feat: add delivery sequence numbers + major server/client refactor

Delivery sequence numbers (MLS epoch ordering fix):
- schemas/node.capnp: add Envelope{seq,data} struct; enqueue returns seq:UInt64;
  fetch/fetchWait return List(Envelope) instead of List(Data)
- storage.rs: Store trait enqueue returns u64; fetch/fetch_limited return
  Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>; FileBackedStore gains QueueMapV3 with per-inbox seq
  counters and V2→V3 on-disk migration
- migrations/002_add_seq.sql: seq column, delivery_seq_counters table, index
- sql_store.rs: atomic UPSERT counter via RETURNING, ORDER BY seq, SCHEMA_VERSION→3
- node_service/delivery.rs: builds Envelope list; returns seq from enqueue
- client/rpc.rs: enqueue→u64, fetch_all/fetch_wait→Vec<(u64,Vec<u8>)>
- client/commands.rs: sort-by-seq before MLS processing; retry loop in cmd_recv
  and receive_pending_plaintexts for correct epoch ordering

Server refactor:
- Split monolithic main.rs into node_service/{mod,delivery,auth_ops,key_ops,p2p_ops}
- Add auth.rs (token validation, rate limiting), config.rs, metrics.rs, tls.rs
- Add SQL migrations runner (001_initial.sql, 002_add_seq.sql)
- OPAQUE PAKE login/registration, sealed-sender mode, queue depth limit (1000)

Client refactor:
- Split lib.rs into client/{commands,rpc,state,retry,hex,mod}
- Add cmd_whoami, cmd_health, cmd_check_key, cmd_ping subcommands
- Add cmd_register_user, cmd_login (OPAQUE), cmd_refresh_keypackage
- Hybrid PQ envelope (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) on all send/recv paths
- E2E test suite expanded

Other:
- quicnprotochat-gui: Tauri 2 desktop GUI skeleton (backend + HTML UI)
- quicnprotochat-p2p: iroh-based P2P transport stub
- quicnprotochat-core: app_message, hybrid_crypto modules; GroupMember API updates
- .github/workflows/size-lint.yml: binary size regression check
- docs: protocol comparison, roadmap updates, fully-operational checklist
This commit is contained in:
2026-02-22 20:40:12 +01:00
parent b5b361e2ff
commit 6b8b61c6ae
56 changed files with 10693 additions and 3024 deletions

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@@ -54,3 +54,5 @@ dashmap = { workspace = true }
assert_cmd = "2"
tempfile = "3"
portpicker = "0.1"
rand = "0.8"
hex = "0.4"

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
pub fn encode(bytes: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> String {
bytes.as_ref().iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
}
pub fn decode(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, &'static str> {
if s.len() % 2 != 0 {
return Err("odd-length hex string");
}
(0..s.len())
.step_by(2)
.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).map_err(|_| "invalid hex character"))
.collect()
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
pub mod commands;
pub mod hex;
pub mod retry;
pub mod rpc;
pub mod state;
pub use commands::*;
pub use rpc::{connect_node, enqueue, fetch_all, fetch_hybrid_key, fetch_key_package, fetch_wait, upload_hybrid_key, upload_key_package};
pub use state::{decode_identity_key, load_existing_state, load_or_init_state, save_state};

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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
//! Retry with exponential backoff for transient RPC failures.
use std::future::Future;
use std::time::Duration;
use rand::Rng;
use tracing::warn;
/// Default maximum number of retry attempts (including the first try).
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES: u32 = 3;
/// Default base delay in milliseconds for exponential backoff.
pub const DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY_MS: u64 = 500;
/// Runs an async operation with retries. On `Ok(t)` returns immediately.
/// On `Err(e)`: if `is_retriable(&e)` and `attempt < max_retries`, sleeps with
/// exponential backoff (plus jitter) then retries; otherwise returns the last error.
pub async fn retry_async<F, Fut, T, E, P>(
op: F,
max_retries: u32,
base_delay_ms: u64,
is_retriable: P,
) -> Result<T, E>
where
F: Fn() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Result<T, E>>,
P: Fn(&E) -> bool,
{
let mut last_err = None;
for attempt in 0..max_retries {
match op().await {
Ok(t) => return Ok(t),
Err(e) => {
last_err = Some(e);
let err = last_err.as_ref().unwrap();
if !is_retriable(err) || attempt + 1 >= max_retries {
break;
}
let delay_ms = base_delay_ms * 2u64.saturating_pow(attempt);
let jitter_ms = rand::thread_rng().gen_range(0..=delay_ms / 2);
let total_ms = delay_ms + jitter_ms;
warn!(
attempt = attempt + 1,
max_retries,
delay_ms = total_ms,
"RPC failed, retrying after backoff"
);
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(total_ms)).await;
}
}
}
Err(last_err.expect("retry_async: last_err set when we break after Err"))
}
/// Classifies `anyhow::Error` for retry: returns `false` for auth or invalid-param
/// errors (do not retry), `true` for transient errors (network, timeout, server 5xx).
/// When in doubt, returns `true` (retry).
pub fn anyhow_is_retriable(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
let s = format!("{:#}", err);
let s_lower = s.to_lowercase();
// Do not retry: auth / permission
if s_lower.contains("unauthorized")
|| s_lower.contains("auth failed")
|| s_lower.contains("access denied")
|| s_lower.contains("401")
|| s_lower.contains("forbidden")
|| s_lower.contains("403")
|| s_lower.contains("token")
{
return false;
}
// Do not retry: bad request / invalid params
if s_lower.contains("bad request")
|| s_lower.contains("400")
|| s_lower.contains("invalid param")
|| s_lower.contains("fingerprint mismatch")
{
return false;
}
// Retry: network, timeout, connection, server error, or anything else
true
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::Context;
use quinn::{ClientConfig, Endpoint};
use quinn_proto::crypto::rustls::QuicClientConfig;
use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
use rustls::{ClientConfig as RustlsClientConfig, RootCertStore};
use tokio_util::compat::{TokioAsyncReadCompatExt, TokioAsyncWriteCompatExt};
use capnp_rpc::{rpc_twoparty_capnp::Side, twoparty, RpcSystem};
use quicnprotochat_core::HybridPublicKey;
use quicnprotochat_proto::node_capnp::{auth, node_service};
use crate::AUTH_CONTEXT;
use super::retry::{anyhow_is_retriable, retry_async, DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY_MS, DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES};
/// Establish a QUIC/TLS connection and return a `NodeService` client.
///
/// Must be called from within a `LocalSet` because capnp-rpc is `!Send`.
pub async fn connect_node(
server: &str,
ca_cert: &Path,
server_name: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<node_service::Client> {
let addr: SocketAddr = server
.parse()
.with_context(|| format!("server must be host:port, got {server}"))?;
let cert_bytes = std::fs::read(ca_cert).with_context(|| format!("read ca_cert {ca_cert:?}"))?;
let mut roots = RootCertStore::empty();
roots
.add(CertificateDer::from(cert_bytes))
.context("add root cert")?;
let mut tls = RustlsClientConfig::builder()
.with_root_certificates(roots)
.with_no_client_auth();
tls.alpn_protocols = vec![b"capnp".to_vec()];
let crypto = QuicClientConfig::try_from(tls)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid client TLS config: {e}"))?;
let bind_addr: SocketAddr = "0.0.0.0:0".parse().context("parse client bind address")?;
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::client(bind_addr)?;
endpoint.set_default_client_config(ClientConfig::new(Arc::new(crypto)));
let connection = endpoint
.connect(addr, server_name)
.context("quic connect init")?
.await
.context("quic connect failed")?;
let (send, recv) = connection.open_bi().await.context("open bi stream")?;
let network = twoparty::VatNetwork::new(
recv.compat(),
send.compat_write(),
Side::Client,
Default::default(),
);
let mut rpc_system = RpcSystem::new(Box::new(network), None);
let client: node_service::Client = rpc_system.bootstrap(Side::Server);
tokio::task::spawn_local(rpc_system);
Ok(client)
}
pub fn set_auth(auth: &mut auth::Builder<'_>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let ctx = AUTH_CONTEXT.get().ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow::anyhow!("init_auth must be called with a non-empty token before RPCs")
})?;
auth.set_version(ctx.version);
auth.set_access_token(&ctx.access_token);
auth.set_device_id(&ctx.device_id);
Ok(())
}
/// Upload a KeyPackage and verify the fingerprint echoed by the AS.
pub async fn upload_key_package(
client: &node_service::Client,
identity_key: &[u8],
package: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let mut req = client.upload_key_package_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_identity_key(identity_key);
p.set_package(package);
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req
.send()
.promise
.await
.context("upload_key_package RPC failed")?;
let server_fp = resp
.get()
.context("upload_key_package: bad response")?
.get_fingerprint()
.context("upload_key_package: missing fingerprint")?
.to_vec();
let local_fp = super::state::sha256(package);
anyhow::ensure!(server_fp == local_fp, "fingerprint mismatch");
Ok(())
}
/// Fetch a KeyPackage for `identity_key` from the AS.
pub async fn fetch_key_package(
client: &node_service::Client,
identity_key: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut req = client.fetch_key_package_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_identity_key(identity_key);
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req
.send()
.promise
.await
.context("fetch_key_package RPC failed")?;
let pkg = resp
.get()
.context("fetch_key_package: bad response")?
.get_package()
.context("fetch_key_package: missing package field")?
.to_vec();
Ok(pkg)
}
/// Enqueue an opaque payload to the DS for `recipient_key`.
/// Returns the per-inbox sequence number assigned by the server.
/// Retries on transient failures with exponential backoff.
pub async fn enqueue(
client: &node_service::Client,
recipient_key: &[u8],
payload: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<u64> {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.to_vec();
let payload = payload.to_vec();
retry_async(
|| {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.clone();
let payload = payload.clone();
async move {
let mut req = client.enqueue_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_recipient_key(&recipient_key);
p.set_payload(&payload);
p.set_channel_id(&[]);
p.set_version(1);
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req.send().promise.await.context("enqueue RPC failed")?;
let seq = resp.get().context("enqueue: bad response")?.get_seq();
Ok(seq)
}
},
DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES,
DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY_MS,
anyhow_is_retriable,
)
.await
}
/// Fetch and drain all payloads for `recipient_key`.
/// Returns `(seq, payload)` pairs — sort by `seq` before MLS processing.
/// Retries on transient failures with exponential backoff.
pub async fn fetch_all(
client: &node_service::Client,
recipient_key: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>> {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.to_vec();
retry_async(
|| {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.clone();
async move {
let mut req = client.fetch_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_recipient_key(&recipient_key);
p.set_channel_id(&[]);
p.set_version(1);
p.set_limit(0); // fetch all
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req.send().promise.await.context("fetch RPC failed")?;
let list = resp
.get()
.context("fetch: bad response")?
.get_payloads()
.context("fetch: missing payloads")?;
let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(list.len() as usize);
for i in 0..list.len() {
let entry = list.get(i);
let seq = entry.get_seq();
let data = entry
.get_data()
.context("fetch: envelope data read failed")?
.to_vec();
payloads.push((seq, data));
}
Ok(payloads)
}
},
DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES,
DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY_MS,
anyhow_is_retriable,
)
.await
}
/// Long-poll for payloads with optional timeout (ms).
/// Returns `(seq, payload)` pairs — sort by `seq` before MLS processing.
/// Retries on transient failures with exponential backoff.
pub async fn fetch_wait(
client: &node_service::Client,
recipient_key: &[u8],
timeout_ms: u64,
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>> {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.to_vec();
retry_async(
|| {
let client = client.clone();
let recipient_key = recipient_key.clone();
let timeout_ms = timeout_ms;
async move {
let mut req = client.fetch_wait_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_recipient_key(&recipient_key);
p.set_timeout_ms(timeout_ms);
p.set_channel_id(&[]);
p.set_version(1);
p.set_limit(0); // fetch all
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req.send().promise.await.context("fetch_wait RPC failed")?;
let list = resp
.get()
.context("fetch_wait: bad response")?
.get_payloads()
.context("fetch_wait: missing payloads")?;
let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(list.len() as usize);
for i in 0..list.len() {
let entry = list.get(i);
let seq = entry.get_seq();
let data = entry
.get_data()
.context("fetch_wait: envelope data read failed")?
.to_vec();
payloads.push((seq, data));
}
Ok(payloads)
}
},
DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES,
DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY_MS,
anyhow_is_retriable,
)
.await
}
/// Upload a hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) public key for an identity.
pub async fn upload_hybrid_key(
client: &node_service::Client,
identity_key: &[u8],
hybrid_pk: &HybridPublicKey,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let mut req = client.upload_hybrid_key_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_identity_key(identity_key);
p.set_hybrid_public_key(&hybrid_pk.to_bytes());
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
req.send()
.promise
.await
.context("upload_hybrid_key RPC failed")?;
Ok(())
}
/// Fetch a peer's hybrid public key from the server.
///
/// Returns `None` if the peer has not uploaded a hybrid key.
pub async fn fetch_hybrid_key(
client: &node_service::Client,
identity_key: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<Option<HybridPublicKey>> {
let mut req = client.fetch_hybrid_key_request();
{
let mut p = req.get();
p.set_identity_key(identity_key);
let mut auth = p.reborrow().init_auth();
set_auth(&mut auth)?;
}
let resp = req
.send()
.promise
.await
.context("fetch_hybrid_key RPC failed")?;
let pk_bytes = resp
.get()
.context("fetch_hybrid_key: bad response")?
.get_hybrid_public_key()
.context("fetch_hybrid_key: missing field")?
.to_vec();
if pk_bytes.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
let pk = HybridPublicKey::from_bytes(&pk_bytes).context("invalid hybrid public key")?;
Ok(Some(pk))
}
/// Decrypt a hybrid envelope. Requires a hybrid key; no fallback to plaintext MLS.
pub fn try_hybrid_decrypt(
hybrid_kp: Option<&quicnprotochat_core::HybridKeypair>,
payload: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let kp = hybrid_kp.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("hybrid key required for decryption"))?;
quicnprotochat_core::hybrid_decrypt(kp, payload).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))
}
/// Return the current Unix timestamp in milliseconds.
pub fn current_timestamp_ms() -> u64 {
std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_millis() as u64
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::Context;
use argon2::Argon2;
use chacha20poly1305::{
aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce,
};
use rand::RngCore;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use quicnprotochat_core::{DiskKeyStore, GroupMember, HybridKeypair, HybridKeypairBytes, IdentityKeypair};
/// Magic bytes for encrypted client state files.
const STATE_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"QPCE";
const STATE_SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
const STATE_NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct StoredState {
pub identity_seed: [u8; 32],
pub group: Option<Vec<u8>>,
/// Post-quantum hybrid keypair (X25519 + ML-KEM-768). `None` for state created before hybrid was added.
#[serde(default)]
pub hybrid_key: Option<HybridKeypairBytes>,
/// Cached member public keys for group participants.
#[serde(default)]
pub member_keys: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl StoredState {
pub fn into_parts(self, state_path: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<(GroupMember, Option<HybridKeypair>)> {
let identity = Arc::new(IdentityKeypair::from_seed(self.identity_seed));
let group = self
.group
.map(|bytes| bincode::deserialize(&bytes).context("decode group"))
.transpose()?;
let key_store = DiskKeyStore::persistent(keystore_path(state_path))?;
let member = GroupMember::new_with_state(identity, key_store, group);
let hybrid_kp = self
.hybrid_key
.map(|bytes| HybridKeypair::from_bytes(&bytes).context("decode hybrid key"))
.transpose()?;
Ok((member, hybrid_kp))
}
pub fn from_parts(member: &GroupMember, hybrid_kp: Option<&HybridKeypair>) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
let group = member
.group_ref()
.map(|g| bincode::serialize(g).context("serialize group"))
.transpose()?;
Ok(Self {
identity_seed: member.identity_seed(),
group,
hybrid_key: hybrid_kp.map(|kp| kp.to_bytes()),
member_keys: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
/// Derive a 32-byte key from a password and salt using Argon2id.
fn derive_state_key(password: &str, salt: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<[u8; 32]> {
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
Argon2::default()
.hash_password_into(password.as_bytes(), salt, &mut key)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("argon2 key derivation failed: {e}"))?;
Ok(key)
}
/// Encrypt `plaintext` with the QPCE format: magic(4) | salt(16) | nonce(12) | ciphertext.
pub fn encrypt_state(password: &str, plaintext: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut salt = [0u8; STATE_SALT_LEN];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; STATE_NONCE_LEN];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
let key = derive_state_key(password, &salt)?;
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key));
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(nonce, plaintext)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("state encryption failed: {e}"))?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(4 + STATE_SALT_LEN + STATE_NONCE_LEN + ciphertext.len());
out.extend_from_slice(STATE_MAGIC);
out.extend_from_slice(&salt);
out.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
Ok(out)
}
/// Decrypt a QPCE-formatted state file.
pub fn decrypt_state(password: &str, data: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let header_len = 4 + STATE_SALT_LEN + STATE_NONCE_LEN;
anyhow::ensure!(
data.len() > header_len,
"encrypted state file too short ({} bytes)",
data.len()
);
let salt = &data[4..4 + STATE_SALT_LEN];
let nonce_bytes = &data[4 + STATE_SALT_LEN..header_len];
let ciphertext = &data[header_len..];
let key = derive_state_key(password, salt)?;
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key));
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce_bytes);
let plaintext = cipher
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("state decryption failed (wrong password?)"))?;
Ok(plaintext)
}
/// Returns true if raw bytes begin with the QPCE magic header.
pub fn is_encrypted_state(bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
bytes.len() >= 4 && &bytes[..4] == STATE_MAGIC
}
pub fn load_or_init_state(path: &Path, password: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<StoredState> {
if path.exists() {
let mut state = load_existing_state(path, password)?;
// Generate hybrid keypair if missing (upgrade from older state).
if state.hybrid_key.is_none() {
state.hybrid_key = Some(HybridKeypair::generate().to_bytes());
write_state(path, &state, password)?;
}
return Ok(state);
}
let identity = IdentityKeypair::generate();
let hybrid_kp = HybridKeypair::generate();
let key_store = DiskKeyStore::persistent(keystore_path(path))?;
let member = GroupMember::new_with_state(Arc::new(identity), key_store, None);
let state = StoredState::from_parts(&member, Some(&hybrid_kp))?;
write_state(path, &state, password)?;
Ok(state)
}
pub fn load_existing_state(path: &Path, password: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<StoredState> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path).with_context(|| format!("read state file {path:?}"))?;
if is_encrypted_state(&bytes) {
let pw = password
.context("state file is encrypted (QPCE); a password is required to decrypt it")?;
let plaintext = decrypt_state(pw, &bytes)?;
bincode::deserialize(&plaintext).context("decode encrypted state")
} else {
bincode::deserialize(&bytes).context("decode state")
}
}
pub fn save_state(
path: &Path,
member: &GroupMember,
hybrid_kp: Option<&HybridKeypair>,
password: Option<&str>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let state = StoredState::from_parts(member, hybrid_kp)?;
write_state(path, &state, password)
}
pub fn write_state(path: &Path, state: &StoredState, password: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create dir {parent:?}"))?;
}
let plaintext = bincode::serialize(state).context("encode state")?;
let bytes = if let Some(pw) = password {
encrypt_state(pw, &plaintext)?
} else {
plaintext
};
std::fs::write(path, bytes).with_context(|| format!("write state {path:?}"))?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn decode_identity_key(hex_str: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let bytes = super::hex::decode(hex_str)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!(e))
.context("identity key must be hex")?;
anyhow::ensure!(bytes.len() == 32, "identity key must be 32 bytes");
Ok(bytes)
}
pub fn keystore_path(state_path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
let mut path = state_path.to_path_buf();
path.set_extension("ks");
path
}
pub fn sha256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
Sha256::digest(bytes).to_vec()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let plaintext = b"test state data";
let password = "test-password";
let encrypted = encrypt_state(password, plaintext).unwrap();
assert!(is_encrypted_state(&encrypted));
let decrypted = decrypt_state(password, &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn wrong_password_fails() {
let plaintext = b"test state data";
let encrypted = encrypt_state("correct", plaintext).unwrap();
assert!(decrypt_state("wrong", &encrypted).is_err());
}
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use quicnprotochat_client::{
cmd_check_key, cmd_create_group, cmd_demo_group, cmd_fetch_key, cmd_health, cmd_invite,
cmd_join, cmd_login, cmd_ping, cmd_recv, cmd_register, cmd_register_state, cmd_register_user,
cmd_send, cmd_whoami, init_auth, ClientAuth,
cmd_chat, cmd_check_key, cmd_create_group, cmd_demo_group, cmd_fetch_key, cmd_health,
cmd_invite, cmd_join, cmd_login, cmd_ping, cmd_recv, cmd_register, cmd_register_state,
cmd_refresh_keypackage, cmd_register_user, cmd_send, cmd_whoami, init_auth, ClientAuth,
};
// ── CLI ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -78,6 +78,15 @@ enum Command {
username: String,
#[arg(long)]
password: String,
/// Hex-encoded Ed25519 identity key (64 hex chars). Optional if --state is provided.
#[arg(long)]
identity_key: Option<String>,
/// State file to derive the identity key (requires same password if encrypted).
#[arg(long)]
state: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Password for the encrypted state file (if any).
#[arg(long)]
state_password: Option<String>,
},
/// Show local identity key, fingerprint, group status, and hybrid key status.
@@ -132,7 +141,7 @@ enum Command {
identity_key: String,
},
/// Run a full Alice/Bob MLS round-trip against live AS and DS endpoints.
/// Run a two-party MLS demo (creator + joiner) against live AS and DS.
DemoGroup {
/// Server address (host:port).
#[arg(long, default_value = "127.0.0.1:7000", env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_SERVER")]
@@ -154,6 +163,22 @@ enum Command {
server: String,
},
/// Refresh the KeyPackage on the server (existing state only).
/// Run periodically (e.g. before server TTL ~24h) or after your KeyPackage was consumed so others can invite you.
RefreshKeypackage {
/// State file path (identity + MLS state).
#[arg(
long,
default_value = "quicnprotochat-state.bin",
env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_STATE"
)]
state: PathBuf,
/// Server address (host:port).
#[arg(long, default_value = "127.0.0.1:7000", env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_SERVER")]
server: String,
},
/// Create a persistent group and save state to disk.
CreateGroup {
/// State file path (identity + MLS state).
@@ -210,9 +235,12 @@ enum Command {
state: PathBuf,
#[arg(long, default_value = "127.0.0.1:7000", env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_SERVER")]
server: String,
/// Recipient identity key (hex, 32 bytes -> 64 chars).
/// Recipient identity key (hex, 32 bytes -> 64 chars). Omit when using --all.
#[arg(long)]
peer_key: String,
peer_key: Option<String>,
/// Send to all other group members (N-way groups).
#[arg(long)]
all: bool,
/// Plaintext message to send.
#[arg(long)]
msg: String,
@@ -237,6 +265,25 @@ enum Command {
#[arg(long)]
stream: bool,
},
/// Interactive 1:1 chat: type to send, incoming messages printed as [peer] <msg>. Ctrl+D to exit.
/// In a two-person group, peer is chosen automatically; use --peer-key only with 3+ members.
Chat {
#[arg(
long,
default_value = "quicnprotochat-state.bin",
env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_STATE"
)]
state: PathBuf,
#[arg(long, default_value = "127.0.0.1:7000", env = "QUICNPROTOCHAT_SERVER")]
server: String,
/// Peer identity key (hex, 64 chars). Omit in a two-person group to use the only other member.
#[arg(long)]
peer_key: Option<String>,
/// How often to poll for incoming messages (milliseconds).
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 500)]
poll_interval_ms: u64,
},
}
// ── Entry point ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -272,6 +319,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
&args.server_name,
&username,
&password,
None,
))
.await
}
@@ -279,6 +327,9 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
server,
username,
password,
identity_key,
state,
state_password,
} => {
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
local
@@ -288,6 +339,9 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
&args.server_name,
&username,
&password,
identity_key.as_deref(),
state.as_deref(),
state_password.as_deref(),
))
.await
}
@@ -351,6 +405,18 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
))
.await
}
Command::RefreshKeypackage { state, server } => {
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
local
.run_until(cmd_refresh_keypackage(
&state,
&server,
&args.ca_cert,
&args.server_name,
state_pw,
))
.await
}
Command::CreateGroup {
state,
server,
@@ -394,6 +460,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
state,
server,
peer_key,
all,
msg,
} => {
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
@@ -403,7 +470,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
&server,
&args.ca_cert,
&args.server_name,
&peer_key,
peer_key.as_deref(),
all,
&msg,
state_pw,
))
@@ -428,5 +496,24 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
))
.await
}
Command::Chat {
state,
server,
peer_key,
poll_interval_ms,
} => {
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
local
.run_until(cmd_chat(
&state,
&server,
&args.ca_cert,
&args.server_name,
peer_key.as_deref(),
state_pw,
poll_interval_ms,
))
.await
}
}
}

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ use std::{path::PathBuf, process::Command, time::Duration};
use assert_cmd::cargo::cargo_bin;
use portpicker::pick_unused_port;
use rand::RngCore;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use tokio::time::sleep;
use hex;
// Required by rustls 0.23 when QUIC/TLS is used from this process (e.g. client in test).
fn ensure_rustls_provider() {
@@ -14,8 +16,9 @@ fn ensure_rustls_provider() {
}
use quicnprotochat_client::{
cmd_create_group, cmd_invite, cmd_join, cmd_ping, cmd_register_state, cmd_send, connect_node,
fetch_wait, init_auth, ClientAuth,
cmd_create_group, cmd_invite, cmd_join, cmd_login, cmd_ping, cmd_register_state,
cmd_register_user, cmd_send, connect_node, enqueue, fetch_wait, init_auth,
receive_pending_plaintexts, ClientAuth,
};
use quicnprotochat_core::IdentityKeypair;
@@ -45,6 +48,8 @@ async fn wait_for_health(server: &str, ca_cert: &PathBuf, server_name: &str) ->
anyhow::bail!("server health never became ready")
}
/// Creator and joiner register; creator creates group and invites joiner; joiner joins;
/// creator sends a message; assert joiner's mailbox receives it.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn e2e_happy_path_register_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
ensure_rustls_provider();
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ async fn e2e_happy_path_register_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.arg(&tls_key)
.arg("--auth-token")
.arg(auth_token)
.arg("--allow-insecure-auth")
.spawn()
.expect("spawn server");
@@ -91,15 +97,14 @@ async fn e2e_happy_path_register_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// Set client auth context.
init_auth(ClientAuth::from_parts(auth_token.to_string(), None));
// LocalSet for capnp !Send operations.
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
let alice_state = base.join("alice.bin");
let bob_state = base.join("bob.bin");
let creator_state = base.join("creator.bin");
let joiner_state = base.join("joiner.bin");
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&alice_state,
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
@@ -109,7 +114,7 @@ async fn e2e_happy_path_register_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&bob_state,
&joiner_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
@@ -118,52 +123,475 @@ async fn e2e_happy_path_register_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_create_group(&alice_state, &server, "test-group", None))
.run_until(cmd_create_group(&creator_state, &server, "test-group", None))
.await?;
// Load Bob identity key from persisted state to use as peer key.
let bob_bytes = std::fs::read(&bob_state)?;
let bob_state_compat: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&bob_bytes)?;
let bob_identity = IdentityKeypair::from_seed(bob_state_compat.identity_seed);
let bob_pk_hex = hex_encode(&bob_identity.public_key_bytes());
let joiner_bytes = std::fs::read(&joiner_state)?;
let joiner_state_compat: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&joiner_bytes)?;
let joiner_identity = IdentityKeypair::from_seed(joiner_state_compat.identity_seed);
let joiner_pk_hex = hex_encode(&joiner_identity.public_key_bytes());
local
.run_until(cmd_invite(
&alice_state,
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
&bob_pk_hex,
&joiner_pk_hex,
None,
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_join(&bob_state, &server, &ca_cert, "localhost", None))
.run_until(cmd_join(&joiner_state, &server, &ca_cert, "localhost", None))
.await?;
// Send Alice -> Bob.
local
.run_until(cmd_send(
&alice_state,
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
&bob_pk_hex,
"hello bob",
Some(&joiner_pk_hex),
false,
"hello",
None,
))
.await?;
// Confirm Bob can fetch at least one payload.
local
.run_until(async {
let client = connect_node(&server, &ca_cert, "localhost").await?;
let payloads = fetch_wait(&client, &bob_identity.public_key_bytes(), 1000).await?;
anyhow::ensure!(!payloads.is_empty(), "no payloads delivered to Bob");
let payloads = fetch_wait(&client, &joiner_identity.public_key_bytes(), 1000).await?;
anyhow::ensure!(!payloads.is_empty(), "no payloads delivered to joiner");
Ok::<(), anyhow::Error>(())
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Three-party group: A creates group, invites B then C; B and C join; A sends, B and C receive;
/// B sends, A and C receive.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn e2e_three_party_group_invite_join_send_recv() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
ensure_rustls_provider();
let temp = TempDir::new()?;
let base = temp.path();
let port = pick_unused_port().expect("free port");
let listen = format!("127.0.0.1:{port}");
let server = listen.clone();
let ca_cert = base.join("server-cert.der");
let tls_key = base.join("server-key.der");
let data_dir = base.join("data");
let auth_token = "devtoken";
let server_bin = cargo_bin("quicnprotochat-server");
let child = Command::new(server_bin)
.arg("--listen")
.arg(&listen)
.arg("--data-dir")
.arg(&data_dir)
.arg("--tls-cert")
.arg(&ca_cert)
.arg("--tls-key")
.arg(&tls_key)
.arg("--auth-token")
.arg(auth_token)
.arg("--allow-insecure-auth")
.spawn()
.expect("spawn server");
struct ChildGuard(std::process::Child);
impl Drop for ChildGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.0.kill();
}
}
let _child_guard = ChildGuard(child);
wait_for_health(&server, &ca_cert, "localhost").await?;
init_auth(ClientAuth::from_parts(auth_token.to_string(), None));
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
let creator_state = base.join("creator.bin");
let b_state = base.join("b.bin");
let c_state = base.join("c.bin");
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&b_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&c_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
))
.await?;
let b_bytes = std::fs::read(&b_state)?;
let b_compat: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&b_bytes)?;
let b_pk_hex = hex_encode(&IdentityKeypair::from_seed(b_compat.identity_seed).public_key_bytes());
let c_bytes = std::fs::read(&c_state)?;
let c_compat: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&c_bytes)?;
let c_pk_hex = hex_encode(&IdentityKeypair::from_seed(c_compat.identity_seed).public_key_bytes());
local
.run_until(cmd_create_group(&creator_state, &server, "test-group", None))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_invite(
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
&b_pk_hex,
None,
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_invite(
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
&c_pk_hex,
None,
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_join(&b_state, &server, &ca_cert, "localhost", None))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_join(&c_state, &server, &ca_cert, "localhost", None))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_send(
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
true,
"hello",
None,
))
.await?;
sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
let b_plaintexts = local
.run_until(receive_pending_plaintexts(
&b_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
1500,
None,
))
.await?;
let c_plaintexts = local
.run_until(receive_pending_plaintexts(
&c_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
1500,
None,
))
.await?;
anyhow::ensure!(
b_plaintexts.iter().any(|p| p.as_slice() == b"hello"),
"B did not receive 'hello', got {:?}",
b_plaintexts
);
anyhow::ensure!(
c_plaintexts.iter().any(|p| p.as_slice() == b"hello"),
"C did not receive 'hello', got {:?}",
c_plaintexts
);
local
.run_until(cmd_send(
&b_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
true,
"hi",
None,
))
.await?;
sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
let a_plaintexts = local
.run_until(receive_pending_plaintexts(
&creator_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
1500,
None,
))
.await?;
let c_plaintexts2 = local
.run_until(receive_pending_plaintexts(
&c_state,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
1500,
None,
))
.await?;
anyhow::ensure!(
a_plaintexts.iter().any(|p| p.as_slice() == b"hi"),
"A did not receive 'hi', got {:?}",
a_plaintexts
);
anyhow::ensure!(
c_plaintexts2.iter().any(|p| p.as_slice() == b"hi"),
"C did not receive 'hi', got {:?}",
c_plaintexts2
);
Ok(())
}
/// Login should refuse if the presented identity key does not match the registered key.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn e2e_login_rejects_mismatched_identity() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
ensure_rustls_provider();
let temp = TempDir::new()?;
let base = temp.path();
let port = pick_unused_port().expect("free port");
let listen = format!("127.0.0.1:{port}");
let server = listen.clone();
let ca_cert = base.join("server-cert.der");
let tls_key = base.join("server-key.der");
let data_dir = base.join("data");
let auth_token = "devtoken";
// Spawn server binary.
let server_bin = cargo_bin("quicnprotochat-server");
let child = Command::new(server_bin)
.arg("--listen")
.arg(&listen)
.arg("--data-dir")
.arg(&data_dir)
.arg("--tls-cert")
.arg(&ca_cert)
.arg("--tls-key")
.arg(&tls_key)
.arg("--auth-token")
.arg(auth_token)
.arg("--allow-insecure-auth")
.spawn()
.expect("spawn server");
struct ChildGuard(std::process::Child);
impl Drop for ChildGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.0.kill();
}
}
let child_guard = ChildGuard(child);
let _ = child_guard;
wait_for_health(&server, &ca_cert, "localhost").await?;
init_auth(ClientAuth::from_parts(auth_token.to_string(), None));
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
let state_path = base.join("user.bin");
// Register and persist state (includes identity key binding).
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&state_path,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
))
.await?;
// Register the user with the bound identity so login can enforce mismatches.
let state_bytes = std::fs::read(&state_path)?;
let stored_state: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&state_bytes)?;
let identity_hex = hex::encode(
IdentityKeypair::from_seed(stored_state.identity_seed).public_key_bytes(),
);
local
.run_until(cmd_register_user(
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
"user1",
"pass",
Some(&identity_hex),
))
.await?;
// Craft an unrelated identity key and attempt login with it.
let mut bogus_identity = [0u8; 32];
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut bogus_identity);
let bogus_hex = hex::encode(bogus_identity);
let result = local
.run_until(cmd_login(
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
"user1",
"pass",
Some(&bogus_hex),
None,
None,
))
.await;
match result {
Ok(_) => anyhow::bail!("login unexpectedly succeeded with mismatched identity"),
Err(e) => {
// Show the full error chain so we can match the server's E016 response.
let msg = format!("{e:#}");
anyhow::ensure!(
msg.contains("identity") || msg.contains("E016"),
"login failed but not for identity mismatch: {msg}"
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Sealed Sender: enqueue with valid token (no identity binding) succeeds; recipient can fetch.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn e2e_sealed_sender_enqueue_then_fetch() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
ensure_rustls_provider();
let temp = TempDir::new()?;
let base = temp.path();
let port = pick_unused_port().expect("free port");
let listen = format!("127.0.0.1:{port}");
let server = listen.clone();
let ca_cert = base.join("server-cert.der");
let tls_key = base.join("server-key.der");
let data_dir = base.join("data");
let auth_token = "devtoken";
let server_bin = cargo_bin("quicnprotochat-server");
let child = Command::new(server_bin)
.arg("--listen")
.arg(&listen)
.arg("--data-dir")
.arg(&data_dir)
.arg("--tls-cert")
.arg(&ca_cert)
.arg("--tls-key")
.arg(&tls_key)
.arg("--auth-token")
.arg(auth_token)
.arg("--allow-insecure-auth")
.arg("--sealed-sender")
.spawn()
.expect("spawn server");
struct ChildGuard(std::process::Child);
impl Drop for ChildGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.0.kill();
}
}
let _child_guard = ChildGuard(child);
wait_for_health(&server, &ca_cert, "localhost").await?;
init_auth(ClientAuth::from_parts(auth_token.to_string(), None));
let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
let state_path = base.join("recipient.bin");
local
.run_until(cmd_register_state(
&state_path,
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
None,
))
.await?;
let state_bytes = std::fs::read(&state_path)?;
let stored: StoredStateCompat = bincode::deserialize(&state_bytes)?;
let recipient_key = IdentityKeypair::from_seed(stored.identity_seed).public_key_bytes();
let identity_hex = hex_encode(&recipient_key);
local
.run_until(cmd_register_user(
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
"recipient",
"pass",
Some(&identity_hex),
))
.await?;
local
.run_until(cmd_login(
&server,
&ca_cert,
"localhost",
"recipient",
"pass",
Some(&identity_hex),
None,
None,
))
.await?;
let client = local.run_until(connect_node(&server, &ca_cert, "localhost")).await?;
local
.run_until(enqueue(&client, &recipient_key, b"sealed-payload"))
.await?;
let payloads = local
.run_until(fetch_wait(&client, &recipient_key, 500))
.await?;
anyhow::ensure!(
payloads.len() == 1 && payloads[0].1.as_slice() == b"sealed-payload",
"expected one payload 'sealed-payload', got {:?}",
payloads
);
Ok(())
}