chore: rename quicproquo → quicprochat in docs, Docker, CI, and packaging
Rename all project references from quicproquo/qpq to quicprochat/qpc across documentation, Docker configuration, CI workflows, packaging scripts, operational configs, and build tooling. - Docker: crate paths, binary names, user/group, data dirs, env vars - CI: workflow crate references, binary names, artifact names - Docs: all markdown files under docs/, SDK READMEs, book.toml - Packaging: OpenWrt Makefile, init script, UCI config (file renames) - Scripts: justfile, dev-shell, screenshot, cross-compile, ai_team - Operations: Prometheus config, alert rules, Grafana dashboard - Config: .env.example (QPQ_* → QPC_*), CODEOWNERS paths - Top-level: README, CONTRIBUTING, ROADMAP, CLAUDE.md
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# Threat Model
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This page defines the attacker models quicproquo is designed to resist,
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This page defines the attacker models quicprochat is designed to resist,
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catalogues what is and is not protected, identifies known gaps in the current
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implementation, and outlines future mitigations.
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@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ state-level adversary).
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**What they can do:**
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- Attempt TLS 1.3 MITM: TLS 1.3 prevents this if the client validates the
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server's certificate. However, quicproquo currently uses **self-signed
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server's certificate. However, quicprochat currently uses **self-signed
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certificates**, which means the client has no CA chain to verify. On the first
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connection, a MITM could present their own certificate and intercept the
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session (trust-on-first-use vulnerability).
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