Remove Noise protocol references from wiki docs and tests
Delete 8 Noise-specific documentation pages (noise-xx.md,
transport-keys.md, adr-001/003/006, framing-codec.md) and update
~30 remaining wiki pages to reflect QUIC+TLS as the sole transport.
Remove obsolete Noise-based integration tests (auth_service.rs,
mls_group.rs). Code-side Noise removal was done in f334ed3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ These decisions are not immutable. Each ADR has a status field and can be supers
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| ADR | Title | Status | One-line summary |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| [ADR-001](adr-001-noise-xx.md) | Noise\_XX for Transport Auth | Accepted | Mutual authentication via static X25519 keys; no CA infrastructure required. |
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| [ADR-002](adr-002-capnproto.md) | Cap'n Proto over MessagePack | Accepted | Zero-copy, schema-enforced serialisation with built-in async RPC replaces hand-rolled MessagePack dispatch. |
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| [ADR-003](adr-003-rpc-inside-noise.md) | RPC Inside the Noise Tunnel | Accepted | Cap'n Proto RPC operates over the encrypted byte stream; transport owns security, RPC owns dispatch. |
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| [ADR-004](adr-004-mls-unaware-ds.md) | MLS-Unaware Delivery Service | Accepted | The DS routes opaque blobs by recipient key; it never inspects MLS content. |
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| [ADR-005](adr-005-single-use-keypackages.md) | Single-Use KeyPackages | Accepted | The AS atomically removes a KeyPackage on fetch to preserve MLS forward secrecy. |
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| [ADR-006](adr-006-pq-gap.md) | PQ Gap in Noise Transport | Accepted | Classical X25519 in Noise is accepted for M1-M5; MLS content is PQ-protected separately. |
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---
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@@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ Several themes recur across multiple ADRs:
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### Layered security
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ADR-001, ADR-003, and ADR-006 all concern the separation between transport-layer security (Noise or QUIC/TLS) and application-layer security (MLS). The core principle is that **no single layer is trusted alone**. Transport encryption protects metadata and provides authentication; MLS provides end-to-end content encryption with forward secrecy and post-compromise security.
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The core principle is that **no single layer is trusted alone**. QUIC/TLS transport encryption protects metadata and provides authentication; MLS provides end-to-end content encryption with forward secrecy and post-compromise security.
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### Server minimalism
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@@ -51,7 +48,7 @@ ADR-004 and ADR-005 reflect a design philosophy where the server does as little
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### Schema-first design
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ADR-002 and ADR-003 establish Cap'n Proto as the single source of truth for the wire format. Every message and RPC call is defined in `.capnp` schema files, which are checked into the repository and used for code generation. This eliminates the class of bugs that arises from hand-rolled serialisation and ensures that the wire format is documented, versioned, and evolvable.
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ADR-002 establishes Cap'n Proto as the single source of truth for the wire format. Every message and RPC call is defined in `.capnp` schema files, which are checked into the repository and used for code generation. This eliminates the class of bugs that arises from hand-rolled serialisation and ensures that the wire format is documented, versioned, and evolvable.
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---
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