c/quicproquo
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

chore: rename project quicnprotochat -> quicproquo (binaries: qpq)

Browse Source 
Rename the entire workspace:
- Crate packages: quicnprotochat-{core,proto,server,client,gui,p2p,mobile} -> quicproquo-*
- Binary names: quicnprotochat -> qpq, quicnprotochat-server -> qpq-server,
  quicnprotochat-gui -> qpq-gui
- Default files: *-state.bin -> qpq-state.bin, *-server.toml -> qpq-server.toml,
  *.db -> qpq.db
- Environment variable prefix: QUICNPROTOCHAT_* -> QPQ_*
- App identifier: chat.quicnproto.gui -> chat.quicproquo.gui
- Proto package: quicnprotochat.bench -> quicproquo.bench
- All documentation, Docker, CI, and script references updated

HKDF domain-separation strings and P2P ALPN remain unchanged for
backward compatibility with existing encrypted state and wire protocol.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Nennemann
2026-03-01 20:11:51 +01:00
parent 553de3a2b7
commit 853ca4fec0
152 changed files with 4070 additions and 788 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

30
docs/src/appendix/references.md
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# References and Further Reading
This page collects the standards, crate documentation, and research papers
referenced throughout the quicnprotochat documentation. Entries are organised by
referenced throughout the quicproquo documentation. Entries are organised by
category.
---
@@ -10,21 +10,21 @@ category.
| Reference | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| [RFC 9420 -- The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/) | The group key agreement protocol used by quicnprotochat. Defines KeyPackages, Welcome messages, Commits, the ratchet tree, epoch advancement, and the security properties (forward secrecy, post-compromise security). See [MLS (RFC 9420)](../protocol-layers/mls.md). |
| [RFC 9000 -- QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9000/) | The transport protocol underlying quicnprotochat's primary connection layer. Provides multiplexed streams, 0-RTT connection establishment, and built-in congestion control. See [QUIC + TLS 1.3](../protocol-layers/quic-tls.md). |
| [RFC 9001 -- Using TLS to Secure QUIC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9001/) | Defines how TLS 1.3 is integrated into QUIC for authentication and key exchange. quicnprotochat uses this via the `quinn` + `rustls` stack. |
| [RFC 8446 -- The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8446/) | The TLS version used exclusively by quicnprotochat (no TLS 1.2 fallback). Provides the handshake, key schedule, and record layer for QUIC transport security. |
| [RFC 9180 -- Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9180/) | The public-key encryption scheme used internally by MLS for encrypting to KeyPackage init keys. quicnprotochat's MLS ciphersuite uses DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) with AES-128-GCM. |
| [NIST FIPS 203 -- Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final) | The post-quantum KEM standard. quicnprotochat plans to use ML-KEM-768 in a hybrid construction with X25519 at milestone M7. See [Post-Quantum Readiness](../cryptography/post-quantum-readiness.md). |
| [Cap'n Proto specification](https://capnproto.org/) | The zero-copy serialisation format and RPC system used for all quicnprotochat wire messages and service interfaces. See [Cap'n Proto Serialisation and RPC](../protocol-layers/capn-proto.md). |
| [draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design -- Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/) | The combiner approach used by quicnprotochat's hybrid KEM construction (X25519 shared secret concatenated with ML-KEM-768 shared secret, fed through HKDF). See [Hybrid KEM](../protocol-layers/hybrid-kem.md). |
| [RFC 9420 -- The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/) | The group key agreement protocol used by quicproquo. Defines KeyPackages, Welcome messages, Commits, the ratchet tree, epoch advancement, and the security properties (forward secrecy, post-compromise security). See [MLS (RFC 9420)](../protocol-layers/mls.md). |
| [RFC 9000 -- QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9000/) | The transport protocol underlying quicproquo's primary connection layer. Provides multiplexed streams, 0-RTT connection establishment, and built-in congestion control. See [QUIC + TLS 1.3](../protocol-layers/quic-tls.md). |
| [RFC 9001 -- Using TLS to Secure QUIC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9001/) | Defines how TLS 1.3 is integrated into QUIC for authentication and key exchange. quicproquo uses this via the `quinn` + `rustls` stack. |
| [RFC 8446 -- The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8446/) | The TLS version used exclusively by quicproquo (no TLS 1.2 fallback). Provides the handshake, key schedule, and record layer for QUIC transport security. |
| [RFC 9180 -- Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9180/) | The public-key encryption scheme used internally by MLS for encrypting to KeyPackage init keys. quicproquo's MLS ciphersuite uses DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) with AES-128-GCM. |
| [NIST FIPS 203 -- Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final) | The post-quantum KEM standard. quicproquo plans to use ML-KEM-768 in a hybrid construction with X25519 at milestone M7. See [Post-Quantum Readiness](../cryptography/post-quantum-readiness.md). |
| [Cap'n Proto specification](https://capnproto.org/) | The zero-copy serialisation format and RPC system used for all quicproquo wire messages and service interfaces. See [Cap'n Proto Serialisation and RPC](../protocol-layers/capn-proto.md). |
| [draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design -- Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/) | The combiner approach used by quicproquo's hybrid KEM construction (X25519 shared secret concatenated with ML-KEM-768 shared secret, fed through HKDF). See [Hybrid KEM](../protocol-layers/hybrid-kem.md). |
| [RFC 9497 -- OPAQUE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9497/) | Asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange. Considered for future authentication (see [Future Research](../roadmap/future-research.md)). |
---
## Rust Crate Documentation
| Crate | docs.rs | Role in quicnprotochat |
| Crate | docs.rs | Role in quicproquo |
|-------|---------|----------------------|
| `openmls` | [docs.rs/openmls](https://docs.rs/openmls/) | MLS protocol implementation: group creation, member addition, Welcome processing, application message encryption/decryption. See [MLS (RFC 9420)](../protocol-layers/mls.md). |
| `openmls_rust_crypto` | [docs.rs/openmls_rust_crypto](https://docs.rs/openmls_rust_crypto/) | Pure-Rust cryptographic backend for openmls. Provides the `OpenMlsRustCrypto` provider used by `GroupMember`. |
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Katriel Cohn-Gordon, Cas Cremers, Luke Garratt, Jon Millican, and Kevin Milner.
This paper analyses the security properties of group messaging protocols and
motivates the design of MLS. It defines the security goals (forward secrecy,
post-compromise security, asynchronous operation) that MLS formalises into a
protocol. Essential background for understanding why quicnprotochat uses MLS
protocol. Essential background for understanding why quicproquo uses MLS
rather than extending the Signal protocol to groups.
### Signal Protocol
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Trevor Perrin and Moxie Marlinspike.
[signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
Defines the double ratchet used in Signal's 1:1 messaging. Relevant as a
potential optimisation for quicnprotochat's 1:1 channels (see
potential optimisation for quicproquo's 1:1 channels (see
[Future Research: Double-Ratchet DM Layer](../roadmap/future-research.md#double-ratchet-dm-layer))
and as background for understanding how MLS generalises ratcheting to groups.
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Roberto Avanzi et al.
[NIST PQC Round 3 submission](https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/)
The predecessor to ML-KEM (NIST FIPS 203). CRYSTALS-Kyber was selected by NIST
and standardised as ML-KEM. quicnprotochat uses the `ml-kem` crate which
and standardised as ML-KEM. quicproquo uses the `ml-kem` crate which
implements the final FIPS 203 standard.
### Metadata Resistance
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Signal Blog.
[signal.org/blog/sealed-sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/)
Describes Signal's approach to hiding sender identity from the server. Relevant
to quicnprotochat's future research on metadata resistance (see
to quicproquo's future research on metadata resistance (see
[Future Research](../roadmap/future-research.md)).
---
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ to quicnprotochat's future research on metadata resistance (see
## Cross-references
- [Glossary](glossary.md) -- definitions of terms used in these references
- [Protocol Layers Overview](../protocol-layers/overview.md) -- how the protocols layer in quicnprotochat
- [Protocol Layers Overview](../protocol-layers/overview.md) -- how the protocols layer in quicproquo
- [Cryptography Overview](../cryptography/overview.md) -- cryptographic properties and threat model
- [Future Research](../roadmap/future-research.md) -- technologies under consideration
- [Milestones](../roadmap/milestones.md) -- current project status