feat: add post-quantum hybrid KEM + SQLCipher persistence
Feature 1 — Post-Quantum Hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768): - Create hybrid_kem.rs with keygen, encrypt, decrypt + 11 unit tests - Wire format: version(1) | x25519_eph_pk(32) | mlkem_ct(1088) | nonce(12) | ct - Add uploadHybridKey/fetchHybridKey RPCs to node.capnp schema - Server: hybrid key storage in FileBackedStore + RPC handlers - Client: hybrid keypair in StoredState, auto-wrap/unwrap in send/recv/invite/join - demo-group runs full hybrid PQ envelope round-trip Feature 2 — SQLCipher Persistence: - Extract Store trait from FileBackedStore API - Create SqlStore (rusqlite + bundled-sqlcipher) with encrypted-at-rest SQLite - Schema: key_packages, deliveries, hybrid_keys tables with indexes - Server CLI: --store-backend=sql, --db-path, --db-key flags - 5 unit tests for SqlStore (FIFO, round-trip, upsert, channel isolation) Also includes: client lib.rs refactor, auth config, TOML config file support, mdBook documentation, and various cleanups by user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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README.md
231
README.md
@@ -8,10 +8,6 @@ and ratcheted group key agreement across any number of participants. Messages
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are framed with **Cap'n Proto**, keeping serialisation zero-copy and
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schema-versioned.
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---
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## Protocol stack
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Application / MLS ciphertext │ <- group key ratchet (RFC 9420)
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@@ -33,165 +29,64 @@ schema-versioned.
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---
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## Repository layout
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## Documentation
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```
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quicnprotochat/
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├── crates/
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│ ├── quicnprotochat-core/ # Crypto primitives, QUIC/TLS client helpers, MLS group state machine
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│ │ ├── src/codec.rs # LengthPrefixedCodec — Tokio Encoder + Decoder
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│ │ ├── src/keypair.rs # Transport key helpers (X25519, zeroize-on-drop)
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│ │ ├── src/identity.rs # IdentityKeypair — Ed25519 identity + MLS Signer
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│ │ ├── src/keypackage.rs# generate_key_package — standalone KeyPackage helper
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│ │ └── src/group.rs # GroupMember — full MLS group lifecycle
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│ │
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│ ├── quicnprotochat-proto/ # Cap'n Proto schemas + generated types + serde helpers
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│ │ └── schemas/ → # (symlinked to workspace root schemas/)
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│ │
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│ ├── quicnprotochat-server/ # Authentication Service (AS) + Delivery Service (DS) binary
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│ └── quicnprotochat-client/ # CLI client (ping, register, fetch-key, …)
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│
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└── schemas/
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├── envelope.capnp # Top-level wire envelope (MsgType discriminant + payload)
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├── auth.capnp # AuthenticationService RPC (KeyPackage upload / fetch)
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└── delivery.capnp # DeliveryService RPC (enqueue / fetch MLS messages)
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```
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---
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## Services
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### Node Service (Auth + Delivery) — port 4201
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Single QUIC + TLS 1.3 endpoint exposing Cap'n Proto `NodeService` that combines
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Authentication (KeyPackage upload/fetch) and Delivery (enqueue/fetch) operations.
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```
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uploadKeyPackage(identityKey: Data, package: Data) -> (fingerprint: Data)
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fetchKeyPackage(identityKey: Data) -> (package: Data)
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```
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Packages are indexed by the raw Ed25519 public key (32 bytes) and consumed
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exactly once on fetch, matching the MLS single-use KeyPackage requirement.
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A simple store-and-forward relay for MLS messages. The server never inspects
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payloads — it routes opaque blobs by recipient public key.
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```
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enqueue(recipientKey: Data, payload: Data) -> ()
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fetch(recipientKey: Data) -> (payloads: List(Data))
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```
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`fetch` atomically drains the entire queue in FIFO order.
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---
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## MLS group lifecycle
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```
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GroupMember::new(identity)
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│
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├─ generate_key_package() → upload bytes to AS
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│
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├─ create_group(group_id) → epoch 0, sole member
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│ └─ add_member(kp_bytes)→ (commit_bytes, welcome_bytes)
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│ ↑ │ │
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│ fetched from AS discard send to joiner via DS
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│
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└─ join_group(welcome_bytes) → joined; ready to encrypt
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├─ send_message(plain) → TLS-encoded PrivateMessage → DS
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└─ receive_message(ct) → Some(plaintext) | None (Commit)
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```
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The `OpenMlsRustCrypto` backend is **persistent across calls** on the same
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`GroupMember` instance — it holds the HPKE init private key in its in-memory
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key store between `generate_key_package` and `join_group`.
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---
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## Building
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**Prerequisites:**
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- Rust (stable, 1.77+)
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- `capnp` CLI — the Cap'n Proto schema compiler
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Full documentation is available as an **mdBook** wiki in [`docs/`](docs/):
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```bash
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# Debian / Ubuntu
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apt-get install capnproto
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# Install mdBook (once)
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cargo install mdbook
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# macOS
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brew install capnp
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# Build and serve locally
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mdbook serve docs
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# Open http://localhost:3000
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```
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**Build everything:**
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### Highlights
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- **[Architecture Overview](docs/src/architecture/overview.md)** — Two-service model, dual-key design, crate layout
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- **[Protocol Deep Dives](docs/src/protocol-layers/overview.md)** — QUIC/TLS, Noise_XX, Cap'n Proto, MLS, Hybrid KEM
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- **[Cryptographic Properties](docs/src/cryptography/overview.md)** — Forward secrecy, post-compromise security, PQ readiness, threat model
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- **[Design Rationale](docs/src/design-rationale/overview.md)** — Why MLS over Signal/Matrix, ADRs for all key decisions
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- **[Wire Format Reference](docs/src/wire-format/overview.md)** — Annotated Cap'n Proto schemas
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- **[Getting Started](docs/src/getting-started/prerequisites.md)** — Build, run, demo walkthrough
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- **[Roadmap](docs/src/roadmap/milestones.md)** — Milestones, production readiness, future research
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---
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## Quick start
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```bash
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# Prerequisites: Rust 1.77+, capnp CLI
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brew install capnp # macOS
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# apt-get install capnproto # Debian/Ubuntu
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# Build and test
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cargo build --workspace
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```
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**Run tests:**
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```bash
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cargo test --workspace
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```
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---
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## Running
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**Start the server** (NodeService on :4201):
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```bash
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# Start the server (port 7000 by default)
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-server
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# or with a custom port:
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-server -- --listen 0.0.0.0:4201
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```
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Current TLS defaults (development): self-signed cert/key written to `data/` if
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missing. Override via CLI flags or env vars:
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# Or via a config file (TOML)
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cat > quicnprotochat-server.toml <<'EOF'
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listen = "0.0.0.0:7000"
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data_dir = "data"
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tls_cert = "data/server-cert.der"
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tls_key = "data/server-key.der"
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auth_token = "devtoken"
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store_backend = "file" # or "sql"
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db_path = "data/quicnprotochat.db"
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db_key = ""
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EOF
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-server -- --config quicnprotochat-server.toml
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| Purpose | Flag | Env var | Default |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Listen address | `--listen` | `QUICNPROTOCHAT_LISTEN` | `0.0.0.0:4201` |
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| TLS cert (DER) | `--tls-cert` | `QUICNPROTOCHAT_TLS_CERT` | `data/server-cert.der` |
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| TLS key (DER) | `--tls-key` | `QUICNPROTOCHAT_TLS_KEY` | `data/server-key.der` |
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**Client commands:**
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```bash
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# Check connectivity
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- ping
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# Generate a fresh identity + KeyPackage, upload to AS
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# Prints your identity_key (hex) — share this with peers
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- register
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# Fetch a peer's KeyPackage (they must have registered first)
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- fetch-key <64-hex-char identity key>
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# Run an end-to-end Alice↔Bob demo against live AS + DS
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# Run the Alice/Bob demo
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- demo-group \
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--server 127.0.0.1:4201 \
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--ds-server 127.0.0.1:4201
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# Persistent group CLI (stateful)
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- register-state --state state.bin --server 127.0.0.1:4201
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- create-group --state state.bin --group-id my-group
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- invite --state state.bin --peer-key <peer hex> --server 127.0.0.1:4201 --ds-server 127.0.0.1:4201
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- join --state state.bin --ds-server 127.0.0.1:4201
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- send --state state.bin --peer-key <peer hex> --msg "hello" --ds-server 127.0.0.1:4201
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cargo run -p quicnprotochat-client -- recv --state state.bin --ds-server 127.0.0.1:4201
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--server 127.0.0.1:7000 --ds-server 127.0.0.1:7000
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```
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Server address defaults to `127.0.0.1:4201`; override with `--server` or
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`QUICNPROTOCHAT_SERVER`. The same endpoint serves both Authentication and
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Delivery.
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State file notes: the persisted state stores your identity and MLS group state
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after you have joined. If you generate a KeyPackage (`register-state`) and then
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restart before consuming the Welcome, the join may fail because the HPKE init
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key is not retained; run join in the same session you register.
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See the [full demo walkthrough](docs/src/getting-started/demo-walkthrough.md) for a step-by-step guide.
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---
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@@ -199,45 +94,21 @@ key is not retained; run join in the same session you register.
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| # | Name | Status | What it adds |
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|---|------|--------|--------------|
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| M1 | QUIC/TLS transport | ✅ | QUIC + TLS 1.3 endpoint, length-prefixed framing, Ping/Pong |
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| M2 | Authentication Service | ✅ | Ed25519 identity, KeyPackage generation, AS upload/fetch |
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| M3 | Delivery Service + MLS groups | ✅ | DS relay, `GroupMember` create/join/add/send/recv |
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| M4 | Group CLI subcommands | 🔜 | Persistent CLI (`create-group`, `invite`, `join`, `send`, `recv`); demo-group already available |
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| M5 | Multi-party groups | 🔜 | N > 2 members, Commit fan-out, Proposal handling |
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| M6 | Persistence | 🔜 | SQLite key store, durable group state |
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| M7 | Post-quantum | 🔜 | PQ hybrid for MLS/HPKE |
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---
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## Production hardening roadmap (high level)
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1) **Transport & identity**: ACME/Let’s Encrypt, pinned identities, TLS policy
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hardening, server identity via CA.
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2) **Persistence**: Move AS/DS and MLS state to Postgres; encrypted at rest;
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retention/TTL and migrations.
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3) **AuthZ & accounts**: User/device accounts (OIDC/passwordless), device
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binding, revocation/recovery; bind MLS credentials to issued identities.
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4) **Delivery semantics**: Message IDs, idempotent enqueue/fetch, ordering per
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conversation, backpressure/retries; attachment pipeline via encrypted
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object storage.
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5) **Observability & ops**: Structured logs with correlation IDs; Prometheus
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metrics; tracing; alerting + SLOs; audit logs for auth/key events.
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6) **Client resilience**: Reconnect/resume, offline queue, multi-device key
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handling; key verification UX (QR/safety numbers); recovery flows.
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7) **Security & compliance**: Dependency audits, fuzzing, SAST/DAST, pentest;
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SBOM/signed releases; PII minimization and retention controls.
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| M1 | QUIC/TLS transport | Done | QUIC + TLS 1.3 endpoint, length-prefixed framing, Ping/Pong |
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| M2 | Authentication Service | Done | Ed25519 identity, KeyPackage generation, AS upload/fetch |
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| M3 | Delivery Service + MLS groups | Done | DS relay, `GroupMember` create/join/add/send/recv |
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| M4 | Group CLI subcommands | Next | Persistent CLI (`create-group`, `invite`, `join`, `send`, `recv`) |
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| M5 | Multi-party groups | Planned | N > 2 members, Commit fan-out, Proposal handling |
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| M6 | Persistence | Planned | SQLite key store, durable group state |
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| M7 | Post-quantum | Planned | PQ hybrid for MLS/HPKE (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) |
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---
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## Security notes
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- This is a **proof-of-concept**. It has not been audited.
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- The server uses a self-signed TLS cert by default; clients trust it via a
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local DER file. No pinning or CA-based identity is enforced yet.
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- MLS credentials use `CredentialType::Basic` (public key only). A real
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deployment would bind credentials to a certificate authority.
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- The Delivery operation does no authentication of the `recipientKey` field —
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anyone can enqueue for any recipient. Access control is a future milestone.
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This is a **proof-of-concept research project**. It has not been audited.
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See the [threat model](docs/src/cryptography/threat-model.md) for a detailed
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analysis of what is and isn't protected.
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---
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