



WIMSE                                                       C. Nennemann
Internet-Draft                                    Independent Researcher
Intended status: Standards Track                        24 February 2026
Expires: 28 August 2026


       Execution Context Tokens for Distributed Agentic Workflows
               draft-nennemann-wimse-execution-context-00

Abstract

   This document defines Execution Context Tokens (ECTs), an extension
   to the Workload Identity in Multi System Environments (WIMSE)
   architecture for distributed agentic workflows in regulated
   environments.  ECTs provide signed, structured records of task
   execution order, policy evaluation outcomes, and compliance state
   across agent-to-agent communication.  By extending WIMSE Workload
   Identity Tokens with execution context claims in JSON Web Token (JWT)
   format, this specification enables regulated systems to maintain
   structured audit trails that support compliance verification.  ECTs
   use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure to represent task
   dependencies, record policy evaluation outcomes at each decision
   point, and integrate with WIMSE Workload Identity Tokens (WIT) using
   the same signing model and cryptographic primitives.  A new HTTP
   header field, Execution-Context, is defined for transporting ECTs
   alongside existing WIMSE headers.  ECTs are a technical building
   block that supports, but does not by itself constitute, compliance
   with regulatory frameworks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 August 2026.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Scope and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Relationship to Regulatory Compliance . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  WIMSE Architecture Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  WIMSE Foundation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Extension Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Integration Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Execution Context Token Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  JWT Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  Standard JWT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.2.  Execution Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.3.  Policy Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.2.4.  Data Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.5.  Task Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.6.  Compensation and Rollback . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.2.7.  Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.3.  Complete ECT Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  HTTP Header Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Execution-Context Header Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  DAG Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  Validation Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.3.  DAG Validation Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Signature and Token Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Verification Procedure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Verification Pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  Audit Ledger Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   9.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22



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     9.1.  Medical Device SDLC Workflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       9.1.1.  FDA Audit with DAG Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.2.  Financial Trading Workflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.3.  Compensation and Rollback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.4.  Autonomous Logistics Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     10.1.  Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     10.2.  Self-Assertion Limitation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       10.2.1.  Witness Attestation Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     10.3.  Organizational Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     10.4.  Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     10.5.  Replay Attack Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.6.  Man-in-the-Middle Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.7.  Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.8.  Collusion and False Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.9.  Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.10. Timestamp Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     10.11. ECT Size Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   11. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     11.1.  Data Exposure in ECTs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     11.2.  Data Minimization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     11.3.  Storage and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     11.4.  Regulatory Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     12.1.  Media Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     12.2.  HTTP Header Field Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     12.3.  JWT Claims Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     12.4.  ECT Policy Decision Values Registry  . . . . . . . . . .  36
     12.5.  ECT Regulated Domain Values Registry . . . . . . . . . .  36
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     WIMSE Workload Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange and the "act" Claim  . . . . . . . . .  40
     Transaction Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     Distributed Tracing (OpenTelemetry) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust) . . . .  42
     W3C Verifiable Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Implementation Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     Minimal Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     Storage Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     Interoperability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Regulatory Compliance Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
   Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     Example 1: Simple Two-Agent Workflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44



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     Example 2: Medical Device SDLC with Release Approval  . . . . .  46
     Example 3: Parallel Execution with Join . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Motivation

   The Workload Identity in Multi System Environments (WIMSE) framework
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch] provides robust workload authentication through
   Workload Identity Tokens (WIT) and Workload Proof Tokens (WPT).  The
   WIMSE service-to-service protocol [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]
   defines how workloads authenticate each other across call chains
   using the Workload-Identity and Workload-Proof-Token HTTP headers.

   However, workload identity alone does not address execution
   accountability.  Knowing who performed an action does not record what
   was done, what policy was applied, or whether compliance requirements
   were evaluated at each decision point.

   Regulated environments increasingly deploy autonomous agents that
   coordinate across organizational boundaries.  Multiple regulatory
   frameworks — including [EU-AI-ACT], [FDA-21CFR11], [MIFID-II], and
   [DORA] — require structured, auditable records of automated decision-
   making and execution (see Table 4 for a detailed mapping).

   This document defines an extension to the WIMSE architecture that
   addresses the gap between workload identity and execution
   accountability.  WIMSE authenticates agents; this extension records
   what they did, in what order, and what policy was evaluated.

   As identified in [I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity], call context in
   agentic workflows needs to be visible and preserved.  ECTs provide a
   mechanism to address this requirement with cryptographic assurances.

1.2.  Problem Statement

   Three core gaps exist in current approaches to regulated agentic
   systems:

   1.  WIMSE authenticates agents but does not record what they actually
       did.  A WIT proves "Agent A is authorized" but not "Agent A
       executed Task X, under Policy Y, producing Output Z."

   2.  No standard mechanism exists to record policy evaluation outcomes
       at each decision point in a multi-agent workflow.




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   3.  No mechanism exists to cryptographically link compensation and
       rollback decisions to original actions.

   Existing observability tools such as distributed tracing
   [OPENTELEMETRY] provide visibility for debugging and monitoring but
   do not provide cryptographic assurances.  Tracing data is not
   cryptographically signed, not tamper-evident, and not designed for
   regulatory audit scenarios.

1.3.  Scope and Applicability

   This document defines:

   *  The Execution Context Token (ECT) format (Section 4)

   *  DAG structure for task dependency ordering (Section 6)

   *  Policy checkpoint recording (Section 4.2.3)

   *  Integration with the WIMSE identity framework (Section 3)

   *  An HTTP header for ECT transport (Section 5)

   *  Audit ledger interface requirements (Section 8)

   The following are out of scope and are handled by WIMSE:

   *  Workload authentication and identity provisioning

   *  Key distribution and management

   *  Trust domain establishment and management

   *  Credential lifecycle management

1.4.  Relationship to Regulatory Compliance

   ECTs are a technical mechanism that can support compliance programs
   by providing structured, cryptographically signed execution records.
   ECTs do not by themselves constitute compliance with any regulatory
   framework referenced in this document.

   Compliance with each referenced regulation requires organizational
   controls, policies, procedures, validation, and governance measures
   beyond the scope of this specification.  The regulatory references in
   this document are intended to motivate the design requirements, not
   to claim that implementing ECTs satisfies these regulations.




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   ECTs provide evidence of claimed execution ordering and policy
   evaluation.  They do not independently verify that the claimed
   execution actually occurred as described, that the policy evaluation
   was correct, or that the agent faithfully performed the stated
   action.  The trustworthiness of ECT claims depends on the
   trustworthiness of the signing agent and the integrity of the broader
   deployment environment.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The following terms are used in this document:

   Agent:  An autonomous workload, as defined by WIMSE
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch], that executes tasks within a workflow.

   Task:  A discrete unit of agent work that consumes inputs and
      produces outputs.

   Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG):  A graph structure representing task
      dependency ordering where edges are directed and no cycles exist.

   Execution Context Token (ECT):  A JSON Web Token [RFC7519] defined by
      this specification that records task execution details and policy
      evaluation outcomes.

   Audit Ledger:  An append-only, immutable log of all ECTs within a
      workflow or set of workflows, used for regulatory audit and
      compliance verification.

   Policy Checkpoint:  A point in a workflow where a policy evaluation
      outcome is recorded within an ECT.

   Workload Identity Token (WIT):  A WIMSE credential proving a
      workload's identity within a trust domain.

   Workload Proof Token (WPT):  A WIMSE proof-of-possession token used
      for request-level authentication.

   Trust Domain:  A WIMSE concept representing an organizational
      boundary with a shared identity issuer, corresponding to a SPIFFE
      [SPIFFE] trust domain.




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   Witness:  A third-party entity that observes and attests to the
      execution of a task, providing additional accountability.

3.  WIMSE Architecture Integration

3.1.  WIMSE Foundation

   The WIMSE architecture [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch] defines:

   *  Workload Identity Tokens (WIT) that prove a workload's identity
      within a trust domain ("I am Agent X in trust domain Y")

   *  Workload Proof Tokens (WPT) that prove possession of the private
      key associated with a WIT ("I control the key for Agent X")

   *  Multi-hop authentication via the service-to-service protocol
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]

   The following execution accountability needs are complementary to the
   WIMSE scope and are not addressed by workload identity alone:

   *  Recording what agents actually do with their authenticated
      identity

   *  Recording policy evaluation outcomes at each hop

   *  Maintaining structured execution records

   *  Linking compensation or rollback actions to original tasks

3.2.  Extension Model

   ECTs extend WIMSE by adding an execution accountability layer between
   the identity layer and the application layer:

















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   +--------------------------------------------------+
   |  WIMSE Layer (Identity)                          |
   |    WIT: "I am Agent X (spiffe://td/agent/x)"    |
   |    WPT: "I prove I control the key for Agent X"  |
   +--------------------------------------------------+
                          |
                          v
   +--------------------------------------------------+
   |  ECT Layer (Execution Accountability) [This Spec]|
   |    ECT: "Task executed, dependencies met,        |
   |          policy evaluated, outcome recorded"      |
   +--------------------------------------------------+
                          |
                          v
   +--------------------------------------------------+
   |  Ledger Layer (Immutable Record)                 |
   |    "All ECTs appended to audit ledger"           |
   +--------------------------------------------------+

               Figure 1: WIMSE Extension Architecture Layers

   This extension reuses the WIMSE signing model, extends JWT claims
   using standard JWT extensibility [RFC7519], and maintains WIMSE
   concepts including trust domains and workload identifiers.

3.3.  Integration Points

   An ECT integrates with the WIMSE identity framework through the
   following mechanisms:

   *  The ECT JOSE header "kid" parameter MUST reference the public key
      identifier from the agent's WIT.

   *  The ECT "iss" claim MUST use the WIMSE workload identifier format
      (a SPIFFE ID [SPIFFE]).

   *  The ECT MUST be signed with the same private key associated with
      the agent's WIT.

   *  The ECT signing algorithm (JOSE header "alg" parameter) MUST match
      the algorithm used in the corresponding WIT.

   When an agent makes an HTTP request to another agent, the Execution-
   Context header is carried alongside WIMSE identity headers:

   HTTP Request from Agent A to Agent B:
     Workload-Identity:    <WIT for Agent A>
     Execution-Context:    <ECT recording what A did>



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                       Figure 2: HTTP Header Stacking

   When a Workload Proof Token (WPT) is available per
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol], agents SHOULD include it alongside the
   WIT and ECT.  ECT verification does not depend on the presence of a
   WPT; the ECT is independently verifiable via the WIT public key.

   The receiving agent (Agent B) verifies in order:

   1.  WIT (WIMSE layer): Verifies Agent A's identity within the trust
       domain.  WPT verification, if present, per
       [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol].

   2.  ECT (this extension): Records what Agent A did, what policy was
       evaluated, and what precedent tasks exist.

   3.  Ledger: Appends the verified ECT to the audit ledger.

4.  Execution Context Token Format

   An Execution Context Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] signed
   as a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] using the Compact
   Serialization.  JWS JSON Serialization MUST NOT be used for ECTs.

4.1.  JOSE Header

   The ECT JOSE header MUST contain the following parameters:

   {
     "alg": "ES256",
     "typ": "wimse-exec+jwt",
     "kid": "agent-a-key-id-123"
   }

                     Figure 3: ECT JOSE Header Example

   alg:  REQUIRED.  The digital signature algorithm used to sign the
      ECT.  MUST match the algorithm in the corresponding WIT.
      Implementations MUST support ES256 [RFC7518].  The "alg" value
      MUST NOT be "none".  Symmetric algorithms (e.g., HS256, HS384,
      HS512) MUST NOT be used, as ECTs require asymmetric signatures for
      non-repudiation.

   typ:  REQUIRED.  MUST be set to "wimse-exec+jwt" to distinguish ECTs
      from other JWT types, consistent with the WIMSE convention for
      type parameter values.

   kid:  REQUIRED.  The key identifier referencing the public key from



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      the agent's WIT [RFC7517].  Used by verifiers to look up the
      correct public key for signature verification.

4.2.  JWT Claims

   The ECT payload contains both WIMSE-compatible standard JWT claims
   and execution context claims defined by this specification.

4.2.1.  Standard JWT Claims

   The following standard JWT claims [RFC7519] MUST be present in every
   ECT:

   iss:  REQUIRED.  StringOrURI.  The issuer of the ECT, which MUST be
      the workload's SPIFFE ID in the format spiffe://<trust-
      domain>/<path>.  This MUST match the "sub" claim of the agent's
      WIT.

   sub:  OPTIONAL.  StringOrURI.  The subject of the ECT.  When present,
      MUST equal the "iss" claim.  This claim is included for
      compatibility with JWT libraries and frameworks that expect a
      "sub" claim to be present.

   aud:  REQUIRED.  StringOrURI or array of StringOrURI.  The intended
      recipient(s) of the ECT.  Because ECTs serve as both inter-agent
      messages and audit records, the "aud" claim SHOULD contain the
      identifiers of all entities that will verify the ECT.  In practice
      this means:

      *  *Point-to-point delivery*: when an ECT is sent from one agent
         to a single next agent, "aud" contains that agent's workload
         identity.  The receiving agent verifies the ECT and forwards it
         to the ledger on behalf of the issuer.

      *  *Direct-to-ledger submission*: when an ECT is submitted
         directly to the audit ledger (e.g., after a join or at workflow
         completion), "aud" contains the ledger's identity.

      *  *Multi-audience*: when an ECT must be verified by both the next
         agent and the ledger independently, "aud" MUST be an array
         containing both identifiers (e.g.,
         ["spiffe://example.com/agent/next",
         "spiffe://example.com/system/ledger"]).  Each verifier checks
         that its own identity appears in the array.

      In multi-parent (join) scenarios where a task depends on ECTs from
      multiple parent agents, the joining agent creates a new ECT with
      the parent task IDs in "par".  The "aud" of this new ECT is set



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      according to the rules above based on where the ECT will be
      delivered — it is independent of the "aud" values in the parent
      ECTs.

   iat:  REQUIRED.  NumericDate.  The time at which the ECT was issued.
      The ECT records a completed action, so the "iat" value reflects
      when the record was created, not when task execution began.

   exp:  REQUIRED.  NumericDate.  The expiration time of the ECT.
      Implementations SHOULD set this to 5 to 15 minutes after "iat" to
      limit the replay window while allowing for reasonable clock skew
      and processing time.

   The standard JWT "nbf" (Not Before) claim is not used in ECTs because
   ECTs record completed actions and are valid immediately upon
   issuance.

   jti:  REQUIRED.  String.  A globally unique identifier for both the
      ECT and the task it records, in UUID format [RFC9562].  Since each
      ECT represents exactly one task, "jti" serves as both the token
      identifier (for replay detection) and the task identifier (for DAG
      parent references in "par").  Receivers MUST reject ECTs whose
      "jti" has already been seen within the expiration window.  When
      "wid" is present, uniqueness is scoped to the workflow; when "wid"
      is absent, uniqueness MUST be enforced globally across the ECT
      store.

4.2.2.  Execution Context

   The following claims are defined by this specification:

   wid:  OPTIONAL.  String.  A workflow identifier that groups related
      ECTs into a single workflow.  When present, MUST be a UUID
      [RFC9562].

   exec_act:  REQUIRED.  String.  The action or task type identifier
      describing what the agent performed (e.g., "process_payment",
      "validate_safety", "calculate_dosage").  Note: this claim is
      intentionally named "exec_act" rather than "act" to avoid
      collision with the "act" (Actor) claim registered by [RFC8693].

   par:  REQUIRED.  Array of strings.  Parent task identifiers
      representing DAG dependencies.  Each element MUST be the "jti"
      value of a previously verified ECT.  An empty array indicates a
      root task with no dependencies.  A workflow MAY contain multiple
      root tasks.





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4.2.3.  Policy Evaluation

   The following claims record policy evaluation outcomes:

   pol:  OPTIONAL.  String.  The identifier of the policy rule that was
      evaluated for this task (e.g., "clinical_data_access_policy_v1").
      MUST be present when "pol_decision" is present.

   pol_decision:  OPTIONAL.  String.  The result of the policy
      evaluation.  When present, MUST be one of the values registered in
      the ECT Policy Decision Values registry (Section 12.4).  MUST be
      present when "pol" is present.  Initial values are:

      *  "approved": The policy evaluation succeeded and the task was
         authorized to proceed.

      *  "rejected": The policy evaluation failed.  A "rejected" ECT
         MUST still be recorded for accountability.  An ECT with
         "pol_decision" of "rejected" MAY appear as a parent in the
         "par" array of a subsequent ECT, but only for compensation,
         rollback, or remediation tasks.  Agents MUST NOT proceed with
         normal workflow execution based on a parent ECT whose
         "pol_decision" is "rejected".

      *  "pending_human_review": The policy evaluation requires human
         judgment before proceeding.  Agents MUST NOT proceed with
         dependent tasks until a subsequent ECT from a human reviewer
         records an "approved" decision referencing this task as a
         parent.

      When "pol" and "pol_decision" are absent, the ECT records task
      execution without a policy checkpoint.  Regulated deployments
      SHOULD include policy claims on all ECTs to maintain complete
      audit trails.

   pol_enforcer:  OPTIONAL.  StringOrURI.  The identity of the entity
      (system or person) that evaluated the policy decision.  When
      present, SHOULD use SPIFFE ID format.

   pol_timestamp:  OPTIONAL.  NumericDate.  The time at which the policy
      decision was made.  When present, MUST be equal to or earlier than
      the "iat" claim.

   This specification intentionally defines only the recording of policy
   evaluation outcomes.  The mechanisms by which policies are defined,
   distributed to agents, and evaluated are out of scope.  The "pol"
   claim is an opaque identifier referencing an external policy; the
   semantics and enforcement of that policy are determined by the



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   deployment environment.  Implementations may use any policy engine or
   framework (e.g., OPA/Rego, Cedar, XACML, or custom solutions)
   provided that the evaluation outcome is faithfully recorded in the
   ECT claims defined above.

4.2.4.  Data Integrity

   The following claims provide integrity verification for task inputs
   and outputs without revealing the data itself:

   inp_hash:  OPTIONAL.  String.  A cryptographic hash of the input
      data, formatted as "hash-algorithm:base64url-encoded-hash" (e.g.,
      "sha-256:n4bQgYhMfWWaL-qgxVrQFaO_TxsrC4Is0V1sFbDwCgg").  The hash
      algorithm identifier MUST be a lowercase value from the IANA Named
      Information Hash Algorithm Registry (e.g., "sha-256", "sha-384",
      "sha-512").  Implementations MUST support "sha-256" and SHOULD use
      "sha-256" unless a stronger algorithm is required.
      Implementations MUST NOT accept hash algorithms weaker than
      SHA-256 (e.g., MD5, SHA-1).  The hash MUST be computed over the
      raw octets of the input data.

   out_hash:  OPTIONAL.  String.  A cryptographic hash of the output
      data, using the same format and algorithm requirements as
      "inp_hash".

   inp_classification:  OPTIONAL.  String.  The data sensitivity
      classification of the input (e.g., "public", "confidential",
      "restricted").

4.2.5.  Task Metadata

   The following claims provide additional context about task execution:

   exec_time_ms:  OPTIONAL.  Integer.  The execution duration of the
      task in milliseconds.  MUST be a non-negative integer.

   regulated_domain:  OPTIONAL.  String.  The regulatory domain
      applicable to this task.  Values MUST be registered in the ECT
      Regulated Domain Values registry (Section 12.5).

   model_version:  OPTIONAL.  String.  The version identifier of the AI
      or ML model used to perform the task, if applicable.

   witnessed_by:  OPTIONAL.  Array of StringOrURI.  Identifiers of
      third-party entities that the issuing agent claims observed or
      attested to the execution of this task.  When present, each
      element SHOULD use SPIFFE ID format.  Note that this claim is
      self-asserted by the ECT issuer; witnesses listed here do not co-



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      sign this ECT.  For stronger assurance, witnesses SHOULD submit
      independent signed ECTs to the ledger attesting to their
      observation (see Section 10.2.1).  In regulated environments,
      implementations SHOULD use witness attestation for critical
      decision points to mitigate the risk of single-agent false claims.
      See also Section 10.2 for the security implications of self-
      asserted witness claims.

4.2.6.  Compensation and Rollback

   compensation_required:  OPTIONAL.  Boolean.  Indicates whether this
      task is a compensation or rollback action for a previous task.

   compensation_reason:  OPTIONAL.  String.  A human-readable reason for
      the compensation action.  MUST be present if
      "compensation_required" is true.  Values SHOULD use structured
      identifiers (e.g., "policy_violation_in_parent_trade") rather than
      free-form text to minimize the risk of embedding sensitive
      information.  See Section 11.2 for privacy guidance.  If
      "compensation_reason" is present, "compensation_required" MUST be
      true.

   Note: compensation ECTs reference historical parent tasks via the
   "par" claim.  The referenced parent ECTs may have passed their own
   "exp" time; ECT expiration applies to the verification window of the
   ECT itself, not to its validity as a parent reference in the ledger.

4.2.7.  Extensions

   ext:  OPTIONAL.  Object.  An extension object for domain-specific
      claims not defined by this specification.  Implementations that do
      not understand extension claims MUST ignore them.

   To avoid key collisions between different domains, extension key
   names MUST use reverse domain notation (e.g.,
   "com.example.custom_field").  Implementations MUST NOT use
   unqualified key names within the "ext" object.  To prevent abuse and
   excessive token size, the serialized JSON representation of the "ext"
   object SHOULD NOT exceed 4096 bytes, and the JSON nesting depth
   within the "ext" object SHOULD NOT exceed 5 levels.  Implementations
   SHOULD reject ECTs whose "ext" claim exceeds these limits.

4.3.  Complete ECT Example

   The following is a complete ECT payload example:






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   {
     "iss": "spiffe://example.com/agent/clinical",
     "sub": "spiffe://example.com/agent/clinical",
     "aud": "spiffe://example.com/agent/safety",
     "iat": 1772064150,
     "exp": 1772064750,
     "jti": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001",

     "wid": "a0b1c2d3-e4f5-6789-abcd-ef0123456789",
     "exec_act": "recommend_treatment",
     "par": [],

     "pol": "clinical_reasoning_policy_v2",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "pol_enforcer": "spiffe://example.com/policy/clinical-engine",
     "pol_timestamp": 1772064145,

     "inp_hash": "sha-256:n4bQgYhMfWWaL-qgxVrQFaO_TxsrC4Is0V1sFbDwCgg",
     "out_hash": "sha-256:LCa0a2j_xo_5m0U8HTBBNBNCLXBkg7-g-YpeiGJm564",
     "inp_classification": "confidential",
     "exec_time_ms": 245,
     "regulated_domain": "medtech",
     "model_version": "clinical-reasoning-v4.2",

     "witnessed_by": [
       "spiffe://example.com/audit/observer-1"
     ]
   }

                   Figure 4: Complete ECT Payload Example

5.  HTTP Header Transport

5.1.  Execution-Context Header Field

   This specification defines the Execution-Context HTTP header field
   [RFC9110] for transporting ECTs between agents.

   The header field value is the ECT in JWS Compact Serialization format
   [RFC7515].  The value consists of three Base64url-encoded parts
   separated by period (".") characters.

   An agent sending a request to another agent includes the Execution-
   Context header alongside the WIMSE Workload-Identity header:







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   GET /api/safety-check HTTP/1.1
   Host: safety-agent.example.com
   Workload-Identity: eyJhbGci...WIT...
   Execution-Context: eyJhbGci...ECT...

                   Figure 5: HTTP Request with ECT Header

   When multiple parent tasks contribute context to a single request,
   multiple Execution-Context header field lines MAY be included, each
   carrying a separate ECT in JWS Compact Serialization format.

   When a receiver processes multiple Execution-Context headers, it MUST
   individually verify each ECT per the procedure in Section 7.  If any
   single ECT fails verification, the receiver MUST reject the entire
   request.  The set of verified parent task IDs across all received
   ECTs represents the complete set of parent dependencies available for
   the receiving agent's subsequent ECT.

6.  DAG Validation

6.1.  Overview

   ECTs form a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) where each task references
   its parent tasks via the "par" claim.  This structure provides a
   cryptographically signed record of execution ordering, enabling
   auditors to reconstruct the complete workflow and verify that
   required predecessor tasks were recorded before dependent tasks.

   DAG validation is performed against the audit ledger, which serves as
   the authoritative store of previously verified ECTs.

6.2.  Validation Rules

   When receiving and verifying an ECT, implementations MUST perform the
   following DAG validation steps:

   1.  Task ID Uniqueness: The "jti" claim MUST be unique within the
       applicable scope (the workflow identified by "wid", or the entire
       ECT store if "wid" is absent).  If an ECT with the same "jti"
       already exists, the ECT MUST be rejected.

   2.  Parent Existence: Every task identifier listed in the "par" array
       MUST correspond to a task that is available in the ECT store
       (either previously recorded in the ledger or received inline as a
       verified parent ECT).  If any parent task is not found, the ECT
       MUST be rejected.





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   3.  Temporal Ordering: The "iat" value of every parent task MUST NOT
       be greater than the "iat" value of the current task plus a
       configurable clock skew tolerance (RECOMMENDED: 30 seconds).
       That is, for each parent: parent.iat < child.iat +
       clock_skew_tolerance.  The tolerance accounts for clock skew
       between agents; it does not guarantee strict causal ordering from
       timestamps alone.  Causal ordering is primarily enforced by the
       DAG structure (parent existence in the ECT store), not by
       timestamps.  If any parent task violates this constraint, the ECT
       MUST be rejected.

   4.  Acyclicity: Following the chain of parent references MUST NOT
       lead back to the current ECT's "jti".  If a cycle is detected,
       the ECT MUST be rejected.

   5.  Parent Policy Decision: If any parent ECT contains a
       "pol_decision" of "rejected" or "pending_human_review", the
       current ECT's "exec_act" MUST indicate a compensation, rollback,
       remediation, or human review action.  Implementations MUST NOT
       accept an ECT representing normal workflow continuation when a
       parent's "pol_decision" is not "approved", unless the current ECT
       has "compensation_required" set to true.  This rule only applies
       when the parent ECT contains policy claims.

   6.  Trust Domain Consistency: Parent tasks SHOULD belong to the same
       trust domain or to a trust domain with which a federation
       relationship has been established.

6.3.  DAG Validation Algorithm

   The following pseudocode describes the DAG validation procedure:




















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   function validate_dag(ect, ledger, clock_skew_tolerance):
     // Step 1: Uniqueness check
     if ledger.contains(ect.jti, ect.wid):
       return error("ECT ID already exists")

     // Step 2: Parent existence and temporal ordering
     for parent_id in ect.par:
       parent = ledger.get(parent_id)
       if parent is null:
         return error("Parent task not found: " + parent_id)
       if parent.iat >= ect.iat + clock_skew_tolerance:
         return error("Parent task not earlier than current")

     // Step 3: Cycle detection (with traversal limit)
     visited = set()
     result = has_cycle(ect.jti, ect.par, ledger, visited,
                         max_ancestor_limit)
     if result is error or result is true:
       return error("Circular dependency or depth limit exceeded")

     return success

   function has_cycle(target_jti, parent_ids, ledger,
                      visited, max_depth):
     if visited.size() >= max_depth:
       return error("Maximum ancestor traversal limit exceeded")
     for parent_id in parent_ids:
       if parent_id == target_jti:
         return true
       if parent_id in visited:
         continue
       visited.add(parent_id)
       parent = ledger.get(parent_id)
       if parent is not null:
         result = has_cycle(target_jti, parent.par, ledger,
                             visited, max_depth)
         if result is error or result is true:
           return result
     return false

                    Figure 6: DAG Validation Pseudocode

   The cycle detection traverses the ancestor graph rooted at the
   current task's parents.  The complexity is O(V) where V is the number
   of ancestor nodes reachable from the current task's parent
   references.  For typical workflows with shallow DAGs, this is
   efficient.  To prevent denial-of-service via extremely deep or wide
   DAGs, implementations SHOULD enforce a maximum ancestor traversal



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   limit (RECOMMENDED: 10000 nodes).  If the limit is reached before
   cycle detection completes, the ECT SHOULD be rejected.
   Implementations SHOULD cache cycle detection results for previously
   verified tasks to avoid redundant traversals.

7.  Signature and Token Verification

7.1.  Verification Procedure

   When an agent receives an ECT, it MUST perform the following
   verification steps in order:

   1.   Parse the JWS Compact Serialization to extract the JOSE header,
        payload, and signature components per [RFC7515].

   2.   Verify that the "typ" header parameter is "wimse-exec+jwt".

   3.   Verify that the "alg" header parameter is not "none" and is not
        a symmetric algorithm.

   4.   Verify the "kid" header parameter references a known, valid
        public key from a WIT within the trust domain.

   5.   Retrieve the public key identified by "kid" and verify the JWS
        signature per [RFC7515] Section 5.2.

   6.   Verify that the signing key identified by "kid" has not been
        revoked within the trust domain.  Implementations MUST check the
        key's revocation status using the trust domain's key lifecycle
        mechanism (e.g., certificate revocation list, OCSP, or SPIFFE
        trust bundle updates).

   7.   Verify the "alg" header parameter matches the algorithm in the
        corresponding WIT.

   8.   Verify the "iss" claim matches the "sub" claim of the WIT
        associated with the "kid" public key.

   9.   Verify the "aud" claim contains the verifier's own workload
        identity.  When "aud" is an array, it is sufficient that the
        verifier's identity appears as one element; the presence of
        other audience values does not cause verification failure.  When
        the verifier is the audit ledger, the ledger's own identity MUST
        appear in "aud".

   10.  Verify the "exp" claim indicates the ECT has not expired.





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   11.  Verify the "iat" claim is not unreasonably far in the past
        (implementation-specific threshold, RECOMMENDED maximum of 15
        minutes) and is not unreasonably far in the future (RECOMMENDED:
        no more than 30 seconds ahead of the verifier's current time, to
        account for clock skew).

   12.  Verify all required claims ("jti", "exec_act", "par") are
        present and well-formed.

   13.  If "pol" or "pol_decision" is present, verify that both are
        present and that "pol_decision" is one of "approved",
        "rejected", or "pending_human_review".

   14.  Perform DAG validation per Section 6.

   15.  If all checks pass, the ECT MUST be appended to the audit
        ledger.

   If any verification step fails, the ECT MUST be rejected and the
   failure MUST be logged for audit purposes.  Error messages SHOULD NOT
   reveal whether specific parent task IDs exist in the ledger, to
   prevent information disclosure.

   When ECT verification fails during HTTP request processing, the
   receiving agent SHOULD respond with HTTP 403 (Forbidden) if the WIT
   is valid but the ECT is invalid, and HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) if the
   ECT signature verification fails.  The response body SHOULD include a
   generic error indicator without revealing which specific verification
   step failed.  The receiving agent MUST NOT process the requested
   action when ECT verification fails.

7.2.  Verification Pseudocode

   function verify_ect(ect_jws, verifier_id,
                        trust_domain_keys, ledger):
     // Parse JWS
     (header, payload, signature) = parse_jws(ect_jws)

     // Verify header
     if header.typ != "wimse-exec+jwt":
       return reject("Invalid typ parameter")

     if header.alg == "none" or is_symmetric(header.alg):
       return reject("Prohibited algorithm")

     // Look up public key
     public_key = trust_domain_keys.get(header.kid)
     if public_key is null:



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       return reject("Unknown key identifier")

     // Verify signature
     if not verify_jws_signature(header, payload,
                                  signature, public_key):
       return reject("Invalid signature")

     // Verify key not revoked
     if is_key_revoked(header.kid, trust_domain_keys):
       return reject("Signing key has been revoked")

     // Verify algorithm alignment
     wit = get_wit_for_key(header.kid)
     if header.alg != wit.alg:
       return reject("Algorithm mismatch with WIT")

     // Verify issuer matches WIT subject
     if payload.iss != wit.sub:
       return reject("Issuer does not match WIT subject")

     // Verify audience
     if verifier_id not in payload.aud:
       return reject("ECT not intended for this recipient")

     // Verify not expired
     if payload.exp < current_time():
       return reject("ECT has expired")

     // Verify iat freshness (not too old, not in the future)
     if payload.iat < current_time() - max_age_threshold:
       return reject("ECT issued too long ago")
     if payload.iat > current_time() + clock_skew_tolerance:
       return reject("ECT issued in the future")

     // Verify required claims
     for claim in ["jti", "exec_act", "par"]:
       if claim not in payload:
         return reject("Missing required claim: " + claim)

     // Validate policy claims (optional, but must be paired)
     if "pol" in payload or "pol_decision" in payload:
       if "pol" not in payload or "pol_decision" not in payload:
         return reject("pol and pol_decision must both be present")
       if payload.pol_decision not in
          ["approved", "rejected", "pending_human_review"]:
         return reject("Invalid pol_decision value")

     // Validate DAG (against ledger or inline parent ECTs)



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     result = validate_dag(payload, ledger,
                            clock_skew_tolerance)
     if result is error:
       return reject("DAG validation failed")

     // All checks passed; append to ledger
     ledger.append(payload)
     return accept

                   Figure 7: ECT Verification Pseudocode

8.  Audit Ledger Interface

   ECTs are designed to be recorded in an immutable audit ledger for
   compliance verification and post-hoc analysis.  This specification
   defines required properties for the ledger but does not mandate a
   specific storage technology.  Implementations MAY use append-only
   logs, databases with cryptographic commitment schemes, distributed
   ledgers, or any storage mechanism that provides the required
   properties.

   An audit ledger implementation MUST provide:

   1.  Append-only semantics: Once an ECT is recorded, it MUST NOT be
       modified or deleted.

   2.  Ordering: The ledger MUST maintain a total ordering of ECT
       entries via a monotonically increasing sequence number.

   3.  Lookup by ECT ID: The ledger MUST support efficient retrieval of
       ECT entries by "jti" value.

   4.  Integrity verification: The ledger SHOULD provide a mechanism to
       verify that no entries have been tampered with (e.g., hash chains
       or Merkle trees).

   The ledger SHOULD be maintained by an entity independent of the
   workflow agents to reduce the risk of collusion.

9.  Use Cases

   This section describes representative use cases demonstrating how
   ECTs provide execution records in regulated environments.  These
   examples demonstrate ECT mechanics; production deployments would
   include additional domain-specific requirements beyond the scope of
   this specification.





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   Note: task identifiers in this section are abbreviated for
   readability.  In production, all "jti" values are required to be
   UUIDs per Section 4.2.2.

9.1.  Medical Device SDLC Workflow

   In a medical device software development lifecycle (SDLC), AI agents
   assist across multiple phases from requirements analysis through
   release approval.  Regulatory frameworks including [FDA-21CFR11]
   Section 11.10(e) and [EU-MDR] require audit trails documenting the
   complete development process for software used in medical devices.

   Agent A (Spec Reviewer):
     jti: task-001    par: []
     exec_act: review_requirements_spec
     pol: spec_review_policy_v2     pol_decision: approved

   Agent B (Code Generator):
     jti: task-002    par: [task-001]
     exec_act: implement_module
     pol: coding_standards_v3       pol_decision: approved

   Agent C (Test Agent):
     jti: task-003    par: [task-002]
     exec_act: execute_test_suite
     pol: test_coverage_policy_v1   pol_decision: approved

   Agent D (Build Agent):
     jti: task-004    par: [task-003]
     exec_act: build_release_artifact
     pol: build_validation_v2       pol_decision: approved

   Human Release Manager:
     jti: task-005    par: [task-004]
     exec_act: approve_release
     pol: release_approval_policy   pol_decision: approved
     pol_enforcer: spiffe://meddev.example/human/release-mgr-42
     witnessed_by: [spiffe://meddev.example/audit/qa-observer-1]

                   Figure 8: Medical Device SDLC Workflow

   ECTs record that requirements were reviewed before implementation
   began, that tests were executed against the implemented code, that
   the build artifact was validated, and that a human release manager
   explicitly approved the release.  The DAG structure ensures no phase
   was skipped or reordered.





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9.1.1.  FDA Audit with DAG Reconstruction

   During a regulatory audit, an FDA reviewer requests evidence of the
   development process for a specific software release.  The auditing
   authority retrieves all ECTs sharing the same workflow identifier
   ("wid") from the audit ledger and reconstructs the complete DAG:

   task-001 (review_requirements_spec)
     |
     v
   task-002 (implement_module)
     |
     v
   task-003 (execute_test_suite)
     |
     v
   task-004 (build_release_artifact)
     |
     v
   task-005 (approve_release) [human, witnessed]

                 Figure 9: Reconstructed DAG for FDA Audit

   The reconstructed DAG provides cryptographic evidence that:

   *  Each phase was executed by an identified and authenticated agent.

   *  Policy checkpoints were evaluated at every phase transition.

   *  The execution sequence was maintained (no step was bypassed).

   *  A human-in-the-loop approved the final release, with independent
      witness attestation.

   *  Timestamps and execution durations are recorded for each step.

   This can contribute to compliance with:

   *  [FDA-21CFR11] Section 11.10(e): Computer-generated audit trails
      that record the date, time, and identity of the operator.

   *  [EU-MDR] Annex II: Technical documentation traceability for the
      software development lifecycle.

   *  [EU-AI-ACT] Article 12: Automatic logging capabilities for high-
      risk AI systems involved in the development process.





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   *  [EU-AI-ACT] Article 14: ECTs can record evidence that human
      oversight events occurred during the release process.

9.2.  Financial Trading Workflow

   In a financial trading workflow, agents perform risk assessment,
   compliance verification, and trade execution.  The DAG structure
   records that compliance checks were evaluated before trade execution.

   Agent A (Risk Assessment):
     jti: task-001    par: []
     exec_act: calculate_risk_exposure
     pol: risk_limits_policy_v2  pol_decision: approved

   Agent B (Compliance):
     jti: task-002    par: [task-001]
     exec_act: verify_compliance
     pol: compliance_check_v1    pol_decision: approved

   Agent C (Execution):
     jti: task-003    par: [task-002]
     exec_act: execute_trade
     pol: execution_policy_v3    pol_decision: approved

                   Figure 10: Financial Trading Workflow

   This can contribute to compliance with:

   *  [MIFID-II]: ECTs provide cryptographic records of the execution
      sequence that can support transaction audit requirements.

   *  [DORA] Article 12: ECTs contribute to ICT activity logging.

   *  [EU-AI-ACT] Article 12: Logging of decisions made by AI-driven
      systems.

9.3.  Compensation and Rollback

   When a compliance violation is discovered after execution, ECTs
   provide a mechanism to record authorized compensation actions with a
   cryptographic link to the original task:










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   {
     "iss": "spiffe://bank.example/agent/operations",
     "sub": "spiffe://bank.example/agent/operations",
     "aud": "spiffe://bank.example/system/ledger",
     "iat": 1772150550,
     "exp": 1772151150,
     "jti": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440099",
     "wid": "d3e4f5a6-b7c8-9012-def0-123456789012",
     "exec_act": "initiate_trade_rollback",
     "par": ["550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440003"],
     "pol": "compensation_policy_v1",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "pol_enforcer": "spiffe://bank.example/human/compliance-officer",
     "compensation_required": true,
     "compensation_reason": "policy_violation_in_parent_trade"
   }

                    Figure 11: Compensation ECT Example

   The "par" claim links the compensation action to the original trade,
   creating an auditable chain from execution through violation
   discovery to remediation.

9.4.  Autonomous Logistics Coordination

   In a logistics workflow, multiple compliance checks complete before
   shipment commitment.  The DAG structure records that all required
   checks were completed:























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   Agent A (Route Planning):
     jti: task-001    par: []
     exec_act: plan_route
     pol: route_policy_v1        pol_decision: approved

   Agent B (Customs):
     jti: task-002    par: [task-001]
     exec_act: validate_customs
     pol: customs_policy_v2      pol_decision: approved

   Agent C (Safety):
     jti: task-003    par: [task-001]
     exec_act: verify_cargo_safety
     pol: safety_policy_v1       pol_decision: approved

   Agent D (Payment):
     jti: task-004    par: [task-002, task-003]
     exec_act: authorize_payment
     pol: payment_policy_v3      pol_decision: approved

   System (Commitment):
     jti: task-005    par: [task-004]
     exec_act: commit_shipment
     pol: commitment_policy_v1   pol_decision: approved

             Figure 12: Logistics Workflow with Parallel Tasks

   Note that tasks 002 and 003 both depend only on task-001 and can
   execute in parallel.  Task 004 depends on both, demonstrating the
   DAG's ability to represent parallel execution with a join point.

10.  Security Considerations

   This section addresses security considerations following the guidance
   in [RFC3552].

10.1.  Threat Model

   The following threat actors are considered:

   *  Malicious agent (insider threat): An agent within the trust domain
      that intentionally creates false ECT claims.

   *  Compromised agent (external attacker): An agent whose private key
      has been obtained by an external attacker.

   *  Ledger tamperer: An entity attempting to modify or delete ledger
      entries after they have been recorded.



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   *  Time manipulator: An entity attempting to manipulate timestamps to
      alter perceived execution ordering.

10.2.  Self-Assertion Limitation

   ECTs are self-asserted by the executing agent.  The agent claims what
   it did, and this claim is signed with its private key.  A compromised
   or malicious agent could create ECTs with false claims (e.g., setting
   "pol_decision" to "approved" without actually evaluating the policy).

   ECTs do not independently verify that:

   *  The claimed execution actually occurred as described

   *  The policy evaluation was correctly performed

   *  The input/output hashes correspond to the actual data processed

   *  The agent faithfully performed the stated action

   The trustworthiness of ECT claims depends on the trustworthiness of
   the signing agent.  To mitigate single-agent false claims, regulated
   environments SHOULD use the "witnessed_by" mechanism to include
   independent third-party observers at critical decision points.
   However, the "witnessed_by" claim is self-asserted by the ECT issuer:
   the listed witnesses do not co-sign the ECT and there is no
   cryptographic evidence within a single ECT that the witnesses
   actually observed the task.  An issuing agent could list witnesses
   that did not participate.

10.2.1.  Witness Attestation Model

   To address the self-assertion limitation of the "witnessed_by" claim,
   witnesses SHOULD submit their own independent signed ECTs to the
   audit ledger attesting to the observed task.  A witness attestation
   ECT:

   *  MUST set "iss" to the witness's own workload identity.

   *  MUST set "exec_act" to "witness_attestation" (or a domain-
      specific equivalent).

   *  MUST include the observed task's "jti" in the "par" array, linking
      the attestation to the original task.

   *  MUST set "pol_decision" to "approved" to indicate the witness
      confirms the observation.




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   When a task's "witnessed_by" claim lists one or more witnesses,
   auditors SHOULD verify that corresponding witness attestation ECTs
   exist in the ledger for each listed witness.  A mismatch between the
   "witnessed_by" list and the set of independent witness ECTs in the
   ledger SHOULD be flagged during audit review.

   This model converts witness attestation from a self-asserted claim to
   a cryptographically verifiable property of the ledger: the witness
   independently signs their own ECT using their own key, and the ledger
   records both the original task ECT and the witness attestation ECTs.

10.3.  Organizational Prerequisites

   ECTs operate within a broader trust framework.  The guarantees
   provided by ECTs are only meaningful when the following
   organizational controls are in place:

   *  Key management governance: Controls over who provisions agent keys
      and how keys are protected.

   *  Ledger integrity governance: The ledger is maintained by an entity
      independent of the workflow agents.

   *  Policy lifecycle management: Policy identifiers in ECTs map to
      actual, validated policy rules.

   *  Agent deployment governance: Agents are deployed and maintained in
      a manner that preserves their integrity.

10.4.  Signature Verification

   ECTs MUST be signed with the agent's private key using JWS [RFC7515].
   The signature algorithm MUST match the algorithm specified in the
   agent's WIT.  Receivers MUST verify the ECT signature against the WIT
   public key before processing any claims.  Receivers MUST verify that
   the signing key has not been revoked within the trust domain (see
   step 6 in Section 7).

   If signature verification fails or if the signing key has been
   revoked, the ECT MUST be rejected entirely and the failure MUST be
   logged.

   Implementations MUST use established JWS libraries and MUST NOT
   implement custom signature verification.







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10.5.  Replay Attack Prevention

   ECTs include short expiration times (RECOMMENDED: 5-15 minutes) to
   limit the window for replay attacks.  The "aud" claim restricts
   replay to unintended recipients: an ECT intended for Agent B will be
   rejected by Agent C.  The "iat" claim enables receivers to reject
   ECTs that are too old, even if not yet expired.

   The DAG structure provides additional replay protection: an ECT
   referencing parent tasks that already have a recorded child task with
   the same action can be flagged as a potential replay.

   Implementations MUST maintain a cache of recently-seen "jti" values
   to detect replayed ECTs within the expiration window.  An ECT with a
   duplicate "jti" value MUST be rejected.

10.6.  Man-in-the-Middle Protection

   ECTs do not replace transport-layer security.  ECTs MUST be
   transmitted over TLS or mTLS connections.  When used with the WIMSE
   service-to-service protocol [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol], transport
   security is already established.  HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421]
   provide an alternative channel binding mechanism.

   The defense-in-depth model provides:

   *  TLS/mTLS (transport layer): Prevents network-level tampering.

   *  WIT/WPT (WIMSE identity layer): Proves agent identity and request
      authorization.

   *  ECT (execution accountability layer): Records what the agent did
      and under what policy.

10.7.  Key Compromise

   If an agent's private key is compromised, an attacker can forge ECTs
   that appear to originate from that agent.  To mitigate this risk:

   *  Implementations SHOULD use short-lived keys and rotate them
      frequently (hours to days, not months).

   *  Private keys SHOULD be stored in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
      or equivalent secure key storage.

   *  Trust domains MUST support rapid key revocation.





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   *  Upon suspected compromise, the trust domain MUST revoke the
      compromised key and issue a new WIT with a fresh key pair.

   ECTs signed with a compromised key that were recorded in the ledger
   before revocation remain valid historical records but SHOULD be
   flagged in the ledger as "signed with subsequently revoked key" for
   audit purposes.

10.8.  Collusion and False Claims

   A single malicious agent cannot forge parent task references because
   DAG validation requires parent tasks to exist in the ledger.
   However, multiple colluding agents could potentially create a false
   execution history if they control the ledger.

   Mitigations include:

   *  Independent ledger maintenance: The ledger SHOULD be maintained by
      an entity independent of the workflow agents.

   *  Witness attestation: Using the "witnessed_by" claim to include
      independent third-party observers.

   *  Cross-verification: Multiple independent ledger replicas can be
      compared for consistency.

   *  Out-of-band audit: External auditors periodically verify ledger
      contents against expected workflow patterns.

10.9.  Denial of Service

   ECT signature verification is computationally inexpensive
   (approximately 1ms per ECT on modern hardware for ES256).  DAG
   validation complexity is O(V) where V is the number of ancestor nodes
   reachable from the parent references; for typical shallow DAGs this
   is efficient.

   Implementations SHOULD apply rate limiting at the API layer to
   prevent excessive ECT submissions.  DAG validation SHOULD be
   performed after signature verification to avoid wasting resources on
   unsigned or incorrectly signed tokens.










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10.10.  Timestamp Accuracy

   ECTs rely on timestamps ("iat", "exp") for temporal ordering.  Clock
   skew between agents can lead to incorrect ordering judgments.
   Implementations SHOULD use synchronized time sources (e.g., NTP) and
   SHOULD allow a configurable clock skew tolerance (RECOMMENDED: 30
   seconds).

   Cross-organizational deployments where agents span multiple trust
   domains with independent time sources MAY require a higher clock skew
   tolerance.  Deployments using trust domain federation SHOULD document
   their configured clock skew tolerance value and SHOULD ensure all
   participating trust domains agree on a common tolerance.

   The temporal ordering check in DAG validation incorporates the clock
   skew tolerance to account for minor clock differences between agents.

10.11.  ECT Size Constraints

   ECTs with many parent tasks or large extension objects can increase
   HTTP header size.  Implementations SHOULD limit the "par" array to a
   maximum of 256 entries.  Workflows requiring more parent references
   SHOULD introduce intermediate aggregation tasks.  The "ext" object
   SHOULD NOT exceed 4096 bytes when serialized as JSON and SHOULD NOT
   exceed a nesting depth of 5 levels (see also Section 4.2.7).

11.  Privacy Considerations

11.1.  Data Exposure in ECTs

   ECTs necessarily reveal:

   *  Agent identities ("iss", "aud") for accountability purposes

   *  Action descriptions ("exec_act") for audit trail completeness

   *  Policy evaluation outcomes ("pol", "pol_decision") for compliance
      verification

   *  Timestamps ("iat", "exp") for temporal ordering

   ECTs are designed to NOT reveal:

   *  Actual input or output data values (replaced with cryptographic
      hashes via "inp_hash" and "out_hash")

   *  Internal computation details or intermediate steps




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   *  Proprietary algorithms or intellectual property

   *  Personally identifiable information (PII)

11.2.  Data Minimization

   Implementations SHOULD minimize the information included in ECTs.
   The "exec_act" claim SHOULD use structured identifiers (e.g.,
   "process_payment") rather than natural language descriptions.  The
   "pol" claim SHOULD reference policy identifiers rather than embedding
   policy content.

   The "compensation_reason" claim (Section 4.2.6) deserves particular
   attention: because it is human-readable and may describe the
   circumstances of a failure or policy violation, it risks exposing
   sensitive operational details.  Implementations SHOULD use short,
   structured reason codes (e.g., "policy_violation_in_parent_trade")
   rather than free-form natural language explanations.  Implementers
   SHOULD review "compensation_reason" values for potential information
   leakage before deploying to production.

11.3.  Storage and Access Control

   ECTs stored in audit ledgers SHOULD be access-controlled so that only
   authorized auditors and regulators can read them.  Implementations
   SHOULD consider encryption at rest for ledger storage containing
   sensitive regulatory data.

   Full input and output data (corresponding to the hashes in ECTs)
   SHOULD be stored separately from the ledger with additional access
   controls, since auditors may need to verify hash correctness but
   general access to the data values is not needed.

11.4.  Regulatory Access

   ECTs are designed for interpretation by qualified human auditors and
   regulators.  ECTs provide structural records of execution ordering
   and policy evaluation; they are not intended for public disclosure.

12.  IANA Considerations

12.1.  Media Type Registration

   This document requests registration of the following media type in
   the "Media Types" registry maintained by IANA:

   Type name:  application




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   Subtype name:  wimse-exec+jwt

   Required parameters:  none

   Optional parameters:  none

   Encoding considerations:  8bit; an ECT is a JWT that is a JWS using
      the Compact Serialization, which is a sequence of Base64url-
      encoded values separated by period characters.

   Security considerations:  See the Security Considerations section of
      this document.

   Interoperability considerations:  none

   Published specification:  This document

   Applications that use this media type:  Applications that implement
      regulated agentic workflows requiring execution context tracing
      and audit trails.

   Additional information:  Magic number(s): none File extension(s):
      none Macintosh file type code(s): none

   Person and email address to contact for further information:  Christi
      an Nennemann, ietf@nennemann.de

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  none

   Author:  Christian Nennemann

   Change controller:  IETF

12.2.  HTTP Header Field Registration

   This document requests registration of the following header field in
   the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry"
   maintained by IANA:

   Field name:  Execution-Context

   Status:  permanent

   Specification document:  This document, Section 5





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12.3.  JWT Claims Registration

   This document requests registration of the following claims in the
   "JSON Web Token Claims" registry maintained by IANA:

   +=======================+=================+============+===========+
   |       Claim Name      | Claim           |   Change   | Reference |
   |                       | Description     | Controller |           |
   +=======================+=================+============+===========+
   |          wid          | Workflow        |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Identifier      |            |   4.2.2   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |        exec_act       | Action/Task     |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Type            |            |   4.2.2   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |          par          | Parent Task     |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Identifiers     |            |   4.2.2   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |          pol          | Policy Rule     |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Identifier      |            |   4.2.3   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |      pol_decision     | Policy Decision |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Result          |            |   4.2.3   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |      pol_enforcer     | Policy Enforcer |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Identity        |            |   4.2.3   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |     pol_timestamp     | Policy Decision |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Timestamp       |            |   4.2.3   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |        inp_hash       | Input Data Hash |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       |                 |            |   4.2.4   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |        out_hash       | Output Data     |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Hash            |            |   4.2.4   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |   inp_classification  | Input Data      |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Classification  |            |   4.2.4   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |      exec_time_ms     | Execution Time  |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | (ms)            |            |   4.2.5   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |      witnessed_by     | Witness         |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Identities      |            |   4.2.5   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |    regulated_domain   | Regulatory      |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Domain          |            |   4.2.5   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+



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   |     model_version     | AI/ML Model     |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Version         |            |   4.2.5   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   | compensation_required | Compensation    |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Flag            |            |   4.2.6   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |  compensation_reason  | Compensation    |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Reason          |            |   4.2.6   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+
   |          ext          | Extension       |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                       | Object          |            |   4.2.7   |
   +-----------------------+-----------------+------------+-----------+

                    Table 1: JWT Claims Registrations

12.4.  ECT Policy Decision Values Registry

   This document establishes the "ECT Policy Decision Values" registry
   under the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" group.  Registration policy is
   Specification Required per [RFC8126].

   The initial contents of the registry are:

   +======================+===================+============+===========+
   |        Value         | Description       |   Change   | Reference |
   |                      |                   | Controller |           |
   +======================+===================+============+===========+
   |       approved       | Policy            |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                      | evaluation        |            |   4.2.3   |
   |                      | succeeded         |            |           |
   +----------------------+-------------------+------------+-----------+
   |       rejected       | Policy            |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                      | evaluation        |            |   4.2.3   |
   |                      | failed            |            |           |
   +----------------------+-------------------+------------+-----------+
   | pending_human_review | Awaiting          |    IETF    |  Section  |
   |                      | human             |            |   4.2.3   |
   |                      | judgment          |            |           |
   +----------------------+-------------------+------------+-----------+

                    Table 2: ECT Policy Decision Values

12.5.  ECT Regulated Domain Values Registry

   This document establishes the "ECT Regulated Domain Values" registry
   under the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" group.  Registration policy is
   Specification Required per [RFC8126].




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   The initial contents of the registry are:

     +==========+====================+===================+===========+
     |  Value   | Description        | Change Controller | Reference |
     +==========+====================+===================+===========+
     | medtech  | Medical technology |        IETF       |  Section  |
     |          | and devices        |                   |   4.2.5   |
     +----------+--------------------+-------------------+-----------+
     | finance  | Financial services |        IETF       |  Section  |
     |          | and trading        |                   |   4.2.5   |
     +----------+--------------------+-------------------+-----------+
     | military | Military and       |        IETF       |  Section  |
     |          | defense            |                   |   4.2.5   |
     +----------+--------------------+-------------------+-----------+

                    Table 3: ECT Regulated Domain Values

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]
              Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-arch-06, 30 September 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              arch-06>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]
              Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A., and Y.
              Sheffer, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-
              protocol-07, 16 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              s2s-protocol-07>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.






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   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9562]  Davis, K., Peabody, B., and P. Leach, "Universally Unique
              IDentifiers (UUIDs)", RFC 9562, DOI 10.17487/RFC9562, May
              2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9562>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [DORA]     European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational
              resilience for the financial sector (DORA)", 14 December
              2022, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554>.

   [EU-AI-ACT]
              European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and
              of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial
              intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act)", 13 June 2024,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689>.

   [EU-MDR]   European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices (MDR)", 5
              April 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/745>.




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   [FDA-21CFR11]
              U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Title 21, Code of
              Federal Regulations, Part 11: Electronic Records;
              Electronic Signatures", <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/
              title-21/chapter-I/subchapter-A/part-11>.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
              Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
              "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-07, 24 January 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-07>.

   [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
              Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
              Transparent Digital Supply Chains", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-22, 10
              October 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-22>.

   [I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity]
              Yuan, N. and P. C. Liu, "WIMSE Applicability for AI
              Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ni-wimse-
              ai-agent-identity-01, 20 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ni-wimse-ai-
              agent-identity-01>.

   [I-D.oauth-transaction-tokens-for-agents]
              Raut, A., "Transaction Tokens For Agents", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-oauth-transaction-tokens-
              for-agents-04, 10 February 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-for-agents-04>.

   [MIFID-II] European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
              "Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of
              the Council on markets in financial instruments (MiFID
              II)", 15 May 2014,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/65>.

   [OPENTELEMETRY]
              Cloud Native Computing Foundation, "OpenTelemetry
              Specification",
              <https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/>.






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   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3552>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

   [RFC9421]  Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
              Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
              February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.

   [SPIFFE]   "Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone
              (SPIFFE)",
              <https://spiffe.io/docs/latest/spiffe-about/overview/>.

Related Work

WIMSE Workload Identity

   The WIMSE architecture [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch] and service-to- service
   protocol [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol] provide the identity
   foundation upon which ECTs are built.  WIT/WPT answer "who is this
   agent?" and "does it control the claimed key?" while ECTs record
   "what did this agent do?" and "what policy was evaluated?"  Together
   they form an identity-plus-accountability framework for regulated
   agentic systems.

OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange and the "act" Claim

   [RFC8693] defines the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange protocol and registers
   the "act" (Actor) claim in the JWT Claims registry.  The "act" claim
   creates nested JSON objects representing a delegation chain: "who is
   acting on behalf of whom."  While the nesting superficially resembles
   a chain, it is strictly linear (each "act" object contains at most
   one nested "act"), represents authorization delegation rather than
   task execution, and carries no task identifiers, policy decisions, or
   input/output integrity data.  The "act" chain cannot represent
   branching (fan-out) or convergence (fan-in) and therefore cannot form
   a DAG.

   ECTs intentionally use the distinct claim name "exec_act" for the
   action/task type to avoid collision with the "act" claim.  The two
   concepts are orthogonal: "act" records "who authorized whom," ECTs
   record "what was done, in what order, with what policy outcomes."




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Transaction Tokens

   OAuth Transaction Tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
   propagate authorization context across workload call chains.  The
   Txn-Token "req_wl" claim accumulates a comma-separated list of
   workloads that requested replacement tokens, which is the closest
   existing mechanism to call-chain recording.

   However, "req_wl" cannot form a DAG because:

   *  It is linear: a comma-separated string with no branching or
      merging representation.  When a workload fans out to multiple
      downstream services, each receives the same "req_wl" value and the
      branching is invisible.

   *  It is incomplete: only workloads that request a replacement token
      from the Transaction Token Service appear in "req_wl"; workloads
      that forward the token unchanged are not recorded.

   *  It carries no task-level granularity, no parent references, no
      policy evaluation outcomes, and no execution content.

   Extensions for agentic use cases
   ([I-D.oauth-transaction-tokens-for-agents]) add agent identity and
   constraints ("agentic_ctx") but no execution ordering or DAG
   structure.

   ECTs and Transaction Tokens are complementary: a Txn-Token propagates
   authorization context ("this request is authorized for scope X on
   behalf of user Y"), while an ECT records execution accountability
   ("task T was performed, depending on tasks P1 and P2, with policy Z
   evaluated and approved").  An agent request could carry both a Txn-
   Token for authorization and an ECT for execution recording.  The WPT
   "tth" claim defined in [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol] can hash-bind a
   WPT to a co-present Txn-Token; a similar binding mechanism for ECTs
   is a potential future extension.

Distributed Tracing (OpenTelemetry)

   OpenTelemetry [OPENTELEMETRY] and similar distributed tracing systems
   provide observability for debugging and monitoring.  ECTs differ in
   several important ways: ECTs are cryptographically signed per-task
   with the agent's private key; ECTs are tamper-evident through JWS
   signatures; ECTs enforce DAG validation rules; and ECTs are designed
   for regulatory audit rather than operational monitoring.
   OpenTelemetry data is typically controlled by the platform operator
   and can be modified or deleted without detection.  ECTs and
   distributed traces are complementary: traces provide observability



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   while ECTs provide signed execution records.  ECTs may reference
   OpenTelemetry trace identifiers in the "ext" claim for correlation.

Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

   Both ECTs and blockchain systems provide immutable records.  This
   specification intentionally defines only the ECT token format and is
   agnostic to the storage mechanism.  ECTs can be stored in append-only
   logs, databases with cryptographic commitments, blockchain networks,
   or any storage providing the required properties defined in
   Section 8.

SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust)

   The SCITT architecture [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture] defines a
   framework for creating transparent and auditable supply chain records
   through Transparency Services, Signed Statements, and Receipts.  ECTs
   and SCITT are naturally complementary: the ECT "wid" (Workflow
   Identifier) claim can serve as a correlation identifier referenced in
   SCITT Signed Statements, linking a complete ECT audit trail to a
   supply chain transparency record.  For example, in a regulated
   manufacturing workflow, each agent step produces an ECT (recording
   what was done, by whom, under what policy), while the overall
   workflow identified by "wid" is registered as a SCITT Signed
   Statement on a Transparency Service.  This enables auditors to verify
   both the individual execution steps (via ECT DAG validation) and the
   end-to-end supply chain integrity (via SCITT Receipts) using the
   "wid" as the shared correlation point.  The "ext" claim in ECTs
   (Section 4.2.2) can carry SCITT-specific metadata such as
   Transparency Service identifiers or Receipt references for tighter
   integration.

W3C Verifiable Credentials

   W3C Verifiable Credentials represent claims about subjects (e.g.,
   identity, qualifications).  ECTs represent execution records of
   actions (what happened, in what order, under what policy).  While
   both use JWT/JWS as a serialization format, their semantics and use
   cases are distinct.

Implementation Guidance

Minimal Implementation

   A minimal conforming implementation needs to:






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   1.  Create JWTs with all required claims ("iss", "aud", "iat", "exp",
       "jti", "exec_act", "par") and policy claims ("pol",
       "pol_decision") when policy evaluation was performed.

   2.  Sign ECTs with the agent's private key using an algorithm
       matching the WIT (ES256 recommended).

   3.  Verify ECT signatures against WIT public keys.

   4.  Perform DAG validation (parent existence, temporal ordering,
       cycle detection).

   5.  Append verified ECTs to the audit ledger.

Storage Recommendations

   *  Append-only log: Simplest approach; immutability by design.

   *  Database with hash chains: Periodic cryptographic commitments over
      batches of entries.

   *  Distributed ledger: Maximum immutability guarantees for cross-
      organizational audit.

   *  Hybrid: Hot storage in a database, cold archive in immutable
      storage.

Performance Considerations

   *  ES256 signature verification: approximately 1ms per ECT on modern
      hardware.

   *  DAG validation: O(V) where V is the number of reachable ancestor
      nodes (typically small for shallow workflows).

   *  JSON serialization: sub-millisecond per ECT.

   *  Total per-request overhead: approximately 5-10ms, acceptable for
      regulated workflows where correctness is prioritized over latency.

Interoperability

   Implementations are expected to use established JWT/JWS libraries
   (JOSE) for token creation and verification.  Custom cryptographic
   implementations are strongly discouraged.  Implementations are
   expected to be tested against multiple JWT libraries to ensure
   interoperability.




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Regulatory Compliance Mapping

   The following table summarizes how ECTs can contribute to compliance
   with various regulatory frameworks.  ECTs are a technical building
   block; achieving compliance requires additional organizational
   measures beyond this specification.

    +============+========================+==========================+
    | Regulation | Requirement            | ECT Contribution         |
    +============+========================+==========================+
    | FDA 21 CFR | Audit trails recording | Cryptographic signatures |
    | Part 11    | date, time, operator,  | and append-only ledger   |
    |            | actions (11.10(e))     | contribute to audit      |
    |            |                        | trail requirements       |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
    | EU MDR     | Technical              | ECTs provide signed      |
    |            | documentation          | records of AI-assisted   |
    |            | traceability (Annex    | decision sequences       |
    |            | II)                    |                          |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
    | EU AI Act  | Automatic logging      | ECTs contribute          |
    | Art. 12    | capabilities for high- | cryptographic activity   |
    |            | risk AI                | logging                  |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
    | EU AI Act  | Human oversight        | ECTs can record evidence |
    | Art. 14    | capability             | that human oversight     |
    |            |                        | events occurred          |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
    | MiFID II   | Transaction records    | ECTs provide             |
    |            | for supervisory        | cryptographic execution  |
    |            | authorities            | sequence records         |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
    | DORA Art.  | ICT activity logging   | ECT ledger contributes   |
    | 12         | policies               | to ICT activity audit    |
    |            |                        | trail                    |
    +------------+------------------------+--------------------------+

                  Table 4: Regulatory Compliance Mapping

Examples

Example 1: Simple Two-Agent Workflow

   Agent A executes a data retrieval task and sends the ECT to Agent B:

   ECT JOSE Header:





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   {
     "alg": "ES256",
     "typ": "wimse-exec+jwt",
     "kid": "agent-a-key-2026-02"
   }

   ECT Payload:

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://example.com/agent/data-retrieval",
     "sub": "spiffe://example.com/agent/data-retrieval",
     "aud": "spiffe://example.com/agent/validator",
     "iat": 1772064150,
     "exp": 1772064750,
     "jti": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001",
     "wid": "b1c2d3e4-f5a6-7890-bcde-f01234567890",
     "exec_act": "fetch_patient_data",
     "par": [],
     "pol": "clinical_data_access_policy_v1",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "inp_hash": "sha-256:n4bQgYhMfWWaL-qgxVrQFaO_TxsrC4Is0V1sFbDwCgg",
     "out_hash": "sha-256:LCa0a2j_xo_5m0U8HTBBNBNCLXBkg7-g-YpeiGJm564",
     "exec_time_ms": 142,
     "regulated_domain": "medtech"
   }

   Agent B receives the ECT, verifies it, executes a validation task,
   and creates its own ECT:

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://example.com/agent/validator",
     "sub": "spiffe://example.com/agent/validator",
     "aud": "spiffe://example.com/system/ledger",
     "iat": 1772064160,
     "exp": 1772064760,
     "jti": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440002",
     "wid": "b1c2d3e4-f5a6-7890-bcde-f01234567890",
     "exec_act": "validate_safety",
     "par": ["550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001"],
     "pol": "safety_validation_policy_v2",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "exec_time_ms": 89,
     "regulated_domain": "medtech"
   }

   The resulting DAG:





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   task-...-0001 (fetch_patient_data)
     |
     v
   task-...-0002 (validate_safety)

Example 2: Medical Device SDLC with Release Approval

   A multi-step medical device software lifecycle workflow with
   autonomous agents and human release approval:

   Task 1 (Spec Review Agent):

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/spec-reviewer",
     "sub": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/spec-reviewer",
     "aud": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/code-gen",
     "iat": 1772064150,
     "exp": 1772064750,
     "jti": "a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000001",
     "wid": "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901",
     "exec_act": "review_requirements_spec",
     "par": [],
     "pol": "spec_review_policy_v2",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "regulated_domain": "medtech",
     "model_version": "spec-review-v3.1",
     "inp_hash": "sha-256:n4bQgYhMfWWaL-qgxVrQFaO_TxsrC4Is0V1sFbDwCgg",
     "out_hash": "sha-256:LCa0a2j_xo_5m0U8HTBBNBNCLXBkg7-g-YpeiGJm564"
   }

   Task 2 (Code Generation Agent):

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/code-gen",
     "sub": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/code-gen",
     "aud": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/test-runner",
     "iat": 1772064200,
     "exp": 1772064800,
     "jti": "a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000002",
     "wid": "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901",
     "exec_act": "implement_module",
     "par": ["a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000001"],
     "pol": "coding_standards_v3",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "regulated_domain": "medtech",
     "model_version": "codegen-v2.4"
   }




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   Task 3 (Autonomous Test Agent):

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/test-runner",
     "sub": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/test-runner",
     "aud": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/build",
     "iat": 1772064260,
     "exp": 1772064860,
     "jti": "a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000003",
     "wid": "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901",
     "exec_act": "execute_test_suite",
     "par": ["a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000002"],
     "pol": "test_coverage_policy_v1",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "regulated_domain": "medtech",
     "exec_time_ms": 4523
   }

   Task 4 (Build Agent):

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/build",
     "sub": "spiffe://meddev.example/agent/build",
     "aud": "spiffe://meddev.example/human/release-mgr-42",
     "iat": 1772064310,
     "exp": 1772064910,
     "jti": "a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000004",
     "wid": "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901",
     "exec_act": "build_release_artifact",
     "par": ["a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000003"],
     "pol": "build_validation_v2",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "regulated_domain": "medtech",
     "out_hash": "sha-256:Ry1YfOoW2XpC5Mq8HkGzNx3dL9vBa4sUjE7iKt0wPZc"
   }

   Task 5 (Human Release Manager Approval):














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   {
     "iss": "spiffe://meddev.example/human/release-mgr-42",
     "sub": "spiffe://meddev.example/human/release-mgr-42",
     "aud": "spiffe://meddev.example/system/ledger",
     "iat": 1772064510,
     "exp": 1772065110,
     "jti": "a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000005",
     "wid": "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901",
     "exec_act": "approve_release",
     "par": ["a1b2c3d4-0001-0000-0000-000000000004"],
     "pol": "release_approval_policy",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "pol_enforcer": "spiffe://meddev.example/human/release-mgr-42",
     "witnessed_by": [
       "spiffe://meddev.example/audit/qa-observer-1"
     ],
     "regulated_domain": "medtech"
   }

   The resulting DAG records the complete SDLC: spec review preceded
   implementation, implementation preceded testing, testing preceded
   build, and a human release manager approved the final release with
   independent witness attestation.

   task-...-0001 (review_requirements_spec)
     |
     v
   task-...-0002 (implement_module)
     |
     v
   task-...-0003 (execute_test_suite)
     |
     v
   task-...-0004 (build_release_artifact)
     |
     v
   task-...-0005 (approve_release) [human, witnessed]

   An FDA auditor reconstructs this DAG by querying the audit ledger for
   all ECTs with wid "c2d3e4f5-a6b7-8901-cdef-012345678901" and
   verifying each signature.  The DAG provides cryptographic evidence
   that the SDLC followed the prescribed process with human oversight at
   the release gate.

Example 3: Parallel Execution with Join

   A workflow where two tasks execute in parallel and a third task
   depends on both:



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   task-...-0001 (assess_risk)
     |            \
     v             v
   task-...-0002  task-...-0003
   (check         (verify
   compliance)    liquidity)
     |            /
     v           v
   task-...-0004 (execute_trade)

   Task 004 ECT payload:

   {
     "iss": "spiffe://bank.example/agent/execution",
     "sub": "spiffe://bank.example/agent/execution",
     "aud": "spiffe://bank.example/system/ledger",
     "iat": 1772064250,
     "exp": 1772064850,
     "jti": "f1e2d3c4-0004-0000-0000-000000000004",
     "wid": "d3e4f5a6-b7c8-9012-def0-123456789012",
     "exec_act": "execute_trade",
     "par": [
       "f1e2d3c4-0002-0000-0000-000000000002",
       "f1e2d3c4-0003-0000-0000-000000000003"
     ],
     "pol": "trade_execution_policy_v3",
     "pol_decision": "approved",
     "regulated_domain": "finance"
   }

   The "par" array with two entries records that both compliance
   checking and liquidity verification were completed before trade
   execution.

Acknowledgments

   The author thanks the WIMSE working group for their foundational work
   on workload identity in multi-system environments.  The concepts of
   Workload Identity Tokens and Workload Proof Tokens provide the
   identity foundation upon which execution context tracing is built.

Author's Address

   Christian Nennemann
   Independent Researcher
   Email: ietf@nennemann.de





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