeout_ms = p.get_timeout_ms();
        let limit = p.get_limit();
        let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if recipient_key.len() != 32 {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                format!("recipientKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", recipient_key.len()),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        if let Err(e) = require_identity_or_request(
            &auth_ctx,
            &recipient_key,
            self.auth_cfg.allow_insecure_identity_from_request,
        ) {
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        if channel_id.len() == 16 {
            let members = match self.store.get_channel_members(&channel_id) {
                Ok(Some(m)) => m,
                Ok(None) => {
                    return Promise::err(coded_error(E023_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND, "channel not found"));
                }
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
            };
            let caller = match crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                Ok(id) => id,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            };
            let (a, b) = &members;
            let caller_in = caller == a.as_slice() || caller == b.as_slice();
            let recipient_other = (recipient_key.as_slice() == a.as_slice() && caller == b.as_slice())
                || (recipient_key.as_slice() == b.as_slice() && caller == a.as_slice());
            if !caller_in || !recipient_other {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E022_CHANNEL_ACCESS_DENIED,
                    "caller or recipient not a member of this channel",
                ));
            }
        }

        let store = Arc::clone(&self.store);
        let waiters: Arc<DashMap<Vec<u8>, Arc<Notify>>> = self.waiters.clone();

        Promise::from_future(async move {
            let fetch_fn = |s: &Arc<dyn Store>, rk: &[u8], ch: &[u8], lim: u32| -> Result<Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>, capnp::Error> {
                if lim > 0 {
                    s.fetch_limited(rk, ch, lim as usize).map_err(storage_err)
                } else {
                    s.fetch(rk, ch).map_err(storage_err)
                }
            };

            let messages = fetch_fn(&store, &recipient_key, &channel_id, limit)?;

            if messages.is_empty() && timeout_ms > 0 {
                let waiter = waiters
                    .entry(recipient_key.clone())
                    .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Notify::new()))
                    .clone();
                let _ = timeout(Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms), waiter.notified()).await;
                let msgs = fetch_fn(&store, &recipient_key, &channel_id, limit)?;
                fill_payloads_wait(&mut results, msgs);
                metrics::record_fetch_wait_total();
                return Ok(());
            }

            fill_payloads_wait(&mut results, messages);
            metrics::record_fetch_wait_total();
            Ok(())
        })
    }

    pub fn handle_peek(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::PeekParams,
        mut results: node_service::PeekResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let p = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let recipient_key = match p.get_recipient_key() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = p.get_channel_id().unwrap_or_default().to_vec();
        let version = p.get_version();
        let limit = p.get_limit();
        let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if recipient_key.len() != 32 {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                format!("recipientKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", recipient_key.len()),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        if let Err(e) = require_identity_or_request(
            &auth_ctx,
            &recipient_key,
            self.auth_cfg.allow_insecure_identity_from_request,
        ) {
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        let messages = match self
            .store
            .peek(&recipient_key, &channel_id, limit as usize)
            .map_err(storage_err)
        {
            Ok(m) => m,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        tracing::info!(
            recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&recipient_key[..4]),
            count = messages.len(),
            "audit: peek"
        );

        let mut list = results.get().init_payloads(messages.len() as u32);
        for (i, (seq, data)) in messages.iter().enumerate() {
            let mut entry = list.reborrow().get(i as u32);
            entry.set_seq(*seq);
            entry.set_data(data);
        }

        Promise::ok(())
    }

    pub fn handle_ack(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::AckParams,
        _results: node_service::AckResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let p = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let recipient_key = match p.get_recipient_key() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = p.get_channel_id().unwrap_or_default().to_vec();
        let version = p.get_version();
        let seq_up_to = p.get_seq_up_to();
        let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if recipient_key.len() != 32 {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                format!("recipientKey must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", recipient_key.len()),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        if let Err(e) = require_identity_or_request(
            &auth_ctx,
            &recipient_key,
            self.auth_cfg.allow_insecure_identity_from_request,
        ) {
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        match self
            .store
            .ack(&recipient_key, &channel_id, seq_up_to)
            .map_err(storage_err)
        {
            Ok(removed) => {
                tracing::info!(
                    recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&recipient_key[..4]),
                    seq_up_to = seq_up_to,
                    removed = removed,
                    "audit: ack"
                );
            }
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        }

        Promise::ok(())
    }

    pub fn handle_batch_enqueue(
        &mut self,
        params: node_service::BatchEnqueueParams,
        mut results: node_service::BatchEnqueueResults,
    ) -> Promise<(), capnp::Error> {
        let p = match params.get() {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let recipient_keys = match p.get_recipient_keys() {
            Ok(v) => v,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let payload = match p.get_payload() {
            Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
        };
        let channel_id = p.get_channel_id().unwrap_or_default().to_vec();
        let version = p.get_version();
        let auth_ctx = match validate_auth_context(&self.auth_cfg, &self.sessions, p.get_auth()) {
            Ok(ctx) => ctx,
            Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
        };

        if payload.is_empty() {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(E005_PAYLOAD_EMPTY, "payload must not be empty"));
        }
        if payload.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E006_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
                format!("payload exceeds max size ({} bytes)", MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES),
            ));
        }
        if version > CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION {
            return Promise::err(coded_error(
                E012_WIRE_VERSION,
                format!("wire version {} not supported (max {CURRENT_WIRE_VERSION})", version),
            ));
        }

        if let Err(e) = check_rate_limit(&self.rate_limits, &auth_ctx.token) {
            tracing::warn!("rate_limit_hit");
            metrics::record_rate_limit_hit_total();
            return Promise::err(e);
        }

        // Phase 4.3 — DS sender identity binding (same guarantee as handle_enqueue).
        // sender_identity is derived solely from auth_ctx.identity_key, never client data.
        if !self.sealed_sender {
            if let Err(e) = crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                return Promise::err(e);
            }
        }

        // DM channel authz: validate caller membership once before the loop.
        if channel_id.len() == 16 {
            let members = match self.store.get_channel_members(&channel_id) {
                Ok(Some(m)) => m,
                Ok(None) => {
                    return Promise::err(coded_error(E023_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND, "channel not found"));
                }
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
            };
            let caller = match crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                Ok(id) => id,
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
            };
            let (a, b) = &members;
            let caller_in = caller == a.as_slice() || caller == b.as_slice();
            if !caller_in {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E022_CHANNEL_ACCESS_DENIED,
                    "caller is not a member of this channel",
                ));
            }
        }

        // Eagerly collect recipient keys so params can be dropped before any async work.
        let mut recipient_key_vecs: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(recipient_keys.len() as usize);
        for i in 0..recipient_keys.len() {
            let rk = match recipient_keys.get(i) {
                Ok(v) => v.to_vec(),
                Err(e) => return Promise::err(coded_error(E020_BAD_PARAMS, e)),
            };
            if rk.len() != 32 {
                return Promise::err(coded_error(
                    E004_IDENTITY_KEY_LENGTH,
                    format!("recipientKey[{}] must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}", i, rk.len()),
                ));
            }

            // Per-recipient DM channel membership check (only when channel_id is a 16-byte UUID).
            if channel_id.len() == 16 {
                let members = match self.store.get_channel_members(&channel_id) {
                    Ok(Some(m)) => m,
                    Ok(None) => {
                        return Promise::err(coded_error(
                            E023_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND,
                            "channel not found",
                        ));
                    }
                    Err(e) => return Promise::err(storage_err(e)),
                };
                let caller = match crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx) {
                    Ok(id) => id,
                    Err(e) => return Promise::err(e),
                };
                let (a, b) = &members;
                let recipient_other = (rk == *a && caller == b.as_slice())
                    || (rk == *b && caller == a.as_slice());
                if !recipient_other {
                    return Promise::err(coded_error(
                        E022_CHANNEL_ACCESS_DENIED,
                        "recipient is not a member of this channel",
                    ));
                }
            }

            recipient_key_vecs.push(rk);
        }

        // Hook: on_message_enqueue for each recipient — fires before storage.
        // sender_identity is derived solely from auth_ctx (server-side session state).
        let sender_identity = if self.sealed_sender {
            None
        } else {
            crate::auth::require_identity(&auth_ctx).ok().map(|v| v.to_vec())
        };
        let sender_prefix = sender_identity
            .as_deref()
            .filter(|id| id.len() >= 4)
            .map(|id| fmt_hex(&id[..4]));
        let mut hook_events = Vec::with_capacity(recipient_key_vecs.len());
        for rk in &recipient_key_vecs {
            let event = MessageEvent {
                sender_identity: sender_identity.clone(),
                recipient_key: rk.clone(),
                channel_id: channel_id.clone(),
                payload_len: payload.len(),
                seq: 0,
            };
            if let HookAction::Reject(reason) = self.hooks.on_message_enqueue(&event) {
                return Promise::err(capnp::Error::failed(format!("hook rejected enqueue: {reason}")));
            }
            hook_events.push(event);
        }

        let n = recipient_key_vecs.len();
        let store = Arc::clone(&self.store);
        let waiters = Arc::clone(&self.waiters);
        let fed_client = self.federation_client.clone();
        let local_domain = self.local_domain.clone();
        let hooks = Arc::clone(&self.hooks);

        // Use an async future to support federation relay alongside local enqueue.
        // All storage operations are synchronous; only federation relay calls are await-ed.
        Promise::from_future(async move {
            let mut seqs = Vec::with_capacity(n);

            for rk in &recipient_key_vecs {
                // Federation routing: relay to the recipient's home server when remote.
                let dest = if let (Some(ref _fed), Some(ref domain)) = (&fed_client, &local_domain) {
                    crate::federation::routing::resolve_destination(&store, rk, domain)
                } else {
                    crate::federation::routing::Destination::Local
                };

                let seq = match dest {
                    crate::federation::routing::Destination::Remote(ref remote_domain) => {
                        let fed = fed_client.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
                            capnp::Error::failed("federation client unavailable for remote routing".into())
                        })?;
                        tracing::info!(
                            recipient_prefix = %fmt_hex(&rk[..4]),
                            domain = %remote_domain,
                            "federation: routing batch enqueue to remote server"
                        );
                        fed.relay_enqueue(remote_domain, rk, &payload, &channel_id)
                            .await
                            .map_err(|e| {
                                capnp::Error::failed(format!("federation relay failed: {e}"))
                            })?
                    }
                    crate::federation::routing::Destination::Local => {
                        match store.queue_depth(rk, &channel_id) {
                            Ok(depth) if depth >= MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH => {
                                return Err(coded_error(
                                    E015_QUEUE_FULL,
                                    format!("queue depth {} exceeds limit {MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH}", depth),
                                ));
                            }
                            Err(e) => return Err(storage_err(e)),
                            _ => {}
                        }
                        store
                            .enqueue(rk, &channel_id, payload.clone())
                            .map_err(storage_err)?
                    }
                };

                seqs.push(seq);
                metrics::record_enqueue_total();
                metrics::record_enqueue_bytes(payload.len() as u64);
                crate::auth::waiter(&waiters, rk).notify_waiters();
            }

            let mut list = results.get().init_seqs(seqs.len() as u32);
            for (i, seq) in seqs.iter().enumerate() {
                list.set(i as u32, *seq);
            }

            // Hook: on_batch_enqueue — fires after all messages are stored.
            hooks.on_batch_enqueue(&hook_events);

            tracing::info!(
                sender_prefix = sender_prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or("sealed"),
                recipient_count = n,
                payload_len = payload.len(),
                "audit: batch_enqueue"
            );

            Ok(())
        })
    }
}