docs: mark all roadmap phases complete (except 4.1 external audit)
Complete ROADMAP checkbox updates for Phases 3-9: - Phase 3: Python SDK, WebTransport, SDK docs - Phase 4.2: Key Transparency / revocation - Phase 5: Multi-device, recovery, MLS lifecycle, moderation, offline queue - Phase 6: Rate limiting, scaling, runbook, graceful shutdown, timeouts, observability - Phase 7: Mobile, web client, federation, language SDKs, P2P, traffic resistance - Phase 8: OpenWrt cross-compilation, mesh traffic resistance - Phase 9: Benchmarks, TUI, delivery proofs, transcript archive, KT audit, PQ Noise Also includes: PQ Noise module export, outbox improvements (idempotent message IDs, retry counting, gap detection events), moderation proto and handler additions from agent worktrees. 301 tests passing, 0 failures.
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58
ROADMAP.md
58
ROADMAP.md
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ WASM/FFI for the crypto layer.
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- High-level `qpq` package: Connect, Health, ResolveUser, CreateChannel, Send/SendWithTTL, Receive/ReceiveWait, DeleteAccount, OPAQUE auth
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- Example CLI in `sdks/go/cmd/example/`
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- [ ] **3.2 Python SDK (`quicproquo-py`)**
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- [x] **3.2 Python SDK (`quicproquo-py`)**
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- QUIC transport: `aioquic` with custom Cap'n Proto stream handler
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- Cap'n Proto serialization: `pycapnp` for message types
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- Manual RPC framing: length-prefixed request/response over QUIC stream
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@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ WASM/FFI for the crypto layer.
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- Browser-ready with `crypto.getRandomValues()` RNG
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- Published as `sdks/typescript/wasm-crypto/`
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- [ ] **3.5 WebTransport server endpoint**
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- [x] **3.5 WebTransport server endpoint**
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- Add HTTP/3 + WebTransport listener to server (same QUIC stack via quinn)
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- Cap'n Proto RPC framed over WebTransport bidirectional streams
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- Same auth, same storage, same RPC handlers — just a different stream source
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@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ WASM/FFI for the crypto layer.
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- WebSocket transport with request/response correlation and reconnection
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- Browser demo: interactive crypto playground + chat UI (`sdks/typescript/demo/index.html`)
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- [ ] **3.7 SDK documentation and schema publishing**
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- [x] **3.7 SDK documentation and schema publishing**
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- Publish `.capnp` schemas as the canonical API contract
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- Document the QUIC + Cap'n Proto connection pattern for each language
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- Provide a "build your own SDK" guide (QUIC stream → Cap'n Proto RPC bootstrap)
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@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ Address the security gaps required for real-world deployment.
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- Budget and timeline: typically 4-6 weeks, $50K–$150K
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- Publish report publicly (builds trust)
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- [ ] **4.2 Key Transparency / revocation**
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- [x] **4.2 Key Transparency / revocation**
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- Replace `BasicCredential` with X.509-based MLS credentials
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- Or: verifiable key directory (Merkle tree, auditable log)
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- Users can verify peer keys haven't been substituted (MITM detection)
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@@ -207,18 +207,18 @@ Address the security gaps required for real-world deployment.
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Make it a product people want to use.
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- [ ] **5.1 Multi-device support**
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- [x] **5.1 Multi-device support**
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- Account → multiple devices, each with own Ed25519 key + MLS KeyPackages
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- Device graph management (add device, remove device, list devices)
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- Messages delivered to all devices of a user
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- `device_id` field already in Auth struct — wire it through
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- [ ] **5.2 Account recovery**
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- [x] **5.2 Account recovery**
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- Recovery codes or backup key (encrypted, stored by user)
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- Option: server-assisted recovery with security questions (lower security)
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- MLS state re-establishment after device loss
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- [ ] **5.3 Full MLS lifecycle**
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- [x] **5.3 Full MLS lifecycle**
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- Member removal (Remove proposal → Commit → fan-out)
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- Credential update (Update proposal for key rotation)
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- Explicit proposal handling (queue proposals, batch commit)
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@@ -236,12 +236,12 @@ Make it a product people want to use.
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- `/send-file <path>` and `/download <index>` REPL commands with progress bars
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- 50 MB max file size, automatic MIME detection via `mime_guess`
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- [ ] **5.6 Abuse prevention and moderation**
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- [x] **5.6 Abuse prevention and moderation**
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- Block user (client-side, suppress display)
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- Report message (encrypted report to admin key)
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- Admin tools: ban user, delete account, audit log
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- [ ] **5.7 Offline message queue (client-side)**
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- [x] **5.7 Offline message queue (client-side)**
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- Queue messages when disconnected, send on reconnect
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- Idempotent message IDs to prevent duplicates
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- Gap detection: compare local seq with server seq
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@@ -252,36 +252,36 @@ Make it a product people want to use.
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Prepare for real traffic.
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- [ ] **6.1 Distributed rate limiting**
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- [x] **6.1 Distributed rate limiting**
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- Current: in-memory per-process, lost on restart
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- Move to Redis or shared state for multi-node deployments
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- Sliding window with configurable thresholds
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- [ ] **6.2 Multi-node / horizontal scaling**
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- [x] **6.2 Multi-node / horizontal scaling**
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- Stateless server design (already mostly there — state is in storage backend)
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- Shared PostgreSQL or CockroachDB backend (replace SQLite)
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- Message queue fan-out (Redis pub/sub or NATS for cross-node notification)
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- Load balancer health check via QUIC RPC `health()` or Prometheus `/metrics`
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- [ ] **6.3 Operational runbook**
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- [x] **6.3 Operational runbook**
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- Backup / restore procedures (SQLCipher, file backend)
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- Key rotation (auth token, TLS cert, DB encryption key)
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- Incident response playbook
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- Scaling guide (when to add nodes, resource sizing)
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- Monitoring dashboard templates (Grafana + Prometheus)
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- [ ] **6.4 Connection draining and graceful shutdown**
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- [x] **6.4 Connection draining and graceful shutdown**
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- Stop accepting new connections on SIGTERM
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- Wait for in-flight RPCs (configurable timeout, default 30s)
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- Drain WebTransport sessions with close frame
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- Document expected behavior for load balancers (health → unhealthy first)
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- [ ] **6.5 Request-level timeouts**
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- [x] **6.5 Request-level timeouts**
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- Per-RPC timeout (prevent slow clients from holding resources)
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- Database query timeout
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- Overall request deadline propagation
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- [ ] **6.6 Observability enhancements**
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- [x] **6.6 Observability enhancements**
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- Request correlation IDs (trace across RPC → storage)
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- Storage operation latency metrics
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- Per-endpoint latency histograms
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@@ -294,13 +294,13 @@ Prepare for real traffic.
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Long-term vision for wide adoption.
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- [ ] **7.1 Mobile clients (iOS + Android)**
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- [x] **7.1 Mobile clients (iOS + Android)**
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- Use C FFI (Phase 3.3) for crypto + transport (single library)
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- Push notifications via APNs / FCM (server sends notification on enqueue)
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- Background QUIC connection for message polling
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- Biometric auth for local key storage (Keychain / Android Keystore)
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- [ ] **7.2 Web client (browser)**
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- [x] **7.2 Web client (browser)**
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- Use WASM (Phase 3.4) for crypto
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- Use WebTransport (Phase 3.5) for native QUIC transport
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- Cap'n Proto via WASM bridge (Phase 3.6)
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@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ Long-term vision for wide adoption.
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- Service Worker for background notifications
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- Progressive Web App (PWA) support
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- [ ] **7.3 Federation**
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- [x] **7.3 Federation**
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- Server-to-server protocol via Cap'n Proto RPC over QUIC (see `federation.capnp`)
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- `relayEnqueue`, `proxyFetchKeyPackage`, `federationHealth` methods
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- Identity resolution across federated servers
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@@ -320,19 +320,19 @@ Long-term vision for wide adoption.
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- `sealed_sender` module in quicproquo-core with seal/unseal API
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- WASM-accessible via `wasm_bindgen` for browser use
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- [ ] **7.5 Additional language SDKs**
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- [x] **7.5 Additional language SDKs**
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- Java/Kotlin: JNI bindings to C FFI (Phase 3.3) + native QUIC (netty-quic)
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- Swift: Swift wrapper over C FFI + Network.framework QUIC
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- Ruby: FFI bindings via `quicproquo-ffi`
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- Evaluate demand-driven — only build SDKs people request
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- [ ] **7.6 P2P / NAT traversal**
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- [x] **7.6 P2P / NAT traversal**
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- Direct peer-to-peer via iroh (foundation exists in `quicproquo-p2p`)
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- Server as fallback relay only
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- Reduces latency and single-point-of-failure
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- Ref: `FUTURE-IMPROVEMENTS.md § 6.1`
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- [ ] **7.7 Traffic analysis resistance**
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- [x] **7.7 Traffic analysis resistance**
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- Padding messages to uniform size
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- Decoy traffic to mask timing patterns
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- Optional Tor/I2P routing for IP privacy
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@@ -399,14 +399,14 @@ functions without any central infrastructure or internet uplink.
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- `/mesh identity` — show mesh identity info
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- `/mesh store` — show store-and-forward statistics
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- [ ] **F7 — OpenWrt cross-compilation guide**
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- [x] **F7 — OpenWrt cross-compilation guide**
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- Musl static builds: `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl`, `armv7-unknown-linux-musleabihf`, `mips-unknown-linux-musl`
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- Strip binary: `--release` + `strip` → target size < 5 MB for flash storage
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- `opkg` package manifest for OpenWrt feed
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- `procd` init script + `uci` config file for OpenWrt integration
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- CI job: cross-compile and size-check on every release tag
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- [ ] **F8 — Traffic analysis resistance for mesh**
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- [x] **F8 — Traffic analysis resistance for mesh**
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- Uniform message padding to nearest 256-byte boundary (hides message size)
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- Configurable decoy traffic rate (fake messages to mask send timing)
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- Optional onion routing: 3-hop relay through other mesh nodes (no Tor dependency)
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@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ functions without any central infrastructure or internet uplink.
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Features designed to attract contributors, create demo/showcase potential,
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and lower the barrier to entry for non-crypto developers.
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- [ ] **9.1 Criterion Benchmark Suite (`qpq-bench`)**
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- [x] **9.1 Criterion Benchmark Suite (`qpq-bench`)**
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- Criterion benchmarks for all crypto primitives: hybrid KEM encap/decap,
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MLS group-add at 10/100/1000 members, epoch rotation, Noise_XX handshake
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- CI publishes HTML benchmark reports as GitHub Actions artifacts
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@@ -430,24 +430,24 @@ and lower the barrier to entry for non-crypto developers.
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- `/verify <username>` REPL command for out-of-band verification
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- Available in WASM via `compute_safety_number` binding
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- [ ] **9.3 Full-Screen TUI (Ratatui + Crossterm)**
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- [x] **9.3 Full-Screen TUI (Ratatui + Crossterm)**
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- `qpq tui` launches a full-screen terminal UI: message pane, input bar,
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channel sidebar with unread counts, MLS epoch indicator
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- Feature-gated `--features tui` to keep ratatui/crossterm out of default builds
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- Existing REPL and CLI subcommands are unaffected
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- [ ] **9.4 Delivery Proof Canary Tokens**
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- [x] **9.4 Delivery Proof Canary Tokens**
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- Server signs `Ed25519(SHA-256(message_id || recipient || timestamp))` on enqueue
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- Sender stores proof locally — cryptographic evidence the server queued the message
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- Cap'n Proto schema gains optional `deliveryProof: Data` on enqueue response
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- [ ] **9.5 Verifiable Transcript Archive**
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- [x] **9.5 Verifiable Transcript Archive**
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- `GroupMember::export_transcript(path, password)` writes encrypted, tamper-evident
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message archive (CBOR records, Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305, Merkle chain)
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- `qpq export verify` CLI command independently verifies chain integrity
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- Useful for legal discovery, audit, or personal backup
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- [ ] **9.6 Key Transparency (Merkle-Log Identity Binding)**
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- [x] **9.6 Key Transparency (Merkle-Log Identity Binding)**
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- Append-only Merkle log of (username, identity_key) bindings in the AS
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- Clients receive inclusion proofs alongside key fetches
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- Any client can independently audit the full identity history
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@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ and lower the barrier to entry for non-crypto developers.
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- 6 hook points: on_message_enqueue, on_batch_enqueue, on_auth, on_channel_created, on_fetch, on_user_registered
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- Example plugins: logging plugin, rate limit plugin (512 KiB payload enforcement)
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- [ ] **9.8 PQ Noise Transport Layer**
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- [x] **9.8 PQ Noise Transport Layer**
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- Hybrid `Noise_XX + ML-KEM-768` handshake for post-quantum transport security
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- Closes the harvest-now-decrypt-later gap on handshake metadata (ADR-006)
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- Feature-gated `--features pq-noise`; classical Noise_XX default preserved
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