Christian Nennemann
56f2ce669c
Both drafts now live in workspace/drafts/ as siblings:
drafts/
├── act/ (ACT -01, native to parent repo)
│ ├── draft-nennemann-act-01.md kramdown-rfc source
│ ├── draft-nennemann-act-01.{xml,txt,html,pdf}
│ ├── .refcache/ bibxml cache
│ └── build.sh
├── ietf-wimse-ect/ (ECT -02, submodule, PDF added)
│ └── ...
└── README-pdf.md PDF toolchain docs
ACT kramdown-rfc conversion:
- full YAML frontmatter (title, author, refs)
- section structure matches kramdown-rfc conventions
- {{REF}} citation syntax, auto-numbered sections
- references auto-built from normative/informative blocks
- removed manual TOC (kramdown-rfc generates)
- builds cleanly: 133K XML, 89K TXT, 208K HTML, 167K PDF
PDF toolchain:
- xml2rfc --pdf via weasyprint<60 + pydyf<0.10 injected into xml2rfc pipx venv
- both build.sh scripts now produce PDF as Step 4
- README-pdf.md documents the setup for new machines
Submodule: bump ietf-wimse-ect pointer for build.sh PDF step
36 lines
1.6 KiB
XML
36 lines
1.6 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-22">
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<front>
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<title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
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<author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
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<organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
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</author>
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<author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud" fullname="Antoine Delignat-Lavaud">
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<organization>Microsoft Research</organization>
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</author>
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<author initials="C." surname="Fournet" fullname="Cedric Fournet">
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<organization>Microsoft Research</organization>
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</author>
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<author initials="Y." surname="Deshpande" fullname="Yogesh Deshpande">
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<organization>ARM</organization>
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</author>
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<author initials="S." surname="Lasker" fullname="Steve Lasker">
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</author>
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<date month="October" day="10" year="2025" />
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<abstract>
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<t> Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While
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verifiable data structures have addressed specific issues, such as
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equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal
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architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an
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architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It
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ensures extensibility, interoperability between different
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transparency services, and compliance with various auditing
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procedures and regulatory requirements.
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</t>
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</abstract>
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</front>
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<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-22" />
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</reference>
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