feat: add draft data, gap analysis report, and workspace config

workspace/draft-team/cycles/dynamic-trust-and-reputation/50-reviews-v1/security.md

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+# Security Review
+
+## Findings
+
+### High: assertion authenticity is assumed but not tied to required receiver behavior
+
+The draft correctly says portable trust assertions need authenticated origin and integrity protection, but it does not make rejection behavior explicit. A receiver should not be allowed to consume an unauthenticated portable assertion and still claim conformance.
+
+### High: replay handling depends on freshness, but the minimum stale-data rule is too soft
+
+Freshness is mandatory, which is good, but receivers only SHOULD reject or downgrade stale assertions. For clearly expired assertions, that is too weak. A stronger interoperability floor is warranted.
+
+### Medium: negative trust sharing creates reputational poisoning risk without minimum evidence discipline
+
+The document warns about poisoning and privacy, yet evidence references remain entirely optional. That is reasonable for all assertions, but negative portable assertions may need a stronger requirement for explanation or evidence linkage.
+
+### Medium: collusion risk is identified but not operationalized
+
+The draft notes that multiple issuers may not be independent, but it gives no guidance on how a relying party should avoid double-counting related issuers. Even a brief cautionary requirement or implementation note would help.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Should unauthenticated portable trust assertions be explicitly non-conformant?
+- Should negative assertions require either evidence reference or explanation code?
+
+## Residual risk
+
+Even with improvements, dynamic trust will remain vulnerable to social and operational abuse that pure wire semantics cannot prevent. The draft should state those limits plainly.