feat: add draft data, gap analysis report, and workspace config

workspace/draft-team/cycles/dynamic-trust-and-reputation/00-user-spec.md

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+# User Spec
+
+## Topic
+
+Dynamic Trust and Reputation for Multi-Agent Systems
+
+## Goal
+
+Produce a credible IETF-style Internet-Draft for an interoperable way to represent and exchange runtime trust signals about agents, so systems can adapt authorization, routing, or collaboration decisions as agent behavior changes over time.
+
+## Intended status
+
+Experimental.
+
+Rationale: the need is clear, but trust scoring models are easy to overclaim and likely need deployment experience before standards-track treatment.
+
+## Problem to solve
+
+The analyzer identifies Dynamic Trust and Reputation as a high-severity gap. Current work is dominated by static identity and certificate-style authentication, but long-running agent ecosystems need a way to incorporate runtime behavior, observed failures, successful execution history, and policy violations into ongoing trust decisions.
+
+The draft should address:
+
+- how trust-relevant events are represented
+- how trust assertions or trust updates are shared
+- how recipients understand freshness, confidence, and scope
+- how dynamic trust interacts with but does not replace identity and authorization
+
+## What must be true in the final draft
+
+- The draft distinguishes identity, attestation, authorization, and trust; it must not collapse them into one concept.
+- Dynamic trust is presented as supplemental runtime evidence, not magic security.
+- The mechanism is narrow enough to be interoperable and testable.
+- Security and privacy analysis address manipulation, collusion, replay, reputational poisoning, and unwanted disclosure.
+- The document remains grounded in observable events and explicit confidence, not vague AI safety rhetoric.
+
+## Constraints
+
+- scope constraints
+  Do not try to standardize a universal reputation economy or global scoring service. Focus on exchangeable trust signals and their interpretation boundaries.
+- compatibility constraints
+  Reuse adjacent identity, attestation, and execution-evidence work when possible. Do not redefine base authentication or token exchange.
+- terminology constraints
+  Separate trust event, trust assertion, confidence, freshness, subject, issuer, and scope. Avoid anthropomorphic language.
+
+## Source materials to prioritize
+
+- `/home/c/projects/ietf-draft-analyzer/data/reports/gaps.md`
+- `/home/c/projects/ietf-draft-analyzer/data/reports/holistic-agent-ecosystem-draft-outlines.md`
+- `/home/c/projects/ietf-draft-analyzer/data/reports/ideas.md`
+- `/home/c/projects/ietf-draft-analyzer/data/reports/overview.md`
+- `draft-cosmos-protocol-specification`
+- `draft-jiang-seat-dynamic-attestation`
+- `draft-aylward-daap-v2`
+- `draft-birkholz-verifiable-agent-conversations`
+- relevant WIMSE, RATS, or attestation-adjacent drafts when they help prevent reinvention
+
+## Success criteria
+
+- A reader can tell what trust-relevant event data must be present and how it is scoped.
+- A reader can tell how trust assertions expire, how confidence is expressed, and how misuse is limited.
+- Reviewers can challenge the design on substance rather than on fuzzy terminology or missing threat analysis.
+- The draft makes clear what decisions dynamic trust can inform and what it must not be trusted to do alone.
+
+## Questions for the team
+
+- What is the minimum interoperable trust event model?
+- Should trust updates be absolute assertions, delta adjustments, or both?
+- How should confidence, issuer scope, and freshness be represented?
+- What privacy risks arise when sharing negative trust events across domains?