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394199b19b
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fix: security hardening — 40 findings from full codebase review
Full codebase review by 4 independent agents (security, architecture,
code quality, correctness) identified ~80 findings. This commit fixes 40
of them across all workspace crates.
Critical fixes:
- Federation service: validate origin against mTLS cert CN/SAN (C1)
- WS bridge: add DM channel auth, size limits, rate limiting (C2)
- hpke_seal: panic on error instead of silent empty ciphertext (C3)
- hpke_setup_sender_and_export: error on parse fail, no PQ downgrade (C7)
Security fixes:
- Zeroize: seed_bytes() returns Zeroizing<[u8;32]>, private_to_bytes()
returns Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, ClientAuth.access_token, SessionState.password,
conversation hex_key all wrapped in Zeroizing
- Keystore: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- MeshIdentity: 0o600 file permissions on Unix
- Timing floors: resolveIdentity + WS bridge resolve_user get 5ms floor
- Mobile: TLS verification gated behind insecure-dev feature flag
- Proto: from_bytes default limit tightened from 64 MiB to 8 MiB
Correctness fixes:
- fetch_wait: register waiter before fetch to close TOCTOU window
- MeshEnvelope: exclude hop_count from signature (forwarding no longer
invalidates sender signature)
- BroadcastChannel: encrypt returns Result instead of panicking
- transcript: rename verify_transcript_chain → validate_transcript_structure
- group.rs: extract shared process_incoming() for receive_message variants
- auth_ops: remove spurious RegistrationRequest deserialization
- MeshStore.seen: bounded to 100K with FIFO eviction
Quality fixes:
- FFI error classification: typed downcast instead of string matching
- Plugin HookVTable: SAFETY documentation for unsafe Send+Sync
- clippy::unwrap_used: warn → deny workspace-wide
- Various .unwrap_or("") → proper error returns
Review report: docs/REVIEW-2026-03-04.md
152 tests passing (72 core + 35 server + 14 E2E + 1 doctest + 30 P2P)
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2026-03-04 07:52:12 +01:00 |
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1b61b7ee8f
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feat: Sprint 9 — mesh identity, store-and-forward, broadcast channels
Self-sovereign mesh networking for offline-capable Freifunk deployments.
- MeshIdentity: Ed25519 keypair-based identity without AS registration,
JSON-persisted seed + known peers directory, sign/verify
- MeshEnvelope: signed store-and-forward envelope with TTL, hop_count,
max_hops, SHA-256 dedup ID, Ed25519 signature verification
- MeshStore: in-memory message queue with dedup, per-recipient capacity
limits, TTL-based garbage collection
- BroadcastChannel: symmetric ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted topic-based
pub/sub for mesh announcements, no MLS overhead
- BroadcastManager: subscribe/unsubscribe/create channels by topic
- P2pNode integration: send_mesh(), receive_mesh(), forward_stored(),
subscribe(), create_broadcast(), broadcast()
- Extended mesh REPL: /mesh send, /mesh broadcast, /mesh subscribe,
/mesh route, /mesh identity, /mesh store (feature-gated)
28 P2P tests pass (21 existing + 7 broadcast). All builds clean.
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2026-03-04 01:42:09 +01:00 |
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