diff --git a/ROADMAP.md b/ROADMAP.md
index d1408cd..806d3fd 100644
--- a/ROADMAP.md
+++ b/ROADMAP.md
@@ -11,29 +11,29 @@
 
 Eliminate all crash paths, enforce secure defaults, fix deployment blockers.
 
-- [ ] **1.1 Remove `.unwrap()` / `.expect()` from production paths**
+- [x] **1.1 Remove `.unwrap()` / `.expect()` from production paths**
   - Replace `AUTH_CONTEXT.read().expect()` in client RPC with proper `Result`
   - Replace `"0.0.0.0:0".parse().unwrap()` in client with fallible parse
   - Replace `Mutex::lock().unwrap()` in server storage with `.map_err()`
   - Audit: `grep -rn 'unwrap()\|expect(' crates/` outside `#[cfg(test)]`
 
-- [ ] **1.2 Enforce secure defaults in production mode**
+- [x] **1.2 Enforce secure defaults in production mode**
   - Reject startup if `QPQ_PRODUCTION=true` and `auth_token` is empty or `"devtoken"`
   - Require non-empty `db_key` when using SQL backend in production
   - Refuse to auto-generate TLS certs in production mode (require existing cert+key)
   - Already partially implemented — verify and harden the validation in `config.rs`
 
-- [ ] **1.3 Fix `.gitignore`**
+- [x] **1.3 Fix `.gitignore`**
   - Add `data/`, `*.der`, `*.pem`, `*.db`, `*.bin` (state files), `*.ks` (keystores)
   - Verify no secrets are already tracked: `git ls-files data/ *.der *.db`
 
-- [ ] **1.4 Fix Dockerfile**
+- [x] **1.4 Fix Dockerfile**
   - Sync workspace members (handle excluded `p2p` crate)
   - Create dedicated user/group instead of `nobody`
   - Set writable `QPQ_DATA_DIR` with correct permissions
   - Test: `docker build . && docker run --rm -it qpq-server --help`
 
-- [ ] **1.5 TLS certificate lifecycle**
+- [x] **1.5 TLS certificate lifecycle**
   - Document CA-signed cert setup (Let's Encrypt / custom CA)
   - Add `--tls-required` flag that refuses to start without valid cert
   - Log clear warning when using self-signed certs
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Eliminate all crash paths, enforce secure defaults, fix deployment blockers.
 
 Build confidence before adding features.
 
-- [ ] **2.1 Expand E2E test coverage**
+- [x] **2.1 Expand E2E test coverage**
   - Auth failure scenarios (wrong password, expired token, invalid token)
   - Message ordering verification (send N messages, verify seq numbers)
   - Concurrent clients (3+ members in group, simultaneous send/recv)
@@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ Build confidence before adding features.
   - Reconnection after server restart
   - KeyPackage exhaustion (fetch when none available)
 
-- [ ] **2.2 Add unit tests for untested paths**
+- [x] **2.2 Add unit tests for untested paths**
   - Client retry logic (exponential backoff, jitter, retriable classification)
   - REPL input parsing edge cases (empty input, special characters, `/` commands)
   - State file encryption/decryption round-trip with bad password
   - Token cache expiry
   - Conversation store migrations
 
-- [ ] **2.3 CI hardening**
+- [x] **2.3 CI hardening**
   - Add `.github/CODEOWNERS` (crypto, auth, wire-format require 2 reviewers)
   - Ensure `cargo deny check` runs on every PR (already in CI — verify)
   - Add `cargo audit` as blocking check (already in CI — verify)
   - Add coverage reporting (tarpaulin or llvm-cov)
   - Add CI job for Docker build validation
 
-- [ ] **2.4 Clean up build warnings**
+- [x] **2.4 Clean up build warnings**
   - Fix Cap'n Proto generated `unused_parens` warnings
   - Remove dead code / unused imports
   - Address `openmls` future-incompat warnings
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Address the security gaps required for real-world deployment.
   - `sender_prefix` tracking in enqueue/batch_enqueue RPCs
   - Sender identity derived from authenticated session
 
-- [ ] **4.4 M7 — Post-quantum MLS integration**
+- [x] **4.4 M7 — Post-quantum MLS integration**
   - Integrate hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) into the OpenMLS crypto provider
   - Group key material gets post-quantum confidentiality
   - Full test suite with PQ ciphersuite