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Remove Noise protocol references from wiki docs and tests

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Delete 8 Noise-specific documentation pages (noise-xx.md,
transport-keys.md, adr-001/003/006, framing-codec.md) and update
~30 remaining wiki pages to reflect QUIC+TLS as the sole transport.
Remove obsolete Noise-based integration tests (auth_service.rs,
mls_group.rs). Code-side Noise removal was done in f334ed3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Nennemann
2026-02-22 08:25:23 +01:00
parent f334ed3d43
commit 9fdb37876a
36 changed files with 125 additions and 2201 deletions
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31
docs/src/cryptography/forward-secrecy.md
View File

@@ -30,30 +30,6 @@ Because the ephemeral keys exist only for the duration of the handshake,
compromising the server's long-term TLS certificate key (currently self-signed
in quicnprotochat) does not reveal past session keys.
### Noise\_XX
Inside the QUIC stream, the Noise\_XX handshake
(`Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s`) provides an additional layer of forward
secrecy. The Noise\_XX pattern uses both ephemeral and static X25519 keys:
```text
→ e Initiator sends ephemeral public key
← e, ee, s, es Responder: ephemeral, DH(e,e), static, DH(e,s)
→ s, se Initiator: static, DH(s,e)
```
The `ee` DH (ephemeral-ephemeral) provides forward secrecy: even if both
parties' static keys (`s`) are later compromised, the ephemeral keys that
contributed to `ee` have already been discarded.
The `es` and `se` DH operations mix in the static keys for authentication, but
the session key depends on the ephemeral contribution. An attacker who
compromises only the static key learns the identity of the parties but cannot
recover the session key without the ephemeral key.
See [X25519 Transport Keys](transport-keys.md) for details on the static
keypair.
## Application Layer Forward Secrecy
### MLS Epoch Ratchet
@@ -125,9 +101,9 @@ operates at two independent layers:
|
v
+------------------------------------------------------+
| TLS 1.3 / Noise_XX |
| Forward secrecy via ephemeral ECDHE / X25519 DH |
| Even if TLS cert or Noise static key is compromised,|
| TLS 1.3 (QUIC) |
| Forward secrecy via ephemeral ECDHE |
| Even if TLS cert is compromised, |
| past transport sessions are protected. |
+------------------------------------------------------+
|
@@ -201,5 +177,4 @@ uniformly to all group members.
- [Key Lifecycle and Zeroization](key-lifecycle.md) -- when keys are created and destroyed
- [Post-Compromise Security](post-compromise-security.md) -- the complementary property (protecting the future)
- [Threat Model](threat-model.md) -- attacker models and what FS protects against
- [X25519 Transport Keys](transport-keys.md) -- Noise ephemeral DH details
- [Ed25519 Identity Keys](identity-keys.md) -- long-term key that FS protects against compromising