| Internet-Draft | Agent Consensus | March 2026 |
| Nennemann | Expires 7 September 2026 | [Page] |
This document defines standardized protocols for multiple AI agents to reach consensus on shared decisions and negotiate capabilities dynamically during runtime collaboration. As autonomous agent systems increasingly operate in multi-agent configurations, the need for formal agreement mechanisms and capability discovery becomes critical. This specification addresses the lack of consensus protocols and capability negotiation standards identified in the gap analysis for AI agent infrastructure.¶
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When multiple AI agents collaborate on shared tasks such as network management, resource allocation, or policy enforcement, they must frequently agree on joint decisions. Currently, no standardized protocol exists for agents to propose actions, vote on alternatives, reach quorum, or handle disagreements.¶
This document addresses Gap 3 (Multi-Agent Consensus) and Gap 10 (Capability Negotiation) from the gap analysis [I-D.nennemann-agent-gap-analysis]. Gap 3 identifies the absence of formal consensus mechanisms for multi-agent coordination, while Gap 10 highlights the lack of dynamic capability negotiation during runtime collaboration.¶
The protocols defined here enable agents to:¶
Propose actions and gather votes from participating agents.¶
Reach agreement using multiple consensus mechanisms suited to different operational contexts.¶
Advertise, discover, and negotiate capabilities dynamically.¶
Record consensus and negotiation outcomes in verifiable evidence chains via the Execution Chain Trace (ECT) framework [I-D.nennemann-wimse-ect].¶
The human-in-the-loop override protocol defined in [I-D.nennemann-agent-dag-hitl-safety] serves as the ultimate escalation path when consensus cannot be reached or when decisions exceed agent authority.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The following terms are used throughout this document:¶
A bounded period during which agents exchange proposals and votes to reach agreement on a specific decision.¶
The minimum number of participating agents required for a consensus round to produce a valid outcome.¶
A structured message submitted by an agent that describes a candidate action or decision for group consideration.¶
A response to a proposal indicating approval, rejection, or abstention, optionally accompanied by a rationale.¶
An agent designated as the coordinator for a consensus round, responsible for collecting votes and declaring outcomes.¶
A structured declaration by an agent of the capabilities it offers to other agents in a collaboration.¶
A message proposing the use of a specific capability under defined terms during a negotiation session.¶
A binding confirmation that an agent agrees to the terms of a capability offer.¶
A bounded interaction between two or more agents for the purpose of agreeing on capability usage terms.¶
The consensus protocol follows a three-phase commit model: propose, vote, and commit. The following diagram illustrates the message flow for a typical consensus round.¶
Agent A Leader Agent B Agent C
| | | |
|--- Propose ---->| | |
| |-- Vote Req --->| |
| |-- Vote Req ------------------> |
| | | |
| |<-- Vote -------| |
| |<-- Vote ---------------------- |
| | | |
| |--- Tally & Decide ----------> |
|<-- Commit ------| | |
| |-- Commit ----->| |
| |-- Commit -------------------> |
| | | |
Propose: An agent submits a proposal to the leader agent.¶
Vote: The leader distributes the proposal to all participants and collects votes within the timeout window.¶
Commit/Abort: The leader evaluates votes against the quorum and consensus mechanism rules, then issues a commit or abort signal to all participants.¶
This specification defines four consensus mechanisms. Implementations MUST support simple majority voting and SHOULD support at least one additional mechanism.¶
A proposal is accepted if more than half of the votes received are approvals. Abstentions do not count toward the total.¶
Each agent is assigned a weight reflecting its trust score, domain expertise, or capability level. A proposal is accepted if the sum of approval weights exceeds a configured threshold (default: 50% of total weight).¶
A designated leader agent makes the final decision after soliciting input from participants. Participant votes serve as advisory input rather than binding decisions.¶
A proposal is considered accepted unless an objection is raised within the timeout window. This mechanism minimizes communication overhead for routine decisions.¶
A proposal message MUST contain the following fields:¶
proposal_id: A globally unique identifier for the proposal (UUID format).¶
proposer: The identity of the proposing agent.¶
consensus_round_id: Identifier for the consensus round.¶
mechanism: The consensus mechanism to use (one of "majority", "weighted", "leader", "optimistic").¶
subject: A human-readable summary of the proposal.¶
action: A structured description of the proposed action.¶
timeout: The deadline for vote collection (as an absolute timestamp per [RFC9110] Section 5.6.7).¶
quorum: The minimum number of votes required.¶
participants: List of agent identifiers eligible to vote.¶
A vote message MUST contain the following fields:¶
proposal_id: The identifier of the proposal being voted on.¶
voter: The identity of the voting agent.¶
decision: One of "approve", "reject", or "abstain".¶
rationale: A human-readable explanation for the vote (REQUIRED for "reject", OPTIONAL for others).¶
timestamp: The time the vote was cast.¶
signature: A JWS [RFC7515] signature over the vote content for non-repudiation.¶
After vote collection, the leader issues either a commit or abort signal:¶
Commit: Indicates the proposal was accepted. All participants MUST execute the agreed action.¶
Abort: Indicates the proposal was rejected. Participants MUST NOT execute the proposed action.¶
Both signals MUST include the proposal_id, the final tally, and a JWS signature from the leader.¶
The quorum for a consensus round is determined by the consensus mechanism in use:¶
Simple majority: ceil(N/2) where N is the number of eligible voters.¶
Weighted: Agents representing at least 50% of total weight must participate.¶
Leader-based: No quorum required; leader decides independently.¶
Optimistic: All eligible agents are considered participants; silence counts as approval.¶
Each consensus round MUST specify a timeout. If quorum is not reached before the timeout:¶
The leader MUST issue an abort signal.¶
The proposing agent MAY re-submit the proposal with a longer timeout or reduced quorum.¶
If the decision is time-critical, the leader MAY escalate to a human operator via the override protocol defined in [I-D.nennemann-agent-dag-hitl-safety].¶
Implementations SHOULD use exponential backoff for re-submissions with a maximum retry count of 3.¶
In distributed deployments where network partitions may occur:¶
A consensus round is valid only if the leader can verify connectivity to a majority of participants.¶
If a partition is detected, all in-progress consensus rounds MUST be suspended until connectivity is restored.¶
Agents MUST NOT accept commit signals from multiple leaders for the same consensus round.¶
When multiple competing proposals address the same resource or decision:¶
Proposals are ranked by a priority score derived from the urgency of the decision, the authority level of the proposer, and the specificity of the proposed action.¶
Higher-priority proposals are evaluated first.¶
Lower-priority proposals that conflict with an accepted higher-priority proposal are automatically rejected.¶
If consensus cannot be reached after the maximum number of retries, or if agents are deadlocked:¶
The leader MUST escalate to a human operator using the override protocol defined in [I-D.nennemann-agent-dag-hitl-safety].¶
The escalation message MUST include the proposal, all votes received, and the reason for escalation.¶
The human operator's decision is binding and MUST be recorded in the ECT.¶
A deadlock exists when:¶
Two or more proposals mutually block each other (circular dependency).¶
A consensus round cannot reach quorum due to persistent abstentions or non-responsive agents.¶
Deadlock breaking strategies:¶
Timeout-based: The oldest proposal takes precedence.¶
Random selection: A verifiable random function selects the winning proposal.¶
Escalation: The deadlock is escalated to a human operator.¶
The leader MUST detect deadlocks within two consecutive failed consensus rounds on related proposals.¶
Agents MUST advertise their capabilities using a structured descriptor format. Capability advertisements extend the agent discovery mechanism and SHOULD be published during agent registration.¶
A capability descriptor MUST include:¶
agent_id: The identity of the advertising agent.¶
capabilities: An array of capability objects, each containing:¶
type: The capability type from the capability registry (see Section 4.3).¶
version: The version of the capability implementation.¶
parameters: Capability-specific configuration parameters.¶
constraints: Limitations on capability usage (e.g., rate limits, maximum payload size).¶
availability: Current availability status ("available", "busy", "degraded", "unavailable").¶
Capabilities are organized into the following categories:¶
Compute: Processing power, model inference, data transformation.¶
Knowledge: Domain expertise, access to knowledge bases, training data coverage.¶
Tool Access: Integration with external tools, APIs, or services.¶
Authorization Scope: Permissions and access levels the agent holds in various systems.¶
Each capability advertisement MUST include version information to enable compatibility checking:¶
min_version: The minimum protocol version supported.¶
max_version: The maximum protocol version supported.¶
deprecated_versions: A list of versions that are supported but deprecated.¶
Agents MUST negotiate a mutually supported version before initiating capability usage.¶
A negotiation session is initiated when an agent requires a capability that it does not possess but has identified in another agent's advertisement.¶
The initiating agent sends a Negotiation Request specifying the desired capability type and parameters.¶
The target agent responds with a Negotiation Response indicating willingness to negotiate.¶
A session_id is established for tracking the negotiation.¶
Sessions have a configurable timeout (default: 60 seconds) and MUST be explicitly closed by either party.¶
Once a session is established:¶
When both parties agree on terms:¶
A Capability Agreement is created containing the final terms, signed by both parties using JWS [RFC7515].¶
The agreement includes a unique agreement_id, the agreed capability parameters, duration, and any usage constraints.¶
Both agents MUST honor the agreement until its expiration or explicit revocation.¶
Either party MAY initiate re-negotiation of an active agreement when:¶
Resource availability changes.¶
New constraints are imposed by external factors.¶
The original terms are no longer adequate.¶
Re-negotiation follows the same offer/counter-offer protocol but references the existing agreement_id.¶
The following capability types are defined as initial entries in the capability registry:¶
| Type ID | Category | Description |
|---|---|---|
| compute.inference | Compute | Model inference execution |
| compute.transform | Compute | Data transformation and processing |
| knowledge.domain | Knowledge | Domain-specific expertise |
| knowledge.retrieval | Knowledge | Information retrieval from knowledge bases |
| tool.api | Tool Access | External API integration |
| tool.execution | Tool Access | Tool or script execution |
| authz.delegate | Authorization | Delegated authorization scope |
| authz.verify | Authorization | Credential and permission verification |
Organizations MAY define custom capability types using a reverse domain name prefix (e.g., "com.example.custom-capability"). Custom capability types:¶
Consensus and capability negotiation events MUST be recorded in the Execution Chain Trace (ECT) framework defined in [I-D.nennemann-wimse-ect] to provide a verifiable audit trail.¶
The following exec_act values are defined for consensus operations:¶
consensus_propose: Records the submission of a proposal. The ECT node MUST include the proposal_id, proposer identity, and proposal summary.¶
consensus_vote: Records a vote cast by an agent. The ECT node MUST include the proposal_id, voter identity, decision, and rationale (if provided).¶
consensus_commit: Records the outcome of a consensus round. The ECT node MUST include the proposal_id, final tally, outcome (commit or abort), and the leader's signature.¶
Capability negotiation events are recorded using the ECT ext (extension) claims mechanism:¶
The ext claim MUST include a "capability_negotiation" object containing the session_id, capability type, and negotiation outcome.¶
Agreement creation and revocation events MUST each produce an ECT node with the agreement_id and relevant terms.¶
Re-negotiation events MUST reference the original agreement_id and include both the previous and updated terms.¶
To prevent an attacker from creating multiple fake agent identities to influence consensus outcomes:¶
Agents MUST authenticate using verifiable credentials bound to their operational identity.¶
The leader MUST verify agent identities before accepting votes.¶
Consensus mechanisms SHOULD incorporate identity verification scores that penalize newly registered or unverified agents.¶
Rate limiting on agent registration prevents rapid creation of sybil identities.¶
The consensus mechanisms defined in this document do not provide full Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT). Deployments requiring BFT guarantees SHOULD:¶
Use weighted consensus with trust scores that reflect agent reliability history.¶
Implement cross-validation of votes through independent verification channels.¶
Set quorum thresholds to at least 2f+1 where f is the maximum number of potentially faulty agents.¶
Consider established BFT protocols (e.g., PBFT) as an alternative consensus mechanism for high-security environments.¶
Agents MUST NOT advertise capabilities they do not possess. Mitigations include:¶
Capability advertisements MUST be signed using the agent's verified credentials.¶
Consumers SHOULD validate capability claims through test invocations before relying on them for critical operations.¶
Agents that fail to deliver advertised capabilities MUST have their trust scores reduced.¶
Repeated capability spoofing SHOULD result in exclusion from future consensus rounds and negotiation sessions.¶
To detect coordinated manipulation of consensus outcomes:¶
Vote patterns SHOULD be analyzed for statistical anomalies (e.g., identical rationales, synchronized timing).¶
Agents SHOULD be required to submit votes independently without knowledge of other agents' votes until the tally is complete (sealed-bid voting).¶
The ECT audit trail enables post-hoc analysis of voting patterns to identify potential collusion.¶
Human operators SHOULD be notified when anomalous voting patterns are detected.¶
This document requests registration of the following exec_act values in the ECT exec_act registry:¶
| Value | Description | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| consensus_propose | Agent submits a consensus proposal | This document |
| consensus_vote | Agent casts a vote on a proposal | This document |
| consensus_commit | Leader commits or aborts a consensus round | This document |
The author thanks the contributors to the NMOP working group discussions on AI agent orchestration and multi-agent coordination challenges.¶