Remove Noise protocol references from wiki docs and tests

Delete 8 Noise-specific documentation pages (noise-xx.md,
transport-keys.md, adr-001/003/006, framing-codec.md) and update
~30 remaining wiki pages to reflect QUIC+TLS as the sole transport.
Remove obsolete Noise-based integration tests (auth_service.rs,
mls_group.rs). Code-side Noise removal was done in f334ed3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/src/protocol-layers/hybrid-kem.md

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ The hybrid KEM module is:
 
 The M5 milestone will integrate the hybrid KEM, likely as an outer encryption layer. Until then, MLS application data is protected by classical X25519 ECDH (128-bit security against classical computers, vulnerable to quantum computers).
 
-The post-quantum gap in the transport layer ([QUIC + TLS 1.3](quic-tls.md) and [Noise\_XX](noise-xx.md)) is a separate concern tracked in [ADR-006: PQ Gap in Noise Transport](../design-rationale/adr-006-pq-gap.md).
+The post-quantum gap in the transport layer ([QUIC + TLS 1.3](quic-tls.md)) is a separate concern -- TLS 1.3 key exchange uses classical ECDHE and does not yet include post-quantum key agreement.
 
 ## Security analysis
 
@@ -276,6 +276,5 @@ The AEAD nonce is derived deterministically from the shared secrets via HKDF. Si
 - [Post-Quantum Readiness](../cryptography/post-quantum-readiness.md) -- Broader discussion of quicnprotochat's PQ strategy.
 - [MLS (RFC 9420)](mls.md) -- The MLS layer that the hybrid KEM will wrap.
 - [Key Lifecycle and Zeroization](../cryptography/key-lifecycle.md) -- How hybrid key material is managed and cleared.
-- [ADR-006: PQ Gap in Noise Transport](../design-rationale/adr-006-pq-gap.md) -- The accepted PQ gap in the transport layers.
 - [Threat Model](../cryptography/threat-model.md) -- Where hybrid KEM fits in the overall threat model.
 - [Milestone Tracker](../roadmap/milestones.md) -- M5 milestone for hybrid KEM integration into MLS.